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A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S
THIS BOOK is about Puerto Rican migration to the United States. I argue that 
migration is an integral part of the island’s history since 1898, that is, since 
the United States took over Puerto Rico as a consequence of the War of 1898 
with Spain. Moreover, the book focuses specifically on the role that the Puerto 
Rican government played in the process of migration in the postwar period, 
particularly during the years between 1947 and 1960. These years represent the 
“big wave” of Puerto Rican migration during the twentieth century.
I am a political scientist by training. When asked why a political scientist 
is engaged in the study of migration, a realm usually left to sociologists and 
anthropologists, I usually respond that this subject is one of the most impor-
tant political phenomena in twentieth-century Puerto Rico. U.S. and Puerto 
Rican government functionaries espoused migration as an alternative to what 
they perceived was the island’s most significant problem: overpopulation. 
Puerto Rican migration to the United States is directly related to U.S. colonial 
policies on the island, including the granting of citizenship to its residents in 
1917. It is best understood as a colonial migration—that is, within the context 
and framework of U.S. colonialism and citizenship in Puerto Rico during the 
twentieth century. This should make the topic of Puerto Rican migration to 
the United States an eminently political subject for research and study.
Migration was also an integral part of Puerto Rican politics in the 1940s 
and in later years, as is widely discussed in the book. Furthermore, migra-
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tion policy—a central topic in this study—reflects an issue of importance for 
the government’s decision-making process and the political leadership that 
managed it at the time (the Popular Democratic Party, or PPD). Migration 
and migration policy were also at the center of the process of reform of the 
Puerto Rican government during the late 1940s. As argued throughout the 
book, migration was as important for PPD and U.S. policy makers as was eco-
nomic policy and the island’s political status issue at that time. The book also 
focuses on the implementation of the government’s migration policy. One of 
the book’s goals is to provide an understanding of the profound impact that 
migration had on Puerto Rican society in areas like education and air trans-
portation, subjects which have remained unexplored until today. The book 
also points to areas where Puerto Rico’s migration policy influenced the devel-
opment of Puerto Rican communities in the United States with programs like 
farm placement for agricultural workers and institutions like the Migration 
Division.
Like all other academic texts, this book has benefitted from the support 
and assistance of many people. I am most grateful to all of them. Many of 
the primary documents used in this book come from the Archivo General de 
Puerto Rico (AGPR—Puerto Rico’s General Archives) in San Juan. Numerous 
individuals helped me during my research at the AGPR. My deepest thanks 
go particularly to archivist Pedro Roig, whose knowledge and devotion to his 
work made my time here as productive as it could be. María Isabel Rodríguez, 
archivist of the AGPR photographic collection, facilitated finding most of the 
photos included in the book.
I also carried out research at the Library and Archives of the Center for 
Puerto Rican Studies (Centro), housed in Hunter College–CUNY in New 
York City. My heartfelt gratitude to senior archivist Pedro Juan Hernández, 
whose knowledge of the archives furthered my research there. Also to librar-
ian Félix Rivera, as well as to all the other members of the Centro Library, for 
supporting my work there.
Many days I have spent using the resources—particularly the invaluable 
collection of newspapers, government reports, and books—of the Colección 
Puertorriqueña (the Puerto Rican Collection) in the General Library of the 
University of Puerto Rico at Río Piedras. My thanks to all of those there who 
have helped me throughout the years in this and other research projects, par-
ticularly to its director, María Ordoñez. My appreciation also to the staff of the 
Fundación Luis Muñoz Marín in San Juan, who provided assistance in using 
its premier collection of documents, and particularly to the director of the 
documents section, Julio Quirós.
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The research for this book began many years ago while I was still in the 
Department of Political Science at the University of Puerto Rico. I would like 
to acknowledge the School of Social Sciences and the department for sup-
porting the initial research and writing for this book with a sabbatical leave. 
The research and writing for most of this book was done while at Hunter 
College, where I have been a faculty member since 2009. The administration 
here has always supported my work for this book. My gratitude to President 
Jennifer Raab and particularly to Provost Vita Rabinowitz for granting me the 
support and resources to advance this project. I would like to recognize also 
the support given to me by the School of Arts and Sciences and the Depart-
ment of Africana and Puerto Rican/Latino Studies at Hunter College. Also 
at Hunter College, the Center for Puerto Rican Studies (Centro) has pro-
vided significant support to my research and invaluable editorial assistance 
since I came here. I am indebted to Centro copy editor Ryan Morgan, who 
had the patience and perseverance to read and edit the initial version of the 
manuscript.
My gratitude to several colleagues and friends who have supported me 
all through the duration of this book project by reading chapters of the book, 
either in the previous or current version of the manuscript, or by sharing ideas 
that benefitted the book through multiple conversations about my undertak-
ing. Special thanks to my dear friend and colleague Angel Israel Rivera Ortiz, 
who read most of the latest version of the manuscript and helped me to clarify 
the text and many ideas. Others who provided guidance and support through-
out include Edwin Meléndez, Carlos Vargas, José Cruz, Pedro Cabán, Ismael 
García, Victor Torres, Jorge Duany, and Xavier Totti.
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A B B R E V I A T I O N S
M O S T O F the primary documents used in this book come from Puerto 
Rico’s General Archives (Archivo General de Puerto Rico; to be abbreviated 
as AGPR), particularly from the Governor’s Office File (Fondo Oficina del 
Gobernador; to be abbreviated as FOG). In endnotes, the full reference to this 
source, particularly for the fund I used the most (Tarea 96–20) (e.g., AGPR, 
Fondo Oficina del Gobernador, tarea 9620, box xxx), will be quoted as AGPR, 
FOG 96–20, xxx.
Another important source of documents used in this book comes from 
the archives of the Luis Muñoz Marín Foundation (Archivo de la Fundación 
Luis Muñoz Marín; to be abbreviated as AFLMM). A full reference from this 
source—for example, AFLMM, Section IV, Series 2, Subseries 9, Department 
of Labor, Folder 277, doc. 23—will be quoted as AFLMM IV:2, Sub. 9, folder 
277, doc. 23.
Other abbreviations used throughout the book are as follows:
BEM: Bureau of Employment and Migration, Puerto Rico Department of Labor
Comm. Labor: Commissioner of Labor
EDA: Economic Development Administration, or Fomento
FPP: Farm Placement Program
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GPR: Government of Puerto Rico
OGPRUS: Office of the Government of Puerto Rico in the United States, 
Center for Puerto Rican Studies Library and Archives
PPD: Partido Popular Democrático (Popular Democratic Party)
USES: United States Employment Service
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
Migration in the Periphery of Empire
IT  IS  QUITE  significant that in the years close to the commemoration of the 
centennial of the Jones Act and the grant of U.S. citizenship to Puerto Ricans 
by Congress in 1917, most news regarding Puerto Rico in the local, U.S., and 
global media is related to the worst economic crisis the island has experienced 
since the 1930s. While Puerto Ricans argue about the turmoil created by the 
Puerto Rican government’s seemingly unpayable public debt and its related 
financial crisis, the second news item widely debated in the local media is 
the continued discussion regarding the increasing number of Puerto Ricans 
leaving the island for the United States as a result of this economic situation. 
According to academic and government reports, Puerto Rican migration in 
the twenty-first century is comparable in terms of volume and magnitude to 
the one experienced during the period of the “great wave of migration” from 
the late 1940s to the early 1960s. At that time, an average of forty thousand 
people left the island for the United States; in 2014 the net migration was esti-
mated to be sixty-four thousand.1 In the United States, news regarding Puerto 
Rico is dominated by the same two issues: the economic collapse of the island 
and its related fiscal crisis, and the continued and increasing migration of 
Puerto Ricans to the U.S. mainland.2
This is not Puerto Rico’s first economic crisis since the United States occu-
pied the territory in 1898, nor is it the first time Puerto Ricans have moved 
to the U.S. mainland in large numbers as a consequence of economic turmoil 
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on the island. But to fully comprehend the issue of Puerto Rican migration to 
the United States, one must understand the complexities of U.S. rule in Puerto 
Rico ever since the island was taken as war booty at the end of the Spanish-
American War. In 1901 the U.S. Supreme Court declared Puerto Rico to be an 
“unincorporated territory,” a novel legal and political category in more than 
one hundred years of U.S. territorial expansion and incorporation. This dec-
laration legitimized the U.S. colonial regime implanted on the island by Con-
gress in 1900. In 1917 Congress granted U.S. citizenship to Puerto Ricans. One 
of the most important consequences of this act was to uphold the unrestricted 
entry of Puerto Ricans to the United States. Thus, colonialism, citizenship, and 
migration are interrelated elements of the Puerto Rican experience and have 
been important in shaping the lives of Puerto Ricans—whether on the island 
or on the U.S. mainland—since 1898.
Migration to the United States has been an integral part of the history of 
Puerto Ricans since the beginning of the twentieth century. The civilian colo-
nial government established by the United States in 1900 through the Foraker 
Act promoted migration as a mechanism to solve what colonial administrators 
concluded was the island’s major problem: overpopulation. Migration to the 
United States increased significantly after the grant of citizenship in 1917. From 
the late 1940s to the early 1960s, over half a million Puerto Ricans migrated 
to the United States. By 2006, more than half of all Puerto Ricans lived on the 
U.S. mainland. Puerto Rican migration is characterized by the movement of 
citizens from a U.S. unincorporated (i.e., colonial) territory to the main juris-
dictional boundaries of the American polity. Puerto Rican migration to the 
United States therefore needs to be understood as a colonial migration, that is, 
within the context of U.S. colonialism and citizenship in Puerto Rico.
One important aspect of this experience is the very active role that the 
government of Puerto Rico played in this process from the late 1940s to the 
mid-1970s. While the governments of many nation-states in the late twentieth 
century—like many in Latin America and the Caribbean—have engaged in 
the promotion of migration and in the incorporation of their citizens in the 
host society, what is peculiar to the Puerto Rican experience is that Puerto 
Rico is an unincorporated territory of the United States, not an independent 
nation-state, and Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens. The Puerto Rican migration 
experience is particular, then, in that it presents a case where the government 
of a non-nation-state was engaged in promoting the migration and incorpora-
tion of its people to the metropolis of which they are technically citizens. To 
achieve its goals of organizing migration, Puerto Rico’s government formu-
lated and implemented its own migration policy.
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Puerto Rico’s migration policy was influenced by the ideas and policies 
adopted by civic and political institutions in the United States—particularly in 
New York City—toward Puerto Rican migrants, as well as by actions and ideas 
of U.S. and Puerto Rican policy makers managing Puerto Rico’s affairs. The 
Puerto Rican government played an important role in the social and politi-
cal incorporation of its migrants in the United States as part of its migration 
project. The policies and practices of Puerto Rico’s government—the creation 
of the Bureau of Employment and Migration (BEM) in San Juan, the Migra-
tion Division in the United States, and the Farm Placement Program (FPP), 
for example—are crucial factors in understanding migration from Puerto Rico 
and Puerto Rican incorporation and community formation in the United 
States in the postwar period.
The Puerto Rican migration experience must be included in the study 
of the long and complex history of migrations to the United States. Recent 
major studies of the American migration experience do not pay due attention 
to the study of a colonial migration to the United States.3 One reason for this 
situation is that the Puerto Rican experience poses a set of questions that are 
not easy to answer, and this may lead to its exclusion from more comprehen-
sive studies of U.S. migrations: Are Puerto Ricans internal migrants or are 
they immigrants? Are they traditional immigrants or transnational migrants? 
What is the role played by U.S. citizenship and colonialism in the migration 
of Puerto Ricans to the United States? If Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens, why 
did the government of Puerto Rico have to play a role in their incorporation 
in the United States? In other words, the Puerto Rican migration experience 
does not fit with the traditional perspectives applied to the study of migrations 
to the United States.
THE STUDY OF PUERTO RICO’S MIGRATION POLICY
This book will focus on the role that Puerto Rico’s government played in the 
migration experience of Puerto Ricans, particularly in the development of 
its migration policy and its specific actions to promote the incorporation of 
Puerto Rican migrants in the United States during 1940s and 1950s, the period 
displaying the largest migration wave in the twentieth century. The study of 
Puerto Rico’s migration policy has not been extensive so far, although it was 
an important element of the Puerto Rican migration experience, as the central 
chapters of this book will maintain. I depart from previous studies of Puerto 
Rican migration policy, particularly from theories that seek to explain migra-
tion policy as a reaction to the individual decisions of migrants to relocate 
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abroad, or that suggest that migration policy is simply a consequence of socio-
economic structural processes.
The former perspective—migration policy as a reaction to the spontane-
ous migration of individuals—was the official policy of the Puerto Rican gov-
ernment since the enactment of the 1947 migration law. This perspective was 
disseminated in the academic arena by Clarence Senior, an adviser to Puerto 
Rico’s government on issues of migration and director of the Puerto Rican 
Department of Labor’s Migration Division for many years. During and after 
his work with the Puerto Rican government, Senior wrote extensively trying 
to explain Puerto Rican migration to the U.S. public, always maintaining the 
Puerto Rican government’s view that “the government neither encourages nor 
discourages migration.” Following a traditional push and pull theory of migra-
tion, Senior argued that Puerto Rico’s migration was caused by the island’s 
overpopulation and lack of jobs, which forced individuals to move to the 
United States, where jobs were available. The government’s migration policy 
came as a reaction to the abuses by labor contractors or to aid individuals who 
migrated on their own in their insertion in the new society—that is, to man-
age the two migrant flows from the island: individual migrants and organized 
migration.4 Senior contended that the strong reaction in the United States 
to the entry of Puerto Ricans after 1947 was due to racism and a traditional 
antagonism toward immigrants. In that sense, he argued, Puerto Rican migra-
tion followed the traditional pattern of incorporation of previous immigrants.5
In reaction to this official view of migration presented by the Puerto Rican 
government, a structural perspective on Puerto Rican migration emerged in 
the 1970s spearheaded by the work of the newly created Centro de Estudios 
Puertorriqueños (Center for Puerto Rican Studies) in New York City. That 
perspective was particularly related to the works of two scholars directly 
linked to Centro, director Frank Bonilla and researcher Ricardo Campos. This 
structural, neo-Marxist approach was first presented in the groundbreaking 
Labor Migration under Capitalism: The Puerto Rican Experience, produced by 
Centro’s History Task Force.6 The book posed a very critical review of the 
official perspective on migration, arguing that Puerto Rican migration—like 
all contemporary migrations—had to be understood as a consequence of the 
process of capitalist accumulation at a global level. Puerto Rican migration 
thus represented the movement of labor from one area of capitalist accu-
mulation to another. Historical peculiarities of the Puerto Rican case—like 
colonialism—had to be incorporated into this analysis, but the Puerto Rican 
experience followed the rules of labor migration under the structure of world 
capitalist accumulation. In the book, only a few cursory remarks are made on 
the role of the Puerto Rican government in the management of the island’s 
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migration. It can be deduced from this analysis that politics and state policies, 
including migration policy, follow the dictates of capitalism.
Bonilla and Campos expanded the perspective introduced in Labor Migra-
tion for many years. They nonetheless maintained the perspective on migra-
tion advanced in the book and paid little attention to the role that the Puerto 
Rican government played in the management of the island’s migration.7 I 
share Bonilla and Campos’s view in explaining migration by structural forces, 
but I think that it is still very important to include the role played by the 
colonial state in the organization and management of Puerto Rican migra-
tion to the United States. Migration was not a creation of the Puerto Rican 
colonial state, of course. However, once it was deemed a “problem” that had 
to be dealt with, the colonial state played a very important role in the lives of 
migrants by encouraging and organizing migration, expanding the air trans-
portation infrastructure to facilitate the movement of migrants, carrying a 
process of migrant selectivity, channeling them into specific locations in the 
United States, becoming an intermediary between laborers and contractors, 
facilitating their incorporation in the United States, taking their defense in 
labor disputes with American employers, and even confronting the federal 
government in defending the rights of Puerto Ricans as U.S. citizens to be 
treated as domestic labor with preferential access for jobs before alien work-
ers. By focusing on the structural forces that promote migration, this perspec-
tive has placed a very limited emphasis on the important role played by the 
Puerto Rican government in this process.
The only work that until now has focused on the formulation of Puerto 
Rico’s migration policy is historian Michael Lapp’s excellent 1991 doctoral dis-
sertation on the Migration Division in New York. Lapp’s study provides the 
most comprehensive study of Puerto Rico’s migration policy to date.8 It is, 
nevertheless, limited by a lack of examination of primary documents from 
archival sources in Puerto Rico that render a different perspective on the 
formulation of migration policy and the political factors that influenced this 
process. Furthermore, by arguing that migration policy in the late 1940s was 
the result of “technocratic” imperatives and policy makers, Lapp presents an 
inaccurate view not only as to why migration policy was formulated but also 
on who formulated it. By focusing on the creation and programs of the Migra-
tion Division in New York, Lapp overstates the role of Senior.9 For the most 
part, he overlooks the workings of the Department of Labor’s BEM, to which 
the Migration Division was subordinated and which organized and directed 
the movement of workers from Puerto Rico to the United States; the Division 
took care of migrants once they were in the United States, but always under 
the directives of the San Juan office. In neglecting this point, Lapp implies 
All Rights Reserved. Copyright © The Ohio State University Press, 2017. Batch 1.
6 •  I N T R O D U C T I O N 
that the formulation of migration policy was not an important policy issue 
to the rising governing party, the Popular Democratic Party (Partido Popular 
Democrático—PPD). I will sustain in later chapters that migration was indeed 
a fundamental issue for the PPD and its main leader, Luis Muñoz Marín. It 
was Muñoz Marín and his inner circle (which did not include Senior) who 
debated, formulated, and implemented the government’s migration policy. 
Puerto Rico’s migration policy was originally formulated and later imple-
mented by the Commissioner of Labor, Fernando Sierra Berdecía. For Muñoz 
Marín and the PPD, migration was as fundamental a government issue as 
economic development and the island’s political status issue. In fact, I will 
argue throughout the book that these three policy areas were directly related 
to one another.
PUERTO RICAN MIGRATION AND TRANSNATIONALISM
International migration is a central phenomenon of the expansion of the 
global economy and of recent changes in the relationships between states. 
Transnational migrations—where immigrants maintain social, economic, and 
political relationships with the home country—are an important element of 
modern global migration studies.10 A key element of the transnational phe-
nomenon is the role played by the homeland state in the promotion of migra-
tion and in the incorporation of its citizens in the host society.11 Thus, one 
important aspect of the migration projects of these homeland states involves 
the elaboration and implementation of migration policies. Eva Ostergaard-
Nielsen emphasizes the importance of migration policies by sending states: 
“Migration policy stands out as a policy area because it is a transnational issue 
which spans the borders between states, blurs the distinction between domes-
tic and foreign policy, goes to the heart of the two-way relationship of obliga-
tions and rights between state and citizens.”12 If Ostergaard-Nielsen is right, 
if migration policy is a clear sign of a transnational issue by a nation-state, 
then how to explain the fact that the Puerto Rican government, a U.S. colonial 
state, elaborated and sustained a migration policy to promote the migration 
and incorporation of Puerto Ricans—technically U.S. citizens—to the United 
States? Even if the Puerto Rican migration experience is not considered as 
transnational, it resembles aspects that are proposed in the literature on politi-
cal transnationalism with regard to the issue of migration policy and the role 
of the state in managing migration.13
Although the Puerto Rican case has been excluded from the comparative 
analysis of major scholars using the transnational perspective, some scholars 
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have argued that the Puerto Rican experience should be studied as a transna-
tional case even though Puerto Rico is not a nation-state and Puerto Ricans 
are U.S. citizens. Well-known anthropologist Jorge Duany, for example, con-
tends that even if the Puerto Rican case is characterized as a colonial migra-
tion, it can be understood as a transnational one.14 Other scholars have also 
argued that Puerto Rican migration and community formation in the United 
States must be understood as a transnational experience.15 The Puerto Rican 
case has been compared to other experiences of Latin American transnation-
alism in the United States.16
In Puerto Rican Nation on the Move, Duany emphasizes the importance 
of migration for Puerto Ricans and the linkages between the island and its 
diaspora in the United States. He also studies the role of the Puerto Rican 
government in the promotion and management of migration to the United 
States.17 But Duany avoids the question of why the Puerto Rican government 
had to engage in such a peculiar role. Furthermore, he follows Lapp’s argu-
ment that Puerto Rico’s migration policy was mostly designed by Senior,18 
a mistaken notion that, as I have just argued, has important historical and 
analytical connotations. In later writings, including his excellent Blurred Bor-
ders, Duany has expanded his framework of study of Puerto Rican migra-
tion. He has compared Puerto Rican migration to the Dominican and Cuban 
transnational migrations to the United States, arguing that the former is an 
example of “colonial transnationalism.” Making comparisons to the experi-
ence of other transnational countries, Duany points to the role the Puerto 
Rican government played in migration, calling it a “transnational colonial 
state.”19
But even after Duany’s very incisive examination of Puerto Rican migra-
tion, his work still raises an important question: can a migration of citizens 
from a colonial territory to the metropolitan homeland be considered as 
transnational?20 The argument made by Duany and other scholars to define 
the Puerto Rican experience as a transnational one is that although Puerto 
Ricans do cross social, economic, and cultural borders, they do not cross 
national political boundaries. Are Puerto Ricans transnational migrants? Not 
in the sense that they have to cross international borders, which is the widely 
accepted definition in this field. But neither can they be considered as tradi-
tional internal migrants to the United States. For Puerto Rican policy mak-
ers, the island migrants, although U.S. citizens, were moving to the United 
States from an “ethnologically different” society, like the European immi-
grants before them. The goal of easing their incorporation and assimilation 
into American society was one of the reasons that justified the Puerto Rican 
government’s migration policy.21
All Rights Reserved. Copyright © The Ohio State University Press, 2017. Batch 1.
8 •  I N T R O D U C T I O N 
How, though, can the migration of citizens from a colonial territory paral-
lel a transnational migration, which is supposed to involve relations between 
nation-states and the movement of peoples from one state to another as immi-
grants? As I have argued elsewhere,22 while it is true that some significant 
political aspects discussed by the transnational perspective are similar to the 
Puerto Rican experience, this unusual condition needs to be explained as a 
consequence of Puerto Rico’s and Puerto Ricans’ constitutional and political 
positioning on the periphery of American empire. The transnational paradigm 
was not developed to understand colonial migrations; there are several factors 
that limit the full application of the transnational framework to the under-
standing of colonial migrations like Puerto Rico’s (citizenship and free entry 
to the metropolis is one). Nevertheless, these scholars are right in pointing out 
that the Puerto Rican case does resemble a transnational migration in many 
ways. It certainly does in the role played by the colonial state in the migration 
experience of Puerto Ricans.
On the other hand, the role played by the colonial state in Puerto Rican 
migration makes this experience very different from any other internal migra-
tion in the United States. If Puerto Ricans are to be considered as internal 
migrants, why did Puerto Rico’s government take upon itself the role to pro-
tect its migrants in the United States and to facilitate their incorporation into 
American society and polity? As U.S. citizens, were not they already incorpo-
rated into the American polity? If Puerto Rican migration is to be regarded as 
an internal migration, then it has no parallel with other internal migrations in 
the United States. There is no evidence that state governments played a major 
role in the migration process or in the protection of their migrants elsewhere 
in the United States, taking actions to facilitate their social, economic, politi-
cal, and cultural incorporation outside of their jurisdictions.
The role of the Puerto Rican colonial state in migration also raises ques-
tions regarding the nature of the Puerto Rican colonial state within the Amer-
ican polity and the nature of U.S. citizenship for Puerto Ricans. The particular 
arrangement of the Puerto Rican colonial state within the U.S. polity (as one 
representing the peoples of an unincorporated territory) and the distinct con-
struct of U.S. citizenship for Puerto Ricans (as one diminished by the colonial 
territory and formulated early in the twentieth century based on the notion 
that these subjects were “alien” to the American polity) made them appear 
foreign to the United States not only culturally but also politically, thus mak-
ing the Puerto Rican migration experience look like a transnational one in 
many ways.
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I agree with Duany and others that the Puerto Rican migration experi-
ence has many attributes similar to those of transnational migrations, par-
ticularly with aspects related to political transnationalism. But characterizing 
it as “colonial transnationalism” does not provide a fuller understanding of 
this migration experience. Puerto Ricans do not move from one nation-state 
to another, so there is no need to acquire the host state citizenship and all that 
this entails in terms of incorporation, identity, and so on. There is no need for 
dual citizenship and all that implies in terms of relationship with the home 
state. There are no obstacles to returning since the homeland territory is under 
the jurisdiction and sovereignty of the metropolitan state, which explains the 
much noticed back and forth or circular migration among Puerto Ricans. 
While Duany underscores the transnational nature of Puerto Rican migra-
tion, one with a colonial character, I rather emphasize the colonial nature of 
Puerto Rican migration, one that because of the specific context of U.S. colo-
nialism in Puerto Rico seems like a transnational migration. It is a migration 
that has been shaped by a specific kind of U.S. citizenship that, according 
to the Supreme Court in Balzac v. the People of Porto Rico, is limited by the 
colonial territory where Puerto Ricans live—a diminished and problematic 
metropolitan citizenship, but one that has allowed Puerto Ricans to enter the 
U.S. territory with no legal obstacles. This is something that transnational 
migrants do not experience.
Puerto Rican migration to the United States seems like a transnational 
migration largely due the particular construction of U.S. colonialism in Puerto 
Rico. The territory was defined by congressional acts and by the Supreme 
Court in the Insular Cases as “foreign in a domestic sense” to the United States 
(the unincorporated territory), a status that has persisted even after Congress 
granted citizenship to Puerto Ricans in 1917. The widespread notion among 
the American elite that Puerto Ricans were “alien” to the United States due to 
their ethnic and cultural characteristics and their presumed low level of civi-
lization provided the basis for defining the territory as unincorporated and 
outside the boundaries of the American polity. This territorial status allowed 
the exclusion of Puerto Ricans from citizenship for many years. But even after 
Puerto Ricans became citizens, the idea that they were somehow alien to the 
United States remained an integral notion to the character of the citizenship 
that they were granted in 1917.23 Although other historical factors have to be 
considered as well, citizenship allowed Puerto Ricans unrestricted access to 
the U.S. mainland. But even as citizens, Puerto Ricans moving to the United 
States were regarded for many decades as alien or foreign in character and 
nature to the United States and not as full members of the American polity.24
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U.S. EMPIRE STUDIES AND PUERTO RICAN MIGRATION
I argue in this book that Puerto Rican migration to the United States has to 
be understood as a colonial migration—that is, as a migration of U.S. citi-
zens coming from a colonial (unincorporated) territory of the United States, 
which highlights the importance of understanding the relationship between 
U.S. colonialism, citizenship and migration in the Puerto Rican experience. 
Herein lies what might be the most important contribution of studying Puerto 
Rican migration to the United States: it is the most significant case of a migra-
tion of citizens from the colonial periphery of overseas territories to the U.S. 
mainland.25
Puerto Ricans and Puerto Rico occupy a liminal position within the Amer-
ican polity. Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens who, because of their linguistic and 
cultural characteristics, are seen as foreigners in the United States. Although 
citizens, their territory is still defined as “foreign in a domestic sense,” accord-
ing to a U.S. Supreme Court 1901 ruling. Their migration to the U.S. mainland 
reflects this confounding status. This might be why American academia in the 
postwar period was not capable of understanding the character of this migra-
tion and of the new migrants, placing their experience within the traditional 
framework of European migrations and concluding repeatedly that they were 
destined to fail in their incorporation to American society, contrary to the 
experience of previous “traditional immigrants.”26 Today, scholars trying to 
place the Puerto Rican experience within the transnational framework face 
a similar analytical predicament: although Puerto Rican migration presents 
some elements that resemble a transnational migration, it does not fit ade-
quately within a perspective that focuses on the movement of immigrants 
from one nation-state to another.
Given that the framework of this book seeks to understand migration 
within the context of U.S. colonialism and citizenship in Puerto Rico, this 
book benefits from and seeks to expand the literature on U.S. empire. The 
hundredth anniversary of U.S. colonialism in the Caribbean and the Pacific 
after the Spanish-American War of 1898 and later the war in Iraq expanded 
the interest and the introspection of studying the United States as an empire. 
The works of distinguished scholars like William Appleman Williams and 
Walter LaFeber, among many others, point to the notable tradition of study-
ing the American imperial venture.27 However, the emphasis of these scholars 
was mostly on “U.S. imperialism,” that is, a focus on the economic, political, 
and military expansion of the United States outside its borders. They mostly 
centered on the study of U.S. diplomacy and followed either the parameters of 
traditional history or Marxism, with its heavy emphasis on economic interests 
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and the exploitation of colonies or neocolonies.28 But beginning in the 1990s, 
a new generation of U.S. scholars began to examine other factors in the char-
acter of U.S. empire: race, gender, class, and culture, among others. They also 
began to accentuate U.S. empire from the inside, that is, on the consequences 
of empire for American society.
The work that is usually cited in the resurgence of studying U.S. empire 
is Cultures of United States Imperialism, a volume edited by Amy Kaplan and 
Donald Pease.29 The book questioned the myth of “American exceptionalism,” 
that is, that contrary to the European great powers, the United States never 
became an empire. It also aimed at putting culture in its widest sense (race, 
gender, identity, etc.) at the center of studies of U.S. empire. Furthermore, 
the book challenged the distinction between the foreign and the domestic as 
two separate fields of inquiry in studies of American society and focused on 
the consequences of empire back home.30 But, ironically, in a book devoted 
to “cultures of imperialism,” there is no essay devoted to Puerto Rico or to 
Puerto Ricans in the United States. In addition, in a book dedicated to ana-
lyzing the relationship between the “domestic” and the “foreign,” there is no 
inquiry regarding colonial migrations, that is, the movement of people from 
the colonial periphery to the metropolitan territory as a consequence of the 
imperial venture.31
A more recent and significant contribution to the study of U.S. empire 
is the volume edited by Alfred W. McCoy and Fransciso Scarano, Colonial 
Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American State. Like Kaplan 
and Pease, they question the idea of American imperial exceptionalism and 
the separation between the foreign and the domestic in U.S. affairs. The basic 
aim of the book is to present the consequences of empire on American soci-
ety, politics, state formation, and economics. The authors point to a contin-
uum between territorial expansion at home and overseas colonial expansion, 
between empire inside and empire outside the borders of the American pol-
ity.32 Notwithstanding the greater inclusion of inquiry on the consequences 
of empire than the Kaplan and Pease volume, the McCoy and Scarano book 
does not deal with one of the most visible consequences of empire for both 
the colonized and the metropolitan societies, with one relationship that clearly 
connects the two ends of the imperial divide and eclipses the divide between 
the foreign and the domestic in empire: the movement of people from the 
colonial periphery to the metropolitan territory.
In the last two decades, several scholars have applied the perspective of 
U.S. empire studies to the research on Puerto Rico and its relationship with 
the United States, including the construction and development of the colo-
nial state in the first half of the twentieth century and its relationship to U.S. 
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imperial policies;33 comparative studies of U.S. colonialism in Puerto Rico and 
the Philippines,34 and also of U.S. colonial policies throughout the American 
“imperial archipelago”;35 the reproductive policies imposed on Puerto Rican 
women by colonial structures and metropolitan private institutions;36 and the 
relationship between education and empire in Puerto Rico.37 The McCoy and 
Scarano volume includes essays on the consequences of U.S. empire in Puerto 
Rico in such areas as justice and law enforcement, education, militarization, 
citizenship, and national identity.38
One area of particular interest in the study of American empire has been 
the field of legal studies, particularly in the Supreme Court decisions known 
as the Insular Cases. The role played by the Supreme Court in the rationaliza-
tion and legitimization of the U.S. imperial presence in Puerto Rico has been 
carefully studied by several scholars.39 The status of Puerto Rico and Puerto 
Ricans in the American polity played an important role in the Insular Cases. 
Related to the latter, as it is also connected to U.S. colonialism in Puerto Rico, 
is the issue of American citizenship for Puerto Ricans. In this area, historians 
and legal scholars have examined the nature of this particular manifestation of 
citizenship and its relationship to U.S. colonialism in Puerto Rico.40
With few notable exceptions, the field of U.S. empire studies has not ade-
quately examined the subject of migration from the colonial periphery to the 
United States.41 Recently, several Filipino scholars have provided excellent 
accounts of the relationship between the construction of a colonial regime 
in the Philippines and the migration and incorporation of Filipinos in the 
United States.42 In the Puerto Rican case, Robert McGreevy has focused on the 
relationship between U.S. empire and Puerto Rican migration to the United 
States.43 This book seeks to expand on these studies of the American empire 
and its consequences abroad and at home, particularly as it relates to the topic 
of empire and colonial migrations. It sustains the importance of examining 
the relationship between U.S. colonialism and citizenship in Puerto Rico in 
order to provide a more comprehensive framework for the study of Puerto 
Rican migration to the United States.
MIGRATION, COLONIALISM, AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE 
PERIPHERY OF EMPIRE
The creation of a colonial periphery by the United States after it took over 
the island in 1898 is crucial to understanding Puerto Rican migration to U.S. 
mainland. Through congressional laws, executive policies, and Supreme Court 
decisions, the American state created a colonial periphery that subordinated 
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Puerto Rico and its people economically and politically and excluded the ter-
ritory in important political and constitutional areas of the American polity. 
In 1900 Congress implemented a colonial government on the island under the 
Foraker Act, an act deemed legal and constitutional by the Supreme Court in 
Downes v. Bidwell (1901) under the legal guise of the unincorporated territory. 
In 1917, the U.S. Congress granted Puerto Ricans a citizenship that came to 
be defined by the colonial relationship between Puerto Rico and the United 
States according to the Supreme Court in Balzac v. the People of Porto Rico 
(1922).
The issue of migration has been an important element of how the U.S. citi-
zenship of Puerto Ricans was defined and redefined throughout the twentieth 
century. After the United States took over the island in 1898, exclusion from 
citizenship for the new colonial subjects was at the center of congressional acts 
approved for Puerto Rico (the Treaty of Paris of 1898, the Foraker Act of 1900) 
and U.S. Supreme Court decisions, most importantly in Downes v. Bidwell. 
One reason for this exclusion was the fear among many U.S. policy makers 
that granting citizenship to the new colonial subjects would allow their unre-
stricted entry to the United States.
Under Article IX of the Treaty of Paris, Filipinos and Puerto Ricans (“the 
natives of the islands”) were excluded from both U.S. and Spanish citizenship, 
although Penínsulares (those born in Spain) retained their Spanish citizenship 
(and thus could become U.S. citizens through naturalization). In his influ-
ential report to Secretary of War Elihu Root on guidelines to a U.S. colonial 
policy, Charles Magoon argued that exclusion from citizenship could prevent 
the new colonial subjects from entering the United States.44 Senator Foraker 
included a clause making Puerto Ricans U.S. citizens in the first draft of his 
bill to create a colonial government in Puerto Rico in 1900. He later declared 
that he withdrew this clause from the bill in reaction to the strong opposition 
it generated; opponents argued that citizenship could imply “incorporation” of 
the territory to the United States and also limit congressional powers in ruling 
the newly conquered territories.45 The April 1900 Foraker Act excluded Puerto 
Ricans from U.S. citizenship and declared them to be “citizens of Porto Rico” 
(the name of the island was also changed).
Exclusion from citizenship was also at the center of a Supreme Court rul-
ing that justified U.S. colonialism and became the basis for the Insular Cases: 
Downes v. Bidwell. The opinions presented by Justices Henry Brown and 
Edward White were very influential in shaping U.S. policy toward the new 
territories. Although these two opinions differed greatly in important mat-
ters, there were nevertheless two issues where both were in agreement: the 
right of the United States to conquer foreign territories as a necessary means 
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to become a great power and the exclusion from the American polity of the 
peoples of the newly conquered territories.46 For both Brown and White, the 
exclusion of the new colonial subjects was justified by the ideas that they were 
alien in nature to the American polity and that they had no right to become 
members of the nation.
Justice Brown believed that the “power to acquire territory” would be 
curtailed if the United States was forced to incorporate these “savage” and 
“uncivilized” peoples as citizens. Congress would not accept the annexation of 
foreign territory if “its inhabitants, however foreign they may be to our hab-
its, traditions, and modes of life, shall become at once citizens of the United 
States.” He argued that the newly conquered territories differed from those 
previously annexed not only in terms of territorial contiguity but also on the 
differences in race and culture of its inhabitants (the latter territories had been 
settled by whites). According to Brown, the peoples of the newly acquired ter-
ritories would have their “natural rights” (life, freedoms, property) protected 
but not their “artificial” or “residual rights” (like the rights of citizenship and 
suffrage, and others “which are peculiar to Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence”). It 
was only after warning about the nefarious consequences of incorporating 
alien peoples into the union that Brown’s opinion stated its well-known ruling 
that “the island of Porto Rico is a territory appurtenant and belonging to the 
United States, but not a part of the United States.”47
Justice White argued that the central question in this case was this: “Had 
Porto Rico, at the time of the passage of the act in question, been incorporated 
into and become an integral part of the United States?” Like Brown, he argued 
that the right to conquer territory would be invalidated if its alien popula-
tion was incorporated as citizens by “the immediate bestowal of citizenship 
on those absolutely unfit to receive it.” White affirmed “how unwarranted is 
the principle of immediate incorporation,” stating that it was inconceivable 
that a treaty “by a mere cession can incorporate an alien people in to the 
United States without the express or implied approval of Congress.” His opin-
ion concluded that “while in an international sense Porto Rico was not a for-
eign country, since it was subject to the sovereignty of and was owned by the 
United States, it was foreign to the United States in a domestic sense, because 
the island had not been incorporated into the United States, but was merely 
appurtenant thereto as a possession.”48 Out of this opinion the doctrine of the 
unincorporated territory became part of U.S. jurisprudence; it has shaped the 
status of Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans within and without the American 
polity ever since.
Downes v. Bidwell said nothing about curtailing the entry of Puerto Ricans 
to the U.S. mainland. The U.S. government tried to control the entry of Puerto 
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Ricans and Filipinos to the United States when it extended in 1902 the regu-
lations of the 1891 immigration law to the inhabitants of these islands. On 
the basis of this interpretation of the law, the commissioner of immigration 
detained a Puerto Rican woman—Isabel González—and prevented her from 
entering New York by arguing that she would become a “public charge,” as 
established in the 1891 law. González not only fought the charge but argued 
that as a Puerto Rican, a U.S. subject living “under the jurisdiction of the 
United States,” she was a U.S. citizen. The U.S. government contended that it 
could prevent Puerto Ricans and Filipinos from entering the United States by 
declaring them as “aliens by birth and race” that could be excluded under the 
Chinese Exclusions laws approved by Congress and sustained by the Supreme 
Court.49 In 1904 the Supreme Court ruled in Gonzales v. Williams that Puerto 
Ricans, although not citizens, could enter the United States freely since they 
were not alien immigrants as the U.S. government argued in that case.50 After 
this decision, Puerto Ricans and Filipinos were acknowledged as U.S. “nation-
als” by the American government.
Puerto Ricans became U.S. citizens on April 1917 after a decade of debate 
within different sectors of the government. In 1916, Congress approved two 
Jones Acts, one for the Philippines and one for Puerto Rico. For Filipinos, it 
began a long transition toward independence during which they remained 
U.S. nationals. For Puerto Ricans, it entailed U.S. citizenship.51 After this con-
gressional act, several U.S.-appointed judges on the island ruled that this grant 
of citizenship had incorporated Puerto Rico to the United States and that all 
constitutional rights must apply in the territory. In Balzac v. the People of Porto 
Rico, the Supreme Court—in a unanimous ruling written by Chief Justice Wil-
liam Howard Taft in 1922—ruled that the people living in an unincorporated 
territory do not enjoy all the rights guaranteed to U.S. citizens: “It is locality 
that is determinative of the application of the Constitution in such matters 
as judicial procedure, and not the status of the people who live in it.” Another 
important ruling in Balzac was the affirmation that the granting of citizen-
ship to inhabitants of an unincorporated territory by itself was not a sign of 
its incorporation into the Union, as it had been prior to 1898. Taft reiterated 
one of Brown’s arguments used to deny citizenship and incorporation to ter-
ritories like Puerto Rico and the Philippines: territorial contiguity and the 
opportunity to be settled by whites. Race and cultural difference still remained 
important elements in denying incorporation and thus future statehood to the 
colonial territories.52
Balzac presented another important pronouncement that often goes unno-
ticed when this ruling is discussed: that moving to the “U.S. proper” was the 
most important additional right that Puerto Ricans would enjoy as U.S. citi-
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zens, and that once there they could “enjoy every right of any other citizen 
of the United States, civil, social and political. A citizen of the Philippines 
must be naturalized before he can settle and vote in this country.”53 Balzac 
affirms that the still-colonial subjects in the unincorporated territory would 
have their constitutional rights and membership in the American polity lim-
ited by Congress even though they were now citizens. That is, the restrictions 
imposed by the unincorporated territory on the constitutional rights of the 
colonial subjects remained as ruled in Downes. Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans 
still remained “foreign in a domestic sense.” On the other hand, what was 
intrinsically new in Balzac with regard to constitutional rights, as Taft stated 
twice, was the idea that Puerto Ricans, as citizens, could now have access to 
full political and civil constitutional rights when they moved within the right-
ful borders of the American polity.
The Filipino and Puerto Rican migration experiences in the United States 
share some similar elements, at least until 1917: both groups were defined as 
“alien” to the U.S. polity immediately after the U.S. occupation of their territo-
ries, and both were excluded from U.S. citizenship and defined as U.S. nation-
als for a time. The right of Puerto Ricans and Filipinos to enter the United 
States freely had been acknowledged in Gonzales v. Williams. After Congress 
approved a Jones Act for each territory (for the Philippines in 1916 and for 
Puerto Rico in 1917), their respective paths in relation to the United States 
differed greatly: under the Jones Act for the Philippines, Filipinos remained 
as U.S. nationals, and their migration to the U.S. territory would be restricted 
in later decades. After the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934, Congress imposed 
extremely restrictive quotas to the Philippines, essentially ending Filipino 
migration to the United States at that time; furthermore, repatriation was 
forced on Filipinos living in the United States. As Paul Kramer has argued, 
in their efforts to stop Filipino migration to the United States, American 
nativists played a significant role in getting Congress to grant independence 
to the Philippines in some undefined future; while not granting immediate 
independence to their country, this act made Filipinos “aliens within the U.S. 
Empire.”54 In Balzac, the U.S. Supreme Court underscored the right of U.S. 
citizens from the unincorporated territories to freely enter the U.S. territory.55 
In Balzac, as in Gonzales, the debate on the nature of U.S. citizenship for 
Puerto Ricans was related to their right to enter the U.S. mainland, that is, to 
migration. After 1917 migration from the colonial territories would be linked 
to the citizenship status of the colonial subjects. For all practical purposes, 
citizenship eventually became a requisite for migration from the U.S. colonial 
periphery to the metropolitan territory.
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Filipino migration to the United States was greatly curtailed in the 1930s, 
while Puerto Rican migration increased after the 1920s. The end of World War 
II also marked different paths for both nationalities: while the Philippines was 
granted independence by the United States in 1946, Puerto Rico remained 
a U.S. colonial territory. On the other hand, the end of the war marked the 
beginning of a great wave of migration from Puerto Rico to the U.S. mainland. 
While Filipinos and Puerto Ricans moved to the United States as colonial sub-
jects, since 1917 Puerto Ricans have migrated as colonial citizens. The fact that 
Puerto Ricans were U.S. citizens might be why the same forces in Congress—
represented by Senator Millard Tydings—that pushed for the independence of 
the Philippines in the 1930s failed in their attempt to do the same with Puerto 
Rico (in 1936 Tydings submitted a bill for Puerto Rico’s independence).
If Puerto Ricans’ new citizenship did not extend to their full incorpo-
ration as members of the American polity, why, then, were they made citi-
zens? According to José Cabranes, it was to guarantee the U.S. presence on the 
island and to secure U.S. strategic interests in the Caribbean, as well as to pre-
vent any future demand for independence at a moment when separatist fer-
vor was on the rise.56 For Efrén Rivera Ramos, citizenship was “imposed” on 
Puerto Ricans not to free these colonials subjects from colonialism but, to the 
contrary, to maintain colonialism on the island. To him, citizenship became 
the most important means of maintaining U.S. hegemony (in the Gramscian 
sense) in Puerto Rico.57
The two Jones Acts for the Philippines and Puerto Rico might also be 
seen as a formal shift in U.S. imperial policy from creating a formal empire to 
creating one of an informal character—that is, from the goal of owning and 
controlling overseas colonies in the mold of European powers to a more indi-
rect form of economic, political, and military domination over foreign coun-
tries. During this period, U.S. invasions of Caribbean and Central American 
countries reflected the new emphasis on gunboat diplomacy. There was never 
a complete agreement within the American elite on having colonial territories 
as the best means of projecting American economic, political, and military 
power abroad. Elihu Root, the architect of U.S. imperial policy as secretary of 
war, always opposed direct control of overseas territories; he also opposed the 
granting of citizenship to Puerto Ricans. In the coming decades, the United 
States took over other overseas territories through purchase or as spoils of 
World War II in the Caribbean and the Pacific. Many became unincorporated 
territories, and in all of these except for one, their populations became U.S. 
citizens, following the Puerto Rican model. All of these unincorporated terri-
tories were small islands with strategic value and relatively small populations. 
Puerto Rico would be the largest and most populated of all of them.58
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POSTWAR MIGRATION AND THE MEANING OF  
U.S. CITIZENSHIP IN PUERTO RICO
U.S. citizenship has impacted all areas of Puerto Rican society—political, eco-
nomic, social, cultural, and ideological—but perhaps none more than migra-
tion. If migration was fundamental in the transformation of Puerto Rican 
society after the end of World War II, then the transformative element of 
this citizenship for thousands of Puerto Ricans in their daily life has been felt 
nowhere more than in their right to migrate to the United States in search 
for jobs when none were available on the island. Citizenship guaranteed their 
right to free movement within the borders of the American nation-state. If 
economic and social factors might explain the causes of Puerto Rican migra-
tion to the United States, it is Puerto Rico’s political relationship with the 
United States and Puerto Ricans’ U.S. citizenship that explains the direction 
and the nature of their migration: the movement from a U.S. colonial terri-
tory to the metropolitan mainland by colonial subjects who happened to be 
U.S. citizens.
The colonial or territorial nature of U.S. citizenship in Puerto Rico influ-
enced the way Puerto Ricans migrated to the United States and the way they 
were incorporated into American society. It also influenced the manner in 
which the Puerto Rican government intervened in the organization of migra-
tion to the United States. Perhaps nothing reflects this more than the constant 
efforts of Puerto Rico’s government after 1947 to have federal agencies and 
U.S. agricultural employers recognize Puerto Rican farmworkers as domestic 
labor with preference on employment over foreign labor. Although they were 
U.S. citizens, for many years the federal government treated Puerto Ricans 
as alien labor along with Mexicans and West Indians. The meaning of “for-
eign in a domestic sense”—as Puerto Rico was declared to be in Downes v. 
Bidwell—extended outside the legal-constitutional and political realm: for 
several decades after the end of World War II, Puerto Ricans were treated as 
“foreign in a domestic sense” in the American labor market mostly because 
they came from a territory that had been defined as foreign to the U.S. consti-
tutionally and politically and also because they looked foreign to the United 
States culturally and ethnically. Puerto Rico’s government had to lobby the 
U.S. government intensely in order to have it recognize Puerto Rican workers 
as U.S. citizens so they could have preferential treatment before foreign labor 
in agricultural jobs.
After the end of World War II, the PPD leadership and government moved 
away from advocating independence for Puerto Rico and into a discourse of 
closer political and economic relations with the United States. In this process, 
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the PPD had to reinterpret its notion of the meaning of U.S. citizenship for 
Puerto Ricans: it was heralded as the strongest bond of “permanent union” 
with the United States in the Commonwealth Constitution in 1952. Migration 
played a part in redefining the meaning of citizenship for the poor and the 
working classes in Puerto Rico. The Puerto Rican masses had begun to use 
this citizenship right after the end of World War II in a different way than the 
elite: for them, a significant meaning of citizenship at that moment was their 
right to move to the U.S. mainland in search for jobs. It was the massive and 
rapid entry of Puerto Ricans to the city that created the “Puerto Rican prob-
lem” in New York in 1947, forcing Puerto Rico’s government to face this issue 
and later to formulate its migration policy. U.S. citizenship provided Puerto 
Ricans with the right to move freely to the United States and later gave the 
island government the tools to ease their incorporation into American society.
THE COLONIAL STATE AND  
PUERTO RICAN POSTWAR MIGRATION
As Taft stated in Balzac, to enjoy full citizenship rights, Puerto Ricans would 
have to move to “the United States proper.” And so they did, not necessarily 
looking to enhance their citizenship rights but in search of jobs that were not 
available in Puerto Rico. Citizenship had not changed the economic structure 
of the island, and the number of Puerto Ricans moving to the United States in 
search of jobs increased rapidly after 1917. Although they were now citizens, 
many sectors in the U.S. mainland—from policy makers to employers to land-
lords to white workers—still regarded Puerto Ricans moving to the United 
States as “citizens of Porto Rico,” that is, as culturally, racially, and politically 
alien or foreign to the United States, as colonial subjects that came from a ter-
ritory that was still not part of the United States, and not as full members of 
the nation.59
Despite the Americanization policies implemented during the first forty 
years of American rule on the island, the maintenance of linguistic and cul-
tural differences in Puerto Rico preserved a Puerto Rican national identity 
that manifested itself in the political arena. The economic and political crisis 
of colonialism in the 1930s was accompanied by a growing sense of cultural 
and political nationalism in Puerto Rico. This growing nationalism in a sense 
culminated in the cultural and political aspects that characterized the creation 
of the Commonwealth in 1952 as an autonomous political and cultural struc-
ture under U.S. sovereignty.
All Rights Reserved. Copyright © The Ohio State University Press, 2017. Batch 1.
20 •  I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Although it was within a U.S. colonial state, the Puerto Rican government 
became the representative of Puerto Ricans during the 1940s, particularly 
after the electoral victory of the PPD in 1940, the election of Muñoz Marín as 
the first elected governor of the island in 1948, and the creation of the Com-
monwealth in 1952. All of these changes and reforms to the colonial structure 
were sought and supported by the majority of Puerto Ricans and legitimized 
through successive elections. Its electoral hegemony and the U.S.-supported 
reforms in the 1940s and 1950s allowed the PPD-led colonial government in 
Puerto Rico to assert a “relative autonomy” over local economic, political, 
and policy areas, including migration. The Puerto Rican government—even 
before the Commonwealth status was created in 1952—became the organizer 
and sponsor of migration to the United States as a mechanism to provide 
stability to the colonial regime in Puerto Rico as well as to legitimize its own 
political authority. In doing so, the Puerto Rican government assumed the 
representation and protection of Puerto Rican migrants in the United States 
and strove to facilitate their incorporation in the U.S. mainland. The Puerto 
Rican government extended its reach to and established government struc-
tures on the U.S. mainland to provide services to its migrants and to facili-
tate their incorporation in the American polity simply because at the time no 
other state structure cared for them. Since Puerto Ricans’ U.S. citizenship did 
not imply de facto inclusion or full membership in the American polity, for 
several decades the Puerto Rican government assumed the task of promoting 
incorporation and providing representation for many island migrants in the 
United States.
This book focuses on the formulation and implementation of Puerto Rico’s 
migration policy in the postwar period. Migration became an important issue 
for U.S. and Puerto Rican policy makers after the end of World War II. Migra-
tion policy required a relatively vast space of action for the Puerto Rican gov-
ernment during this period. It involved the promotion and organization of 
migration through bureaucratic agencies like the BEM in San Juan and the 
Migration Division in the United States, both under the umbrella of the Labor 
Department. It also necessitated reaching other areas of Puerto Rican life, like 
education, air transportation and infrastructure, population control policy, 
tourism, and economic planning. Furthermore, Puerto Rican migration policy 
and politics cannot be divorced from what is traditionally understood as poli-
tics in Puerto Rico, usually seen from the perspective of the island’s political 
status, that is, its relationship with the United States. By the late 1940s and 
early 1950s, migration politics was status politics as the migration issue took 
a central position in the status debate at this time for Puerto Rican and U.S. 
policy makers.
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There are two issues regarding the book’s topic and perspective that call 
for further elaboration. First, this book focuses on the formulation and imple-
mentation of the Puerto Rican government’s migration policy, and hence its 
institutional focal point. I am in no way proposing or advocating a state-
centric approach exclusively to the study of migration or denying agency to 
migrants in defining the Puerto Rican migration experience. Policy issues deal 
with the actions and the ideas that guide such behavior by the state, in this 
case Puerto Rico’s government. As such, the book must focus on (colonial) 
state action in the specific field of migration. By concentrating on this here-
tofore underappreciated perspective, I am not denying migrant agency. On 
the contrary, my argument throughout the book is that once this mass migra-
tion was set in motion spurred by aggregate individual actions, Puerto Rico’s 
government intervened to manage, organize, and regulate this flow of people 
to the United States. The reasons for this course of action are the substance 
of this book. Puerto Rico’s government decided to take a more active role in 
migration only after the mass movement of Puerto Ricans to New York City 
beginning in 1946 produced the “Puerto Rican problem” there. It was people 
moving on their own to the U.S. mainland (what government officials called 
“individual migrants”) that led the government to take action to provide a 
modern air transportation infrastructure, to use the public school system to 
organize and regulate migration, and to try to ease the incorporation of its 
migrants in the U.S. mainland through the Migration Division. It was migrant 
discontent in the beet fields of Michigan in 1950 that led Puerto Rico’s gov-
ernment to revise and streamline its migration policy guidelines for decades 
to come. All these events are examined in the book. I do pay attention to the 
institutional factors that influenced this migration (e.g., Puerto Rico’s politi-
cal relationship with the United States, U.S. citizenship, political actors and 
interests on the island and the U.S. mainland, etc.) that very often are absent 
from the history and analysis of Puerto Rican migration to the United States. 
There are many good accounts on the Puerto Rican migrant experience in the 
United States, but there is none that exclusively examines the formulation and 
implementation of the Puerto Rican government’s migration policy.60 This is 
one of the contributions of this book.
Second, the book discusses the transnational perspective on migration in 
this introduction, but it does not provide an account or advance the theory 
of transnationalism. The main issue of interest and its primary focus is the 
role played by Puerto Rico’s government in Puerto Rican migration to the 
United States. The perspective or theory of transnationalism is addressed here 
because of the prevalence of that perspective in contemporary accounts of 
Puerto Rican migration, particularly by authors who point to the role played 
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by Puerto Rico’s government in migration after World War II. Instead I see 
Puerto Rican migration as a colonial migration that is defined by the particu-
lar construction of Puerto Rico as a colonial territory (the unincorporated 
territory) and the particular construction of Puerto Ricans as (colonial) citi-
zens. It is because of these factors the Puerto Rican migration experience has 
shown elements similar to those cited commonly in the literature of political 
transnationalism.
As in any academic field, the theories of transnationalism, transna-
tional migration, and transnational politics have engendered more than a 
few debates. Particularly significant are the debate related to the meaning 
and scope of transnationalism and transnational migration and the debate 
regarding the spaces where transnationalism is supposed to occur, whether it 
is defined by the actions and borders of the nation-state or by the social fields 
created by the actions and behavior of the immigrants themselves. Although 
these and other debates are significant for the field of transnationalism, they 
do not have any bearing on the arguments made in this book. While transna-
tionalism as an analytical approach may inform some of the debates on Puerto 
Rican migration in recent decades, I take a different approach that focuses on 
the institutional policies implemented by the Puerto Rican government and 
the political and ideological underpinnings that support them.
WHAT’S AHEAD
Chapter 1 elaborates on how the role played by Puerto Rico’s government in 
migration after 1945 was related to the increased relative autonomy of the 
colonial state during this period. It traces the role played by Puerto Rico’s 
government in migration to the early years of U.S. rule on the island and pays 
particular attention to how migration was discussed by U.S. and Puerto Rican 
policy makers during World War II. The chapter explores how policy mak-
ers’ perception during the first half of the twentieth century that the island’s 
major social problem was overpopulation led them to advance migration as a 
solution to this important issue. It also examines how migration was linked to 
discussions of the island’s political status during the 1940s.
Chapter 2 analyzes the making of Puerto Rico’s migration policy in 1947, 
paying particular attention to how the Puerto Rican government took the 
issue of migration to the United States seriously only after the “Puerto Rican 
problem” campaign erupted in New York City that year. The chapter stud-
ies the role played by Commissioner of Labor Fernando Sierra Berdecía in 
the formulation of the government’s migration policy and discusses why the 
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official government policy—to neither encourage nor discourage migration—
concealed a more active participation of the government in the management 
of migration. It also reviews the debates held in Puerto Rico on population 
control and migration during the 1940s and examines the experience faced by 
Puerto Rican migrants in Chicago in 1946, a precursor to the “Puerto Rican 
problem” in New York City and the 1947 migration law.
Chapter 3 explains how the Puerto Rican government after 1947 lobbied 
U.S. employers and the federal government to have island workers consid-
ered as domestic labor and given preference over foreign labor, particularly 
in agricultural work. This analysis shows how Puerto Rico’s government 
used U.S. citizenship to promote its own interests and those of its migrants 
when facing federal government agencies and U.S. employers. The chapter 
also analyzes the political and ideological foundations and workings of the 
Farm Placement Program (FPP), the best example of an organized migration 
by the Puerto Rican government. In addition, it explores how, even when 
the government’s migration policy was directed at promoting migration to 
the United States, it continued to consider possible migration plans to Latin 
America.
Chapter 4 examines the Puerto Rican government’s actions to provide 
cheap and safe air transportation for island migrants going to the United 
States. The government intervened with the federal government and air car-
riers to ensure that reasonable fares and safe travel conditions were provided. 
The chapter analyzes an issue that presented a real threat to the government’s 
migration program: the high number of air crashes from 1947 to 1952. Fur-
thermore, I dispute here the widely accepted idea that tourism was the cen-
tral factor explaining the growth of air transportation in the postwar period. 
Instead, I argue that migration is what led the Puerto Rican government to 
expand the island’s airport infrastructure, to lobby the federal government to 
increase the number of air carriers flying to the island, and to pressure major 
airlines to lower their airfares in Puerto Rico.
In chapter 5, I examine the connection between education policy and 
migration in the 1940s and 1950s, particularly regarding the teaching of Eng-
lish in public schools and the use of the public school system by the gov-
ernment to promote and encourage migration to the United States. The 
intensification of English language education in public schools after the early 
1950s, an issue that had been closely related to the policy of Americanization 
implemented in earlier decades by the colonial government, is directly associ-
ated to the government’s migration policy. Education became part of Puerto 
Rico’s migration policy as migration affected all areas of Puerto Rican life and 
the government sought to make “every Puerto Rican a potential migrant.”
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Chapter 6 discusses the upheaval and discontent of Puerto Rican workers 
in the sugar beet fields of Michigan in the summer of 1950. This event repre-
sents the first major incident of Puerto Rican migrant discontent in the United 
States and also shows how the Puerto Rican government intervened in labor 
disputes involving its workers and U.S. agricultural interests. The Michigan 
incident was the first major challenge to the government’s migration policy, 
both on the island and the U.S. mainland, and had important implications for 
its implementations afterwards. The Michigan episode is also relevant because 
it links migration to the island’s political status issue. Defending the Michigan 
sugar beet growers was Congressman Fred L. Crawford, then the Puerto Rican 
government’s best ally in Congress and a strong supporter of Puerto Rican 
migration to the United States and of Commonwealth status. The chapter also 
looks at how U.S. sugar politics—particularly those represented by sugar beet 
producers like the ones in Michigan—influenced Puerto Rican economic and 
political affairs after 1898, including migration.
By 1950, Puerto Rican farmworkers were already part of that class of 
exploited agricultural workers in the United States known as migratory labor. 
This was in part a consequence of the Puerto Rican government’s migration 
policy and programs, particularly through the FPP. Chapter 7 analyzes the 
status of Puerto Rican farmworkers as migratory labor in the United States 
and the role played by Puerto Rico’s government as a labor contractor, that is, 
as a provider of labor to U.S. agricultural interests. In studying this subject, 
I explain why Puerto Ricans were hired to work in U.S. farms even when, in 
many instances, they were more expensive than foreign or domestic labor, 
and why the FPP—central to the government’s migration policy by then—
lasted for three decades. The chapter also examines how the Puerto Rican 
government provided labor to U.S. employers through the Migration Divi-
sion’s employment program.
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Puerto Rican Migration and the 
Colonial State
A CRUCIAL AS PE C T  of the Puerto Rican migration experience to the United 
States in the postwar period is the central role played by the island govern-
ment in the process of organizing the movement of its people. In this process, 
although the government of Puerto Rico formulated and implemented its 
own migration policy, it did so while accepting the boundaries of its colonial 
subordination to the United States. Its migration policy was influenced not 
only by what was happening in Puerto Rico, but also by the way its migrants 
were received in the metropolitan society. Puerto Rico’s migration policy in 
the late 1940s has to be understood within the perspective of what U.S. and 
Puerto Rican government functionaries defined as the “Puerto Rican prob-
lem,” both on the island and in the United States. Government functionaries 
believed that migration was the best solution to overpopulation, which was 
considered one of Puerto Rico’s most important policy problems. State offi-
cials had been engaged with this issue from the very early days of the U.S. 
regime in Puerto Rico.
The making of Puerto Rico’s migration policy in the late forties cannot 
be seen only as a long-thought-out and well-planned Malthusian alternative 
to the island’s perceived overpopulation problem by the state officials, par-
ticularly by those represented in the PPD.1 Other important factors need to 
be considered in order to have a more comprehensive analysis of the Puerto 
Rican migration experience. First, since the very first days of the American 
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colonial government in Puerto Rico, state officials have seen migration as an 
alternative to overpopulation, believed to be one of Puerto Rico’s major social 
and economic problems. Second, although many Puerto Rican government 
officials in the postwar period shared this idea, representatives of the federal 
government and other U.S. institutions and North American advisors to the 
Puerto Rican government were influential in promoting migration as a serious 
alternative to the island’s economic plight. And third, the historical context 
in which migration policy was elaborated is extremely important in its defi-
nition: Puerto Rican policy makers in the late 1940s formulated a migration 
policy only after the massive migration of Puerto Ricans to New York City 
became a political issue there, with the ensuing negative response by the city’s 
government representatives and media—what became known there as “the 
Puerto Rican problem.”
The first part of this chapter elaborates on the concept of the relative 
autonomy of the colonial state in Puerto Rico to explain the role played by the 
Puerto Rican government in migration. I will argue that migration policy—
like economic policy—was one major area where the colonial government 
achieved certain autonomy in the management of local affairs. The second 
part of this chapter explores how since the beginning of U.S. rule in Puerto 
Rico, leading government officials—many appointed by the U.S. government 
until 1948—began to advance migration as a solution to the problem of over-
population. The chapter discusses migration policies and programs from the 
early days of the twentieth century to the 1940s. It argues that some important 
migration policies implemented by the popularly elected PPD government 
during the late 1940s had already been executed by previous governments.
MIGRATION AND THE RELATIVE AUTONOMY OF THE 
COLONIAL STATE
At the heart of this book is an examination of the role that the government of 
Puerto Rico played in the encouragement and organization of Puerto Rican 
migration to the United States. If the colonial status of Puerto Rico and the 
status of Puerto Ricans as citizens made the unrestricted movement of island-
ers to the U.S. mainland possible, the concrete manifestation of this process 
after 1945 significantly involved the colonial state in Puerto Rico. Like colo-
nialism and citizenship, and closely related to the two, the colonial state is also 
a manifestation of U.S. rule in Puerto Rico.
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In the last few years, renewed interest in the manifestations of U.S. empire 
abroad has brought attention to this peculiar state formation. McCoy, Scar-
ano, and Johnson, for example, conceive the colonial state as a structure 
within what they call the American “imperial state.”2 Recent interest in the 
workings of colonial states in U.S. empire is related to another important issue 
in the imperial dynamic: the role of local elites in maintaining colonialism in 
their territories.3 In American Empire and the Politics of Meaning, Go exam-
ines how the U.S. co-opted but also accommodated the interests of local elites 
in its colonial regimes in the Philippines and Puerto Rico, and how these elites 
participated in the management of the colonial state.4 In his study of U.S. 
colonialism in the Philippines, Kramer conceives the colonial state as a “new 
inclusionary formation” that works to accommodate the local “elite’s desire for 
power and recognition.”5 Although scholars studying the Puerto Rican expe-
rience have examined the role of the colonial state on the island and the role 
of local elites in its management, they have not related the latter to the issue 
of migration. The increased role played by the Puerto Rican government in 
the late 1940s in managing migration to the U.S. mainland has to be related 
to its increased relative autonomy in local affairs and vice versa: migration 
was significant in increasing the colonial state’s management of local affairs 
in Puerto Rico.
The Colonial State in Puerto Rico
Although the U.S. government had previous experience in colonial adminis-
tration with annexed territories such as those taken in the Mexican-American 
War, the experience in the overseas territories acquired in 1898 was quite dif-
ferent. The latter would not be settled by Euro-Americans and would not be 
incorporated into the nation as states. Thus, not only did the ideological and 
judicial justifications for colonial subordination have to be distinct from those 
applied in the annexed territories, but the structures of their colonial govern-
ments had to be different as well. Using the experience of previous European 
colonial powers, as well as its own experience in the annexed territories, the 
United States created colonial states in Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and the 
other overseas territories in order to sustain its colonial rule there.
Go asserts that in order to maintain its rule over the Philippines, the 
United States “had to construct a colonial state—a political institution that 
was geographically distant and juridically distinct from, but subordinate to, 
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the metropolitan government.”6 Go argues that this experience was something 
new for U.S. state functionaries; American colonial administrators
had to construct and administer a political, juridical, and economic system 
separate from the metropolitan state. Simply put, U.S. colonial rule of the 
Philippines demanded something that the Americans had not yet perfected 
in their prior experience: an overseas colonial state. Two interrelated pro-
cess had to unfold in the Philippines: colonial state building and colonial 
governance.7 
As in the Philippines, the process of colonial state building and colonial gov-
ernance in Puerto Rico were interrelated. Building the colonial state implied 
colonial rule on the island. More important yet, both processes required the 
co-optation and cooperation of local elites.
Although during the first half of the twentieth century the colonial state 
in Puerto Rico was administered by a cadre of American colonial functionar-
ies appointed by the federal government, this structure always included the 
participation of local elites in positions within the executive and legislative 
branches of colonial government. The Foraker Act, for example, allowed for a 
party system that provided a resemblance of democratic ruling and political 
participation—although limited—within a colonial context.8 The election of 
the PPD in 1940, the appointment of New Deal reformist governor Rexford G. 
Tugwell, and the reformulation of colonial policies in the aftermath of World 
War II illustrate how the metropolitan state allowed more participation of local 
elites in the governing of the colonial state during this period. This imperial 
detachment from direct colonial governance responded to increasing nation-
alism and desire for participation among Puerto Ricans and the needs of a 
changing global system where the United States now played a hegemonic role. 
The process of increased participation of local elites in the management of 
the colonial state culminated with the creation of the Commonwealth in 1952.
While the position of Puerto Ricans changed within the American polity 
when they became citizens in 1917, the status of Puerto Rico as an unincor-
porated territory and the major structures of the colonial state did not. The 
major reforms to the colonial state by the Jones Act were the creation of a fully 
elected senate and the provision to allow the still presidentially appointed gov-
ernor to name all except two of the cabinet members (previously appointed 
by the U.S. president). That is, colonial state building and colonial governance 
in Puerto Rico did not change with the new status of Puerto Ricans as U.S. 
citizens. The main functions, workings, and structures of the colonial state 
remained the same during the first half of the twentieth century, as Pedro 
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Cabán has argued. He contends that the colonial state “was set up to admin-
ister the colony, promote economic growth, preserve political stability, and 
legitimize colonial rule.” Furthermore, Cabán asserts that “its functions have 
changed as the colonial state has gained relative autonomy to mediate the con-
tent and direction of social and economic change.”9 Although always subordi-
nated to the metropolitan state, the colonial state nevertheless functioned as 
a contested space for conflicts and accommodations between local elites and 
between the elites and the U.S. government.
Throughout its several incarnations (1900–1917, 1917–1952, 1952 to pres-
ent), the colonial state has played an important role not only in governing the 
territory but also in maintaining the stability of the colonial regime and thus 
in sustaining U.S. hegemony in Puerto Rico. The move toward allowing more 
autonomy to local forces in Puerto Rico during the late 1940s responded to 
the increasing demands for reforms (up to and including independence) in 
Puerto Rico as well as to the new global responsibilities of the United States 
as a hegemonic power in the postwar period. To retain a colonial outpost in 
the Caribbean—one of U.S. citizens, no less—seemed hypocritical at a time 
when the United States was moving to reshape the international order by 
supporting the independence of European colonial territories. The very first 
act of the U.S. government after consenting to the Commonwealth status for 
Puerto Rico in 1952 was to have the United Nations declare that Puerto Ricans 
had exercised their right to self-determination and that Puerto Rico had thus 
ended its colonial subordination to the United States.
The intervention of the Puerto Rican government in migration coincided 
with those U.S. policies seeking to enhance self-government for Puerto Ricans. 
The management of migration must be understood as an integral element of 
the increased autonomy of the Puerto Rican colonial state in overseeing local 
affairs in Puerto Rico in the postwar period. For U.S. and Puerto Rican policy 
makers, migration—understood as the outflow of surplus population from 
the island—was intertwined with the increased autonomy in local economic 
and political affairs by providing stability in these two areas of colonial gover-
nance. Furthermore, as indicated by the negative reactions in New York City 
and elsewhere to the entry of Puerto Ricans in the postwar period, for many 
U.S. policy makers Puerto Rican migration to the U.S. mainland was a pol-
icy question that should be managed by the Puerto Rican government. If, as 
understood by U.S. and Puerto Rican decision makers, migration was a means 
of providing social, political, and economic stability to the colonial regime in 
Puerto Rico at a crucial juncture in time for the American government, then 
by managing migration, the Puerto Rican government played an important 
role in maintaining U.S. rule on the island.
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The Colonial State’s Relative Autonomy in Migration
In the early 1970s, a new generation of Puerto Rican scholars began to redefine 
the study of Puerto Rican history and economic and political development, 
particularly the changes that Puerto Rico experienced during the 1930s and 
1940s. This is understandable, given the importance of that period for the cre-
ation of the Commonwealth in 1952 and the era of economic growth spurred 
under Operation Bootstrap. It was also the period that established the PPD’s 
political hegemony and thus ushered in the economic and political develop-
ments of the 1950s.
One of several concepts that gained particular acceptance during this 
process of reconceptualization of Puerto Rican history was the notion of the 
relative autonomy of the colonial state in Puerto Rico.10 The idea of the rela-
tive autonomy of the state was, of course, widely discussed in Europe and 
the United States regarding the development of the modern liberal welfare 
state. In Puerto Rico, the idea of the relative autonomy of the colonial state 
was an attempt to understand the transformations occurring on the island 
since the 1930s, particularly the political and economic reforms of the 1940s. 
The concept of the relative autonomy of the state was used to understand the 
greater role played by the colonial government in economic development and 
economic policy and how the Commonwealth’s supposed autonomy in local 
affairs was used to sustain and maintain U.S. colonial rule in Puerto Rico.
Dietz applied the concept of “relative state autonomy” to explain the so-
called ideological transformation of the PPD economic program, from one 
emphasizing reforms and populism in the early 1940s with policies like state-
owned industries, land reform, and workers’ rights to one set on providing 
incentives to foreign (i.e., U.S.) capital as the basis of economic develop-
ment by the end of that decade. He argued that the colonial state assumed 
a relative autonomy with regard to the established elite in response to the 
economic and social crisis of the 1930s. The reforms implemented by the 
colonial state under the leadership of the PPD and Governor Tugwell pro-
vided the basis for the social, economic, and political stability that made the 
creation of the Commonwealth possible. But these reforms could not surpass 
the limits imposed by Puerto Rico’s colonial relationship with the United 
States.11 The process of reforms in Puerto Rico that began in the mid-1930s 
was promoted both by those local forces that coalesced in the PPD and by 
the metropolitan state. That is, the relative autonomy enjoyed by the colonial 
state that allowed the PPD to have a more influential role in public policy 
was something that was not only acceptable but was indeed promoted by the 
dominant sectors of the metropolitan state. As Dietz and others have argued 
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before, the autonomy enjoyed then by the colonial state was always relative 
within the constraints imposed by the colonial subordination of Puerto Rico 
to the United States.
Missing from this analysis is the relevance of migration in this period and 
the role that the colonial state played in this experience. I would like to claim 
once again the use of the concept of the relative autonomy of the colonial 
state in order to understand not only the role that the colonial state played in 
migration, but also what migration meant in terms of policy making in the 
process of reforming the colonial state. Several scholars have argued that the 
colonial state used its relative autonomy in economic affairs to promote eco-
nomic growth and maintain the stability of the colonial regime. This relative 
autonomy in economic affairs was recognized by the metropolitan state as part 
of its reforms of the colonial relationship with Puerto Rico.12
The colonial state developed another area of relative autonomy in the 
realm of migration. As in the economic arena, migration was a sphere where 
the metropolitan state allowed a certain autonomy for a policy issue that was 
deemed local and of a relative interest to U.S. policy makers, but not one 
that required their immediate intervention. In the economic area, the colonial 
state—before and after the Commonwealth—used the colonial relationship 
with the United States to attract U.S. corporations to the island with local 
tax exemption, exemption from federal wage laws, a common market and 
currency with the metropolitan state, and the political and constitutional 
presence of the United States in the territory as the final arbiter in case of 
any conflict with the local authorities. In the area of migration, the colonial 
state was encouraged by federal, state, and private institutions in the United 
States to assume an active role in the regulation and control of migration from 
Puerto Rico to the United States. As the representative of colonial citizens, the 
Puerto Rican government acted and had a direct presence on U.S. soil, some-
thing that no national state could openly do.
To manage its economic and industrialization policy, the colonial state 
created government bureaucratic institutions, like the Economic Develop-
ment Administration (Fomento), that negotiated with U.S. corporations and 
the federal government over the conditions under which American capi-
tal would invest on the island. Likewise, to manage migration, the colonial 
government created its own bureaucratic institutions, such as the Bureau of 
Employment and Migration (BEM) in San Juan and the Migration Division 
in New York. As in the area of economic development, where the colonial 
government created its particular policy (the Industrial Incentives Act, better 
known as Operation Bootstrap), the Puerto Rican government also formu-
lated and implemented its own migration policy (both, by the way, approved 
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in 1947). The BEM opened offices throughout the island to organize and regu-
late migration and was supported in this mission by municipal mayors. The 
island government used the Department of Education, its largest bureaucracy, 
to “advise” and “orient” “prospective migrants.” To manage the affairs of its 
migrants in the United States, Puerto Rico’s government established migration 
offices in dozens of cities there, extending its bureaucratic and political reach 
well beyond its territorial and constitutional boundaries.
Like in the economic realm, the autonomy enjoyed by the colonial state in 
migration was also relative to what was allowed by the colonial relationship 
and by the metropolitan state. As happened with economic policy, Puerto 
Rico’s migration policy was constrained by the limits imposed by the colo-
nial relationship with the United States. For many years, even after the imple-
mentation of its migration law in 1947, Puerto Rican policy makers attempted 
to carry out migration plans to Latin America, plans that were repeatedly 
rejected by U.S. government officials and thus never accomplished. That is, the 
direction of the flow of Puerto Rican migration to the United States was deter-
mined not only by U.S. citizenship but also by the limits imposed by Puerto 
Rico’s colonial subordination. Migration to the United States thus imposed a 
set of policy goals, like facilitating the incorporation of Puerto Rican migrants 
in the metropolitan territory and society, a job that private and state institu-
tions in the United States were demanding that the Puerto Rican government 
should assume. Indeed, U.S. citizenship facilitated Puerto Rican migration to 
the United States, but it was the nature of that citizenship as a colonial one, 
along with the cultural and ethnic makeup of the island migrants, that pre-
sented obstacles and imposed limitations to their full incorporation in the 
United States.
The role played by the Puerto Rican government in organizing migra-
tion and in facilitating the incorporation of its migrants in the United States 
reflects the ambiguities of the colonial relationship with the United States. If 
indeed the status of Puerto Ricans as citizens and the status of Puerto Rico as 
a U.S. colonial territory facilitated migration to the United States and made 
possible the intervention of the Puerto Rican government there, it was pre-
cisely because of the status of Puerto Ricans as colonial subjects that the colo-
nial state had to intervene in order to advance and ease their incorporation 
in the U.S. mainland.
Because of its character as a colonial state, the Puerto Rican government 
was limited in what it could do in terms of protecting and representing its “cit-
izens” in the United States. The Puerto Rican government had to secure pro-
tection and services for its migrants from private and state institutions, always 
acknowledging their institutional and political jurisdictions and spheres of 
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influence and power. That is what happened in New York City after the anti–
Puerto Rican campaign emerged in 1947 and, later, elsewhere in the United 
States where the Puerto Rican government established its presence in repre-
sentation of Puerto Rican migrants. And that is why Puerto Rico’s migration 
policy followed very closely the recommendations made by private and public 
institutions in the United States in how to deal with Puerto Rican migrants, 
from the creation of the BEM in San Juan, to screening and selecting migrant 
prospects and channeling them away from New York City, to the creation of 
the Migration Division in New York in order to facilitate their incorporation 
and assimilation in the United States. In doing this, the Puerto Rican gov-
ernment followed the traditional perspectives of U.S. institutions in dealing 
with immigrants, that is, to facilitate their incorporation and assimilation into 
American life. But these were different times and Puerto Ricans were differ-
ent migrants, and the institutions that had previously facilitated the incorpo-
ration of European immigrants—the dominant political parties, the church, 
unions, Tammany Hall, and so on—were not there to do the same for these 
migrants. This role was assumed by the Puerto Rican government for nearly 
two decades.
Although it is important to recognize that this autonomy in managing 
migration to the United States was relative—that is, one limited by Puerto 
Rico’s colonial relationship to the United States—one should not minimize 
or downplay the role that the Puerto Rican government played in the rep-
resentation and protection of its “citizens” in the U.S. mainland. The Puerto 
Rican government regulated the hiring of workers by U.S. employers with 
government-approved contracts. It lobbied and pressured the federal govern-
ment to protect and give priority to Puerto Rican agricultural workers over 
alien workers based on their rights as citizens. It regulated and lobbied the 
federal government for safe air transportation for Puerto Ricans moving to 
the United States, and lobbied the U.S. government to allow major airlines 
to fly to Puerto Rico to satisfy the needs for air transportation and eventu-
ally opening air routes to many major U.S. cities. It mediated labor conflicts 
between Puerto Rican migrants and U.S. employers—the 1950 sugar beet 
strike in Michigan is a noteworthy example—not only to protect the farm-
workers but also to assure mainland employers of the Puerto Rican workers’ 
and government’s reliability. It became the representative of New York Puerto 
Ricans for notable private city institutions like the Welfare Council and for 
the political establishment, in the form of the Mayor’s Committee on Puerto 
Rican Affairs. It got involved in New York City politics in 1949 by campaign-
ing and mobilizing against Congressman Vito Marcantonio and in support of 
Mayor William O’Dwyer.
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In Puerto Rico, the government used its bureaucratic institutions, like 
the Departments of Labor and Education, to advise and organize the flow 
of migrants to the United States, be it as individual migrants (those moving 
to the U.S. mainland on their own) or in organized migration (mostly farm-
workers going under a government-approved contract to work in U.S. farms). 
The Department of Labor’s BEM created a vast government superstructure 
to oversee and regulate the flow of people to the U.S. mainland. In order to 
fulfill its goals in the United States, the government of Puerto Rico developed 
an impressive bureaucracy after it opened its Migration Office in New York in 
1948. It later became the Migration Division, with main offices in New York 
City, Chicago, and the Lake Erie region, and by 1958–59, field offices in Bos-
ton; Hartford, Connecticut; Rochester, Middletown, and Riverhead in New 
York; Keyport and Camden in New Jersey; and Hamburg, Pennsylvania (these 
would grow in numbers in the 1960s).
MIGRATION AND THE “PUERTO RICAN PROBLEM” IN 
PUERTO RICO
In the second part of this chapter, I will examine how Puerto Rico’s govern-
ment dealt with migration from 1900 to the mid-1940s. The colonial govern-
ment promoted the organized migration of workers under labor contracts to 
Hawaii and other countries in Latin America starting in 1900, and migra-
tion to the United States became an alternative during World War I. After 
1917, when Puerto Ricans were granted U.S. citizenship, the migration of indi-
viduals to the United States increased, particularly to New York City. During 
this period, there were attempts by the Puerto Rican government to regulate 
migration due to the abuses experienced by island workers. Local and fed-
eral government officials tried to foster migration to the United States and 
other places like Panama during World War II, plans that faced many obsta-
cles. Migration was also a metropolitan objective inasmuch as North Ameri-
can advisers and U.S. federal government institutions favored migration as a 
mechanism to alleviate the island’s social and economic plight and thus pro-
vide stability to the colonial regime.
Contract Labor, Individual Migrants, and Migration Policy Before 
World War II
Most of the U.S.-appointed colonial functionaries since 1900 understood 
Puerto Rico’s main problem to be a lack of resources, a lack of capital and 
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industries, and overpopulation.13 Migration was seen as an alternative to the 
island’s overpopulation problem. In the first report by a U.S.-appointed gover-
nor, Charles Allen favored the migration of Puerto Rican laborers to Hawaii, 
Cuba, and the Dominican Republic. Noting that “these emigrants comprise 
the least desirable elements of this people,” he argued that “the emigration of 
these people can do no great harm to the island. . . . Porto Rico has plenty of 
laborers and poor people generally.”14 In 1915 Arthur Yeager, the colonial gov-
ernor who oversaw the grant of citizenship to Puerto Ricans, ascertained that 
“undoubtedly the fundamental cause [of poverty] is the enormous popula-
tion.” He argued that “the only really effective remedy is the transfer of large 
numbers of Porto Ricans to some other region.”15 He proposed a project to 
colonize the Dominican Republic by Puerto Rican laborers.
An important mechanism through which the colonial state intended to 
lower the surplus labor on the island since the time of Governor Allen was 
the use of contract labor. Thousands of Puerto Rican workers went to work 
under labor contracts to places like Hawaii, Cuba, and the Dominican Repub-
lic in the first years of the twentieth century, mostly in the sugar industry. 
Nearly three thousand workers went to work under contract to Hawaii; their 
experience there was an important reference regarding migration for other 
workers and for the government as well.16 As the Puerto Rican press reported, 
many laborers returned dissatisfied with the working and living conditions in 
Hawaii. In 1903, a report by Puerto Rico’s commissioner of labor sustained the 
complaints raised by Puerto Rican laborers on the contract violations, abuses, 
harsh living conditions, and discrimination suffered in Hawaii.17
Other contract labor expeditions to Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and 
Mexico during the first two decades of the twentieth century were not very 
successful, either. The complaints were similar to those of previous experi-
ences in Hawaii. In several instances, workers abandoned their jobs and had 
to be repatriated back to Puerto Rico, as when the Puerto Rican legislature 
funded for the repatriation of Puerto Rican workers from Mexico in 1911.18 As 
a consequence of these experiences, Puerto Rico’s Labor Bureau felt that these 
expeditions had to be regulated; it concluded in a 1914 report: “If selected 
Porto Rican laborers could be sent in small groups to Cuba or Santo Domingo, 
protected by proper contracts in which the government of Porto Rico is a 
party, such emigration might be advisable.”19 This was precisely the intent of 
the 1919 emigration law approved by the Puerto Rican legislature to protect 
Puerto Rican migrant workers, not only for their benefit but also as a means 
of allowing the continuance of migration flows.
The 1919 law, the island’s first legislation to regulate migration, established 
an important precedent that would be followed by the migration law approved 
in 1947. This law authorized the commissioner of agriculture and labor to 
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intervene “in all matters concerning the emigration of laborers from Porto 
Rico”; it allowed this institution to “regulate such propositions, promises, con-
ditions or offers made to native laborers in cases of emigration; to procure, 
subscribe and enforce such contracts” between Puerto Rican laborers and any 
U.S. or foreign contractors. Furthermore, it states that the insular government 
“shall have no obligation in any emigration to protect or enforce the rights of 
such persons as shall leave this country, unless the contracts entered into and 
between emigrants and the State contracting them shall have been approved 
by the Commissioner of Agriculture and Labor.”20 Nevertheless, its effective-
ness was never proven since the intensity of hiring Puerto Ricans under labor 
contracts decreased in the 1920s and the Puerto Rican government proved 
incapable of enforcing the law, as shown by a 1926 investigation into the 
abuses suffered by Puerto Rican migrants in Arizona.21
World War I had an important impact on the character of Puerto Rican 
migration to the United States. In 1917 the Jones Act made Puerto Ricans 
U.S. citizens, one of the reasons for the increase in the movement of people 
from the island. Although Puerto Ricans had enjoyed free access to the U.S. 
mainland since 1898, migration during this period was not very significant; 
it increased dramatically after 1917.22 Furthermore, some U.S. colonial func-
tionaries saw Puerto Ricans as a source of (cheap) labor that could satisfy the 
manpower needs created by the conflict in Europe.23 Around thirteen thou-
sand Puerto Ricans were employed by 1918 in war-related industries in the 
United States, in places such as New Orleans; Wilmington, North Carolina; 
Brunswick and Savannah, Georgia; and Charleston, South Carolina. As in pre-
vious experiences, contract violations and abuses were common complaints of 
migrants; according to newspaper and government reports, ninety-three men 
died on these projects during several months from 1918 to 1919.24
After the war ended, U.S. colonial functionaries kept insisting on the need 
to encourage migration from Puerto Rico to the United States in order to 
reduce overpopulation on the island and to provide cheap labor to U.S. indus-
tries. For example, the 1926 annual report of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, the 
U.S. bureaucracy in charge of Puerto Rican affairs, noted the negative attitude 
of Puerto Ricans toward migration, particularly to the United States due to 
its different environment, but stated that “the surplus people of Porto Rico 
have an unusual opportunity in the United States” and could migrate “if once 
encouraged to do so.”25
Some Puerto Rican functionaries were concerned with labor contract 
expeditions; they were particularly worried by the abuses experienced by 
migrants going to the U.S. mainland. They called for a greater supervision 
by the Puerto Rican government, as was reflected in a 1927 report by the 
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interim chief of the island’s Labor Bureau. The report questioned the viability 
of contract labor expeditions organized by private interests and argued that “it 
would be best to facilitate a voluntary migration.” It concluded with a request 
to the Employment Bureau of the Department of Agriculture and Employ-
ment to enter into agreements with its counterparts in the United States “as a 
means to obtain knowledge of the places where labor is needed and that the 
latter be selected .  .  . so that they go directly to the appropriate places, con-
tributing this way to lower in an intelligent and methodical way the surplus 
population of the country.”26
In the 1920s, individual, or “spontaneous,” migration replaced labor con-
tract migration as the dominant form of labor migration from Puerto Rico to 
the United States. This migration was represented by the movement of Puerto 
Ricans on their own to the United States, most particularly to New York City. 
By 1930 Puerto Rican officials acknowledged that most of Puerto Rico’s migra-
tion was made of “voluntary” migrants moving to the United States.27 This 
form of migration fueled the dramatic increase of Puerto Ricans living in the 
United States after the 1920s: in 1920 there were 11,811 Puerto Ricans living 
on the mainland, increasing to 52,774 by 1930 and to 69,967 by 1940.28 Most 
migrants headed toward New York City, where, as Sánchez-Korrol so aptly put 
it, the Puerto Rican conglomerate developed from “colonia to community” in 
the 1930s and early 1940s.29
World War II and Puerto Rican Migration Policy
The war years (1940–1945) were years of debate regarding Puerto Rico’s popu-
lation problem and the migration of workers. Various U.S. functionaries in 
Puerto Rico and the mainland generally saw Puerto Ricans as an available 
pool of cheap labor accessible for wartime-related activities. But island gov-
ernment functionaries, including Governor Tugwell and some PPD leaders, 
were generally more cautious about sending out large numbers of workers 
to the U.S. mainland. Metropolitan interests would, of course, prevail, and 
thousands of Puerto Rican laborers were recruited to satisfy the needs of 
the American industries in a time of war. The War Manpower Commission 
(WMC) became the best example of the American government’s action in 
recruiting Puerto Rican labor for mainland labor needs. But although most 
government functionaries agreed that migration was a good alternative to 
deal with the overpopulation problem, there was no consensus among U.S. 
and Puerto Rican policy makers on how to proceed. For example, there was 
disagreement about whether the government should be involved in a mass 
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planned migration or encourage migration of individuals only. Furthermore, 
issues of race, culture, and the status of Puerto Ricans as U.S. citizens influ-
enced how these plans were conceived.
In 1939 Admiral William Leahy was appointed governor of Puerto Rico by 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, signaling Puerto Rico’s increasing military 
importance for the U.S. government. In 1940 Leahy and U.S. functionaries 
began to consider the possibility of an expedition of Puerto Rican workers 
to work in the Panama Canal Zone. The Panama plan is a good example of 
how U.S. policy makers viewed the role that Puerto Rican labor could play for 
U.S. economic and military interests during World War II. It also shows the 
problems faced by the Puerto Rican government in organizing labor migra-
tions during the war period, the place of colonial citizens within broader U.S. 
global interests, and how issues of race and citizenship intersected for Puerto 
Ricans at that time.
In a letter to Leahy on April 8, 1940, Atherton Lee, from the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture in Puerto Rico, proposed a plan to send Puerto Rican 
workers to Panama. On a visit there, he consulted with the American ambas-
sador on the use of Puerto Ricans to satisfy the Panama Canal Zone’s increas-
ing labor needs; because of their status as U.S. citizens, the ambassador “felt 
that Puerto Ricans should have the advantage over other West Indians in 
such employment.” Lee added that during a visit to Panama, President Roo-
sevelt “had expressed the opinion that American citizens exclusively should 
be employed in the new construction work in the Canal Zone. It seemed to 
me that this may have been a result of one of your conversations with the 
President.” Puerto Ricans, he pointed out, would be acceptable to the Pan-
ama government, which “was not particularly pleased with the importation 
of further West Indians,” worried that the entrance of so many black workers 
could have “a great influence on the racial characters of the people of Panama.” 
Lee discarded other migration projects to Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador 
for several reasons, including the possibility they might be “at considerable 
expense to the Federal Government. The Canal Zone seems to have the best 
opportunities for any mass migration from Puerto Rico.”30
For U.S. colonial functionaries, sending Puerto Ricans to the Panama 
Canal Zone would also address the population problem on the island. In a 
letter to Harold Ickes, U.S. secretary of the interior, Leahy argued that 
in view of the heavy overpopulation of Puerto Rico this would appear to be 
a critical time to press upon the War Department the desirability of utilizing 
Puerto Rico’s excess labor population for work on the Canal Zone, and by 
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doing so to relieve to some small extent the unemployment situation which 
now exists here.31
On May 21, C. S. Ridley, governor of the Panama Canal Zone, informed Leahy 
that he had received authorization for the recruitment of Puerto Ricans to 
work in Panama and submitted a plan that included specific conditions to be 
enclosed in a labor contract.32
But there were some apprehensions from functionaries in Puerto Rico 
about the idea. In a June 6 letter to Carlos Gallardo, Puerto Rico’s executive 
secretary, Atherton Lee dismissed his objections to the migration of Puerto 
Ricans to Panama, reasoning that if “properly organized” and if the events 
that led to the disastrous migration to Hawaii could be avoided, there should 
be no reason for this project to fail. He concluded that “the easiest solution 
for the crowded population conditions would be an intelligent migration” 
and Panama “can be made a first step in such a migration.”33 Other Puerto 
Rican functionaries also raised doubts regarding the proposal to send Puerto 
Rican laborers to Panama. Labor Secretary Prudencio Rivera Martínez ques-
tioned the proposed labor contract, declaring that under the conditions of 
the contract, the Panama Canal people would not be able to recruit in the 
United States. But even after the contract was modified to include his con-
cerns, the secretary of labor asserted that the “prevailing conditions” in the 
Panama Canal Zone should be investigated by representatives of the Puerto 
Rican government before any agreement was made or any worker sent there.34
Other war-related obstacles prevented the Panama proposal from com-
ing to fruition. Brigadier General E. L. Daley complained to Leahy in Octo-
ber 1940 that he lacked labor to complete required military constructions in 
Puerto Rico in time; he requested some thirty thousand laborers, maintaining 
that the current twenty thousand were insufficient.35 Another critical issue 
was the transportation of workers to Panama. Leahy had suggested the use of 
military vehicles for this purpose. But on October 25, U.S. Secretary of War 
Henry L. Stimson denied this petition, saying that the military needed their 
transportation vehicles for purposes related to the war.36
The idea to send Puerto Rican workers to the Panama Canal Zone came 
to an end due to war-related events, the improvement in the economic condi-
tions in Puerto Rico during the war, and continued concerns among island 
government functionaries on how island workers would be treated there and 
what their working and living conditions would be. In a February 1941 report 
on his visit to Panama, William D. López, acting commissioner of labor, com-
plained that salaries there were too low for Puerto Ricans and that they would 
be treated as other “foreign” workers and not as U.S. citizens.37 The Canal Zone 
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governor complained to Puerto Rico’s governor, Guy J. Swope, that worker 
transportation to Panama and lower wages were two main obstacles to the 
proposal. After insisting that López’s suggestion for higher wages for Puerto 
Ricans was unfeasible since they would have to raise wages for other “tropi-
cal workers,” he concluded that “there is little prospect of obtaining desir-
able employees for our work from Puerto Rico in the immediate future.”38 
Swope replied that the employment situation in Puerto Rico had improved 
dramatically due to military projects and the construction of the navy base 
in Vieques and that lower salaries on the Panama Canal Zone were not an 
incentive for Puerto Rican workers to go there since unemployment on the 
island had decreased, there was a lack of skilled workers, and higher salaries 
in construction had propelled an increase in other areas.39
Although the proposal to send workers to Panama went no further, migra-
tion continued to be a preoccupation for U.S. and Puerto Rican policy makers. 
Several proposals to send Puerto Ricans to Latin American countries were 
discussed by government officials in the United States and Puerto Rico during 
the war period. As on previous occasions, island functionaries raised concerns 
regarding these proposals for planned migrations. In April 1942, U.S. newspa-
pers reported on a proposal to send five hundred thousand Puerto Ricans to 
colonization projects in undisclosed Latin American countries. The proposal 
raised some concerns, primarily about the adaptation of Puerto Ricans to 
working conditions in a foreign place and the cost to the government of such 
an endeavor. Also considered was the issue that “Puerto Ricans are American 
citizens. If the government should sponsor their emigration to foreign soil, 
the fact that they went on their own volition would not relieve us of moral 
responsibility for their future welfare.”40
In late May 1942, an El Mundo editorial commented on a proposition 
under consideration by the U.S. State Department’s Office of the Coordinator 
of Inter-American Affairs to send Puerto Rican workers to Brazil and Venezu-
ela. The newspaper complained that although the proposal had been under 
discussion for several months in Washington and Latin American capitals, 
Puerto Rico “has not yet had the occasion to even know properly the basis 
and orientations of the migration proposed.”41 In December 1942, it became 
public that Puerto Rico’s Land Authority was considering buying five hundred 
thousand acres of land in the Dominican Republic to distribute to Puerto 
Ricans moving there.42
Another proposal for a planned migration to Venezuela was explored by 
island functionaries in 1945. Following a petition by Governor Tugwell, Car-
los Chardón, then director of the Institute of Tropical Agriculture and better 
known for the Chardón Plan of 1935, traveled to Venezuela to study the pos-
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sibility of sending Puerto Rican workers there. Like previous Puerto Ricans 
officials, Chardón raised questions regarding the idea of a planned migration 
to this country. He reported that the problem with Puerto Rican emigration 
was that “Puerto Ricans have no emigration tradition; they love their country 
and their people too much to take risks going abroad.” He concluded that if 
there was to be a planned migration, it should be “on individual basis,” send-
ing only workers with the adequate skills.43
U.S. government officials also expressed their opposition to the Venezuela 
migration plan. In a report to the secretary of state from the U.S. embassy in 
Caracas, Frank Corrigan quoted Chardón’s negative response to the plan; he 
also stated that even though the idea was supported by Venezuela’s ambas-
sador in Washington and by Abe Fortas, under secretary of the interior, it 
was opposed by Governor Tugwell and had been ignored by the Venezuelan 
government. Furthermore, Corrigan mentioned other negative aspects of the 
colonization plan already named by previous reports and proposed that the 
State Department give no further consideration to this plan.44
Beginning in 1942, officials in the United States and Puerto Rico began 
to discuss planned migrations to the U.S. mainland. One of the earliest pro-
posals comes from the minutes of a meeting between two Puerto Rican offi-
cials (Jaime Bagué and Commissioner of Labor Santiago Iglesias Jr.) and four 
North American functionaries on December 26, 1942. The meeting was called 
to “discuss problems associated with the migration of Puerto Ricans to the 
U.S. during the present emergency both in order to satisfy labor needs in the 
States and to relieve the pressure of overpopulation in Puerto Rico.” The com-
mittee concluded that “migration should be on an individual basis and that 
settlement into strictly Puerto Rican communities .  .  . should be automati-
cally discouraged.” Two important issues raised in this meeting were the racial 
composition and the selection of the migrants. Regarding race, the commit-
tee report stated “that only white workers should be encouraged to migrate 
to Southern states although this policy should not be formally incorporated 
in any statements or documents.” The report added that “good selection in 
Puerto Rico and adequate supervision in the States was considered indispens-
able to any successful migration program.” It also reported that migration 
should be encouraged without worrying “whether the migrants will secure 
permanent or only temporary jobs” and that at the present only “only younger, 
single, skilled workers whether proficient in agriculture or industry” should 
be encouraged to migrate.45
In early October 1942, El Mundo editorialized in favor of a planned migra-
tion to the United States and rejected an earlier proposal to take Puerto Rican 
workers to Brazil on the basis that they were not prepared for the harsh work 
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on rubber plantations; it argued that a well-planned and well-organized migra-
tion, with a careful selection of workers, would be effective and valuable for 
the island.46 Days later, Resident Commissioner Bolívar Pagán was informed 
that the U.S. House of Representatives would consider a bill to facilitate the 
hiring of Puerto Rican workers on the mainland. Puerto Rico’s Chamber of 
Commerce also favored the migration of workers to the mainland to alleviate 
unemployment and misery on the island.47 Later that month, several members 
of congress gave their support to a measure that would finance the transport 
of Puerto Rican workers, thus allowing their employment on the mainland.48
In October 1942, Iglesias Jr. reported to Tugwell on his trip to Washington 
to discuss Puerto Rico’s “labor problem.” There he met with numerous gov-
ernment officials interested in island affairs, including Interior Secretary Har-
old Ickes and War Projects Administration Commissioner Malcolm Miller. 
Iglesias traveled to Washington for another round of meetings in November 
1942.49 In mid-December he announced an agreement that would facilitate 
the emigration of twenty thousand Puerto Rican workers to the mainland. 
Transportation of an estimated one thousand workers per month would be 
provided by the army and navy, as conditions allowed. Iglesias also announced 
that the government of Puerto Rico would not sanction the transfer of work-
ers to Brazil and Venezuela, arguing that it was a risky proposition and that 
the government was concentrating on sending workers to the United States, 
which “assures absolute guarantees for the Puerto Rican worker.”50
In December 1942, the War Department agreed to transport from 800 
to 1,500 workers to the mainland. The U.S. Employment Service (USES) was 
asked to coordinate recruitment with island functionaries. As recommended 
in previous government reports on migration, the government was to select 
workers based on several qualifications: workers were required to have a 
working knowledge of English, a “nest egg” of from $75 to $100, and the skills 
demanded by mainland employers. Some 1,030 workers were recruited. The 
program was ended after six months, however, and the WMC decided to have 
employers carry out their own recruitment of workers through labor con-
tractors. Clarence Senior reported the major employers and the number of 
workers recruited as follows: Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 1,038; Campbell 
Soup Co., 488; Huff Canning Co., 338; and Utah Copper Co., 200.51 In March 
1943, George H. Cross, of the U.S. Human Resources Commission, met in 
Puerto Rico with federal and local functionaries and representatives of the 
labor movement to discuss a migration plan to the United States. According 
to him, the federal government would establish a recruitment center and pay 
for the transportation to the mainland, wages, health services, and transporta-
tion back to the island.52
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According to Edwin Maldonado, the policy change in favor of recruit-
ment of Puerto Rican labor was due to several reasons, including the decrease 
of Mexican bracero labor in the United States during this time and—perhaps 
the most important reason, according to him—the pressure by congressional 
sources, mostly the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions, 
to hire Puerto Ricans and not aliens for war-related jobs.53 Nevertheless, the 
recruitment of Puerto Rican laborers during the war raised some apprehen-
sions in the United States. A significant issue with Puerto Ricans was pre-
cisely their status as citizens, which prevented their return to the island once 
their contract expired, as many U.S. government functionaries and employers 
demanded.54 The latter considered Puerto Ricans unreliable, breaking their 
contracts and leaving for other destinations, and often favored the contract 
of “domestic” workers before “foreign labor.” But many U.S. policy makers 
believed that hiring Puerto Ricans provided a safety valve for the island’s 
unemployment and was in the United States’ best interests, politically and eco-
nomically.55 The WMC ceased its recruiting program in Puerto Rico in June 
1944, after Congress voted to deny the necessary funds for its campaign on the 
island. According to Senior, “Congressmen are reported to have objected to 
bringing Puerto Ricans on the grounds that they could not be sent back home 
after the need for them had ended.”56 As stated by Maldonado, the WMC 
blamed Puerto Ricans for the program’s failure, arguing that 60 percent of 
workers abandoned their jobs before the end of the contract, only 25 percent 
completed their contracts, and just 15 percent returned to Puerto Rico.57
Puerto Rican government functionaries also had some reservations about 
the recruitment of labor on the island. Governor Tugwell favored the recruit-
ment of island workers for war-related needs on the mainland but “was skepti-
cal of the success of large scale labor importation programs.”58 Commissioner 
of Labor Manuel A. Pérez was also apprehensive of planned migration. He 
favored individual migration and restraint on the part of government in play-
ing any role in the recruitment of labor for the United States, as he stated in 
a memo to Tugwell dated February 1945. According to him, the “Department 
has had a bad experience with the group of workers who emigrated to the 
States during the last two years” to work at the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad 
Co., the Huff and Campbell companies, and the Calco Chemical Co. There 
were numerous complaints and “discontent prevailed among the workers.” He 
alluded to the example of the Calco Chemical Co. in Brooklyn, where 72 out 
of 104 workers broke their contracts and left; the other companies had an even 
worse experience. Pérez concluded that the government should not encour-
age these migrations unless “we could plan these migrations very carefully, 
making the proper selection of the workers according to their skill and that 
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steps be taken to insure that they would not have difficulties on account of the 
language, food, etc.”59 It was precisely against this background of labor recruit-
ment during the last years of the war that the Puerto Rican government func-
tionaries began to debate the issue of migration immediately after the war.
Migration and Puerto Rico’s Political Status
The end of the war was a time of debates in Puerto Rico and the United States 
regarding the political future of the island. The PPD won the 1944 elections by 
a landslide, but it was internally divided regarding its option for the island’s 
political status. Pro-independence forces within the PPD wanted to push this 
alternative in the United States. During 1945 and 1946, Muñoz Marín himself 
was revising his ideas about Puerto Rico’s political future, moving away from 
a weak support for independence to some form of autonomous government 
with a continued economic and political relationship with the United States. 
In 1946 Muñoz Marín expelled the independentistas from the party, which 
allowed him and the party to support a status of self-government in autonomy 
with the United States, what later came to be the Estado Libre Asociado (or 
Commonwealth, in English).60
Winds of change were also strengthening in the United States regarding 
Puerto Rico. In 1946 President Truman appointed Jesús T. Piñero as the first 
Puerto Rican governor of the island. In 1948 the people of Puerto Rico elected 
their governor for the first time after Congress approved this measure. The 
huge electoral victory by Muñoz Marín and the PPD in 1948 facilitated their 
push in Washington for further reforms to the political status of the island. In 
1950 Congress approved Law 600, which allowed Puerto Ricans to write their 
own constitution and led to the creation of Commonwealth status in 1952.
This was the context in which Puerto Rican migration to the United States 
became a “problem” for the PPD government. The point to be made here—
and which shall be elaborated further in later chapters—is that the issue of 
migration was always present in the discussions of Puerto Rico’s political and 
economic future during this period. To support this argument, I would like to 
mention three reports from Washington that were important in this delibera-
tion. Scholars who study the evolution of Puerto Rico’s political status concur 
on the importance of these reports to debates in Puerto Rico and the United 
States on the subject.61 The reports spoke of the deplorable economic condi-
tions the island suffered and presented some suggestions for the reform of 
its government and its relationship to the United States. They questioned the 
viability of independence for Puerto Rico, rejected statehood as an alterna-
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tive that was not feasible for the island and that would be turned down in the 
United States, and suggested some form of self-government for Puerto Ricans. 
What no scholar of the island’s political status question ever mentions is that 
these reports also discussed the issue of migration when analyzing the eco-
nomic and political future of Puerto Rico.
The first report, the 1943 U.S. Senate Committee on Territories and Insular 
Affairs’ report on the problems facing Puerto Rico, tried to define the “Puerto 
Rican problem” in a wider perspective regarding U.S. global, national, and 
regional interests. It argued that the “the Puerto Rican problem”
transcends national life; it unavoidably injects itself into the wider field of 
international relations, an undeniable fact which we cannot afford to ignore. 
The Caribbean zone has recently become of unusual mutual interest to the 
United States and England and the policies which will be necessarily adopted 
in any event will affect Puerto Rico to a large extent. . . . It must be consid-
ered from three aspects: (a) The viewpoint of the island, (b) the viewpoint 
of the Nation, and lastly, (c) the international viewpoint.
According to the committee, among the most important issues facing Puerto 
Rico were overpopulation, lack of arable land, emigration, a high birth rate, 
agriculture, and need of new industries. With regard to the issue of migration, 
the report stated:
Unlike the problem of arable land, which cannot be solved emigration can 
be accomplished if there would be a determined effort on the part of the 
Federal Government to that end. Left to the individual or to the local insular 
government, it will never be accomplished.62
The second report, produced by the House Committee on Insular Affairs 
in 1945, was the conclusion of an investigation of political, economic, and 
social affairs in Puerto Rico. The inquiry carried its own political agenda, 
since it was used by congressional Republicans to examine and criticize Tug-
well’s government on the island. Migration of Puerto Ricans was one of the 
issues addressed in its conclusions. It stated that in view “of the fact that there 
appears to be no immediate complete solution to the current chronic prob-
lems of Puerto Rico arising because of the lack of natural resources and the 
congestion of population there, the subcommittee feels that a wise and pru-
dent program of emigration might be helpful.” The report goes on to pro-
pose migration to Latin America, where some countries reported a need for 
labor. It advises a migration of one million persons, or half the island’s popu-
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lation at the time, so that “there would be a sharp increase in the island’s liv-
ing standards, unemployment would end, and United States taxpayers would 
be relieved of the heavy annual relief burden.” The report added that Puerto 
Ricans and their government “have been cool toward emigration in the past 
and might be so again. The island’s past experiences have not been favorable 
although it is the feeling of the subcommittee that wise and adequate planning 
could overcome obstacles that are now objectionable to Puerto Ricans.” It sug-
gests that with the support of the U.S. secretary of interior and Puerto Rican 
leaders, “such a plan could be worked out successfully” to the benefit both of 
the United States and the island.63
The third report was produced by the U.S. Tariff Commission and came 
to be known in Puerto Rico as the Dorfman Report (in reference to its chief 
economist, Ben Dorfman). The commission was asked by Congress to exam-
ine the economic and political consequences of independence, statehood, and 
self-government for the island. Like the two previous congressional reports 
already mentioned, the Dorfman Report recommended self-government for 
Puerto Rico accompanied by new U.S. policies to help the island’s economy.64
According to Muñoz Marín’s biographer and historian Carmelo Rosario 
Natal, the Dorfman Report, along with Muñoz Marín’s conversations with 
leaders in Washington, had a great impact on the leader’s thought regarding 
the island’s political status. Relevant to his new thinking was the negative eco-
nomic impact independence would have on the island, according to Rosario 
Natal. Publication of the Dorfman Report in March 1946 preceded the now-
famous writings by Muñoz Marín in El Mundo, generally known as nuevos 
caminos hacia viejos objetivos (new paths to old goals). In these articles, the 
PPD leader presented his arguments against independence and statehood and 
proposed a “third way” to solve Puerto Rico’s colonial status: self-government 
with the United States.65 This was precisely what some policy makers in the 
United States and congressional reports were saying. The Dorfman Report 
also recommended migration as one of its major conclusions.
While the Dorfman Report’s conclusions regarding the island’s political 
status received the most attention in Puerto Rico (the report rejected both 
independence and statehood on political and economic grounds), it was 
received differently on the U.S. mainland. For example, the New York Times 
headline on the report read: “Ask million people leave Puerto Rico: Tariff 
experts say this and not change in island’s status offers the only economic 
hope.” The article asserts that Puerto Rico would suffer economically under 
any of the political status options that were considered (independence, state-
hood, or dominion). It then adds: “The Commission’s economists reached the 
conclusion that only the emigration of 1,000,000 people and a sharp diminu-
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tion in the birth rate among those remaining would permit the island even 
to approach economic self-support.” After reviewing the disadvantages of the 
three status alternatives, the news report indicated that although emigration 
in itself would not solve the island’s economic problem, it “would make a solu-
tion possible.” If Puerto Rico was not able to control its population, maintain-
ing a minimum standard of living “will be contingent upon their receiving a 
substantial and very likely an ever-increasing, measure of outside aid.”66
It is also worthwhile to point out how a prelude to this report was 
embraced a year earlier in Puerto Rico. The Tariff Commission study had been 
commissioned by the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs at 
the request of Senator Millard Tydings, who, in 1945, submitted another of 
his bills for the independence of Puerto Rico. In April 1945, Dorfman pre-
sented some of the report’s findings to the Senate committee, arguing that 
all status alternatives had economic disadvantages for the island, although he 
acknowledged that Puerto Rico’s relationship to the United States had been on 
the whole beneficial. He questioned the idea (under discussion by the Puerto 
Rican policy makers and scholars then) that measures like population con-
trol, industrialization, and increases in health and education standards alone 
would remedy the island’s dismal economic situation. Dorfman advanced 
the Tariff Commission’s conclusions that a “large-scale emigration from the 
island, amounting to between 750,000 to 1,000,000 persons, would not of 
itself assure a solution of the island’s major economic problems, but would 
merely make a solution possible.”67 The report added that past Puerto Rican 
experiences with emigration had been unsuccessful and that “any new emi-
gration program would clearly have no possibility of success unless it were 
carefully planned under competent and honest auspices and unless it were 
adequately financed.” It then presented one of the findings repeated through-
out the report: “As long as Puerto Rico remains in its present political relation 
to the United States, however, Puerto Ricans are legally free to move to the 
mainland without restriction.” On the other hand, Puerto Rican emigration 
to the United States “would be restricted under the proposed independence 
alternative.”68
It is very important to notice here that although throughout the war 
period U.S. and Puerto Rican policy makers debated the idea of migration, 
there was really no consensus regarding its character (if it should be on an 
individual basis or a mass planned migration) or its direction (whether it 
should be directed to Latin America or to the U.S. mainland). For example, 
the three congressional reports discussed earlier recommended migration—
but not necessarily to the United States; these usually suggested that Puerto 
Rican migration would be directed to Latin America or the Caribbean. By the 
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summer of 1947, Puerto Rican policy makers would be debating not whether 
to promote migration but where to direct it: to allow the continuation of 
migration to the U.S. mainland or to direct it to Latin America. But by the 
time U.S. and Puerto Rican policy makers came to discuss the issue, Puerto 
Rican migration was already moving in one direction: to the United States. It 
was decided by the Puerto Rican masses, not the government. Puerto Rico’s 
migration policy simply followed the footsteps of migrants.
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“Neither Encouraging nor 
Discouraging”
The Making of Puerto Rico’s Migration Policy
A MASSIVE MOVEMENT  of people from Puerto Rico to the United States—
mainly to New York City—began by the end of the war, promoted by the end 
of the war blockade, cheaper air transportation, and the need for cheap labor 
in mainland industries and spurred by the deepening economic crisis on the 
island. In August 1946, Puerto Rico’s first native-appointed governor, Jesús T. 
Piñero, declared in New York that one of his priorities was to the deal with 
“the situation of approximately three hundred fifty thousand Puerto Ricans 
living in New York.” Decision makers in Puerto Rico and New York City were 
concerned about the “problems” created by the massive entrance of Puerto 
Ricans to the city.1 It would take almost a year for the Puerto Rican govern-
ment to adopt some concrete steps in dealing with the migration of Puerto 
Ricans to New York. Meanwhile, the most rabid anti–Puerto Rican campaign 
in the United States began in New York City by early 1947.2 It became known 
in the United States and Puerto Rico as the “Puerto Rican problem.”
The Puerto Rican government’s migration policy, enacted into law in 
December 1947, was a reaction to the “Puerto Rican problem” in New York 
City. It was after this racist anti–Puerto Rican campaign that the island gov-
ernment formulated and implemented its policy to organize and promote 
migration to the United States. Some of the most important aspects of the 
government’s migration policy came as a response to the public debate gen-
erated by this event: its attempt to control and regulate the labor flow to the 
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United States, the channeling of migrants outside New York City, the open-
ing of the Migration Division in New York City, the teaching of English to 
prospective migrants, and the process of screening and selecting potential 
migrants in Puerto Rico, among other policies.
The rapid and massive entry of Puerto Ricans to New York City in the 
immediate postwar period reflects a crucial dilemma in the relationship 
between the United States and its colonial territory and subjects. One impor-
tant feature of the “Puerto Rican problem” debate in New York was the call 
by several institutions, including the report by the New York Welfare Com-
mittee on Puerto Ricans and by representatives of the Puerto Rican govern-
ment, for the U.S. federal government to get involved in the regulation of the 
mass movement of islanders to the U.S. mainland. The federal government did 
not attend to this call for obvious reasons: Puerto Ricans are technically U.S. 
citizens, and the federal government could not intervene in the movement of 
citizens from one area of the United States to another. When nativists reacted 
to the presence of Filipinos in western states in the 1920s and 1930s, they 
forced the federal government to intervene to stop migration from the Phil-
ippines since Filipinos were U.S. nationals, not citizens.3 Given the inability 
of any government entity in the United States—federal, state, or city—to stop 
or regulate Puerto Rican migration, the Puerto Rican government assumed 
the organization of migration from Puerto Rico to the United States. The 
Puerto Rican government, with the consent and support of social and politi-
cal institutions in New York (a predominant receiving destination for island 
migrants), also assumed responsibility for the incorporation of Puerto Ricans 
in U.S. mainland society in the postwar years. Even though the colonial state 
had engaged in the management of migration since the U.S. occupation, sev-
eral elements were needed for this more encompassing management role: a 
revised policy, a new philosophy, and new bureaucratic institutions.
The first section of this chapter reviews the government’s ideas on how to 
control population growth and its relationship with migration policy. In the 
absence of a concrete program for population control, by the late 1940s the 
Puerto Rican government espoused migration as the main mechanism to con-
trol overpopulation. The chapter later examines several factors that influenced 
the making of Puerto Rico’s migration policy in 1947. It presents an analysis of 
the first newsworthy postwar experience of Puerto Rican migrants—in Chi-
cago, during early 1947—and how the island government responded. After 
examining the “Puerto Rican problem” in New York City, the chapter fol-
lows with a discussion on how the issue of migration to the United States and 
elsewhere was debated by island government functionaries and advisers. The 
creation of the governor’s Advisory Committee on Migration at the height of 
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the “Puerto Rican problem” campaign signaled the beginning of a process that 
led to the formulation of a migration policy by the end of 1947.
The chapter concludes with a discussion of how migration policy was 
formulated, particularly the important role played in that process by the 
commissioner of labor, Fernando Sierra Berdecía. It also examines how the 
government’s migration policy main discourse—that the government did not 
encourage or discourage migration—not only tried to address the worries of 
U.S. government and private institutions concerned with the entry of island 
migrants, but also concealed the government’s active participation in the 
movement of its people into the United States.
MIGRATION AND POPULATION CONTROL
Since the 1920s, birth control programs were discussed in Puerto Rico as a 
mechanism to control population growth, and there were repeated attempts 
to implement these programs on the island. According to Briggs, a group of 
“modernizers”—who saw in birth control policies a means to advance Puerto 
Rico’s economic and social modernization and development—made their 
voices heard in the 1940s. For modernizers, overpopulation was the cause of 
Puerto Rican poverty; it was a problem that needed to be solved in order to 
move the island forward.4 This was the position assumed by the PPD leader-
ship in the mid-1940s. Like many others, Muñoz Marín believed that over-
population was the most important problem facing Puerto Rico then. He was 
nevertheless reluctant to propose population control programs as a remedy to 
the problem. Instead, he emphasized the “battle of production” as a solution 
to overpopulation—that is, economic modernization and growth would in 
time lead to a decrease in population.5 Although many PPD leaders favored 
birth control programs, their government did not officially promote the 
practice, probably due to fear of opposition from the Catholic Church and 
nationalists.6
An example of how overpopulation and migration became an important 
issue of public debate at this time is the public forum sponsored by the Public 
Health Association of Puerto Rico, held on July 18 and 19, 1946, titled “Puerto 
Rico’s Population Problem.” Its conclusions, published later that year, listed 
possible solutions to the “population problem”: education, migration, birth 
control, economic improvement, industrial and agricultural development, 
and population redistribution. It concluded by noting the general agreement 
among the participants that none of the solutions were themselves sufficient to 
solve the problem, and that it would take a combination of some or all of them 
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to affect the situation.7 In his introduction to this publication, Muñoz Marín 
stated that “this population problem is possibly the most serious one that our 
people confront [since] it affects practically all the other great problems of 
Puerto Rico.”8 Although Muñoz Marín was initially hesitant to support any 
specific solution to the population problem, particularly if it meant supporting 
birth control programs, by 1947 the government had adopted migration as the 
best solution to solve Puerto Rico’s population problem.9
On the issue of migration, the major debate was between Clarence Senior 
and Salvador Tió (an important PPD intellectual). Senior presented his view 
of migration, later published in his Puerto Rican Emigration: migration might 
be an immediate alternative, but it was not the solution to the island’s popula-
tion problem. He saw in organized mass migration a sign of defeat in facing 
the island’s economic and social problems, a policy too costly and extremely 
difficult to carry out. Tió assumed a different position, arguing that migration 
would be the “cheapest” solution to the population problem. The dilemma 
for him was between “emigration or hunger,” and migration would allow 
other social and economic measures to succeed. He proposed migration to 
South America, where the best conditions for an organized mass migration of 
Puerto Ricans prevailed.10 Similarly, Teodoro Moscoso, Economic Develop-
ment Administration (EDA) director, argued that without “a vast program 
of emigration to more promising lands, coupled with an intense program of 
industrialization and birth control, Puerto Rico’s greatest problem will never 
be resolved.”11
The government’s reluctance to promote birth control programs meant 
that migration became the main mechanism to control the island’s overpop-
ulation. According to Senior some years later, migration was “contributing 
greatly to the reduction of population pressures in Puerto Rico. It is the only 
means, short of widespread death, of directly reducing the present population. 
That such reduction is needed to give the industrial, agricultural, educational, 
and other reconstruction programs a chance to work seems clear.”12 Popula-
tion expert Kingsley Davis characterized Puerto Rico as a “crowded island,” 
the result “of an extremely rapid population growth.” He stated that without 
emigration, the island’s population density would have been even higher and 
concluded: “Emigration has been Puerto Rico’s demographic escape valve.”13
Puerto Rico’s postwar government became seriously involved with 
the management of migration for the first time in late 1946. Surprisingly, 
this involvement began with labor issues arising in Chicago. This situation 
prompted the first examination of the question of migration in the postwar 
period and was the first in a series of events that led to the making of Puerto 
Rico’s migration policy in late 1947.
All Rights Reserved. Copyright © The Ohio State University Press, 2017. Batch 1.
 T H E MA K I N G O F P U E R TO R I CO ’S  M I G R AT I O N P O L I C Y •  53
CHICAGO
In December 1946, a group of Puerto Rican and progressive students from 
the University of Chicago released a preliminary report on the conditions of 
Puerto Rican workers in Chicago. It criticized the working and living condi-
tions of nearly 300 women employed as domestic workers in the Chicago area 
and that of fifty males working at the Chicago Hardware Foundry Co. Accord-
ing to the report, these workers were hired under contract by the Castle, Bar-
ton and Associates (CBA) Employment Agency, and the working contracts 
were approved by the Puerto Rican Department of Labor. However, workers 
were hired under conditions that violated the department’s own regulations. 
They complained that the department did not supervise the working condi-
tions stipulated by the contract. They also stated that on a visit to the Chi-
cago Hardware Foundry, the commissioner of labor, Manuel A. Pérez, was 
able to examine their poor working conditions and did nothing to improve 
them. Pérez responded that the workers had signed the contract voluntarily 
and that the department would intervene only in case of contract violations. 
Both domestic and foundry workers complained that the transportation costs 
were higher than the standard rate, that they received wages lower than the 
standard rate in Chicago, and that they had extreme deductions taken from 
their paychecks. Foundry workers complained of inadequate working and liv-
ing conditions and that they had no health or unemployment benefits.14
One of the students protesting laborers’ poor conditions was Muna 
(Munita) Muñoz Lee, Muñoz Marín’s daughter. Writing to her father, Muñoz 
Lee stated that both students and workers were interested in having him study 
the situation, since “if don Luis [Muñoz Marín] knew [about the situation] 
this would not happen; he is the only person that defends us.” Muñoz Lee 
explained that the group was not opposed, in principle, to migration as a 
means to solve Puerto Rico’s economic problem; however, the existing migra-
tion system, comprising exploitative contracts, did not protect workers’ rights. 
She insisted that the employment of Puerto Rican migrants had generated 
resentment among U.S. mainland workers because Puerto Ricans were hired 
at lower wages.15
In a letter to Muñoz Marín, Pérez insisted that “the actions of these kids, 
well intentioned as they might be, could obstruct these emigration projects 
that were beginning to develop very satisfactorily.”16 In a letter to Muñoz Lee, 
Pérez demanded to see all the evidence of their accusations and challenged 
the group to provide information on better jobs and better contracts available 
to Puerto Ricans in the Chicago area. This, he maintained—and not protest—
would be a better contribution to his department’s efforts to reduced unem-
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ployment and misery in Puerto Rico. He also questioned the group’s criticism 
of an investigation carried out by the Illinois Department of Labor, which 
upheld the employer’s side; he called it official and objective.17
In his reply to an editorial in El Imparcial, which also published the stu-
dents’ report, Pérez asserted that it is better to have a second-rate job than 
no job at all, and that those who protested were doing a disservice to Puerto 
Rico. He maintained that his department had no resources to supervise these 
contracts, that it had no part in the elaboration of contracts, that workers 
signed contracts voluntarily, and that the department’s function was to guar-
antee that the contracts followed the law and provided satisfactory working 
and living conditions. He disregarded the workers’ complaints of low salaries 
by saying that they were nonskilled workers who could not expect high sala-
ries. Regarding the foundry workers’ charges of exaggerated deductions by the 
employer, Pérez replied that if after all the legal deductions—including remit-
tances to family back home—they had little, “Whose fault is it?” He added, “In 
Puerto Rico they do not have even the opportunity to cover their expenses.” 
He argued that the workers were advised by his department of the working 
and living conditions they would face in the United States before leaving the 
island. Pérez insisted that these workers’ expeditions were not organized by 
the government and that many migrants left for the United States on their 
own, without even the minimum of protection offered by a contract. He com-
plained that if protests continued, the department would not be able to find 
workers any contracts, and they would be forced to search for jobs without a 
contract or stay in Puerto Rico living “in misery and hopelessness.”18
This lack of solidarity with migrant workers’ plight was out of step with 
a political party that still claimed to defend the masses. Furthermore, Pérez 
strongly believed that migration was an individual’s decision and that the gov-
ernment should in no way intervene in the movement of people to the United 
States, most particularly in terms of organizing mass migration.19 Just a few 
months after the Chicago incident, Pérez—an appointee of Governor Tug-
well—was replaced as commissioner of labor by Fernando Sierra Berdecía.
The Chicago situation was more serious than Pérez acknowledged: two 
investigations by Puerto Rican government officials confirmed the complaints 
presented by workers and in the students’ report. The first investigation was 
carried out by Carmen Isales, of the Department of Health’s Division of Pub-
lic Welfare. Her report to Muñoz Marín presented the evidence that Pérez 
had defiantly requested from the students. Isales was not against migration; 
her report’s objective was “that mistakes be corrected to prevent that emigra-
tions in the future have those undesired results that this one had.” Isales’s 
letter to Muñoz Marín presented the best political rationale for a conscious 
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and managed migration by the government: migration should “become one 
of the most feasible means to solve our [population] problem” but must be 
managed correctly “since the mistakes that are made affect fundamentally the 
hegemony of the party. The frustrated worker that returns to the country with-
out having achieved his ambitions is a seed of discontent and distrust for the 
party.” Isales questioned the contract approved by the Department of Labor 
and asserted that the working conditions for these migrants were “completely 
undesirable in terms of wages and working conditions.”20
While Isales’s report contained the same conclusions as the university stu-
dents’ reports, her findings were more extensive. With the support of the Chi-
cago YWCA, she confirmed the allegations made by many domestic workers. 
Isales also confirmed the allegations by foundry workers that the company 
was making excessive and illegal deductions from their salaries, while the 
migrants remained without access to social and medical services.21 Isales’s pre-
liminary report presented a severe critique of the Puerto Rican Department 
of Labor, accusing it of betraying the interests of island migrants. She argued 
that the department pressured the workers to comply with the contract even if 
the working and living conditions were not those promised by the agency. She 
questioned how the department could support a contract for workers if, in the 
words of a CBA representative, it “wasn’t worth the paper it was written on.” 
The report interrogated its support for a contract that stipulated for salaries 
below regional standards. Also, the department was criticized for not provid-
ing any support to those domestic workers who had abandoned their jobs due 
to the unsatisfactory working conditions and contract violations. Regarding 
the foundry workers, Isales questioned how the department could approve 
their employment in an industry that did not provide decent working and 
living conditions. She concluded that Puerto Rican workers in Chicago were 
abandoned without any help or support from the Puerto Rican government 
or any other public agency.22
A second examination of the Chicago situation was entrusted by Muñoz 
Marín to Vicente Géigel Polanco, president of the Senate’s Labor Committee 
and an outstanding PPD leader who was behind much of the PPD’s social 
legislation. His investigation reaffirmed all of the conclusions of the students’ 
and Isales’s reports. Géigel Polanco proposed a better selection of workers and 
stricter regulations concerning their recruitment, concluding: “If we are able 
to channel the emigration of workers in a more effective way we will do a great 
service to Puerto Rico by reducing unemployment in the Island.”23 Based on 
Géigel Polanco’s report, the legislature approved Law 89 in May 1947, granting 
powers to the Department of Labor to oversee the hiring of workers under 
contract to the United States and to regulate and approve all contracts. It also 
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proclaimed that no worker would be protected by the government of Puerto 
Rico unless the contract had been approved by the department. All foreign 
employers would be forced to inform the department of their intention to hire 
workers in Puerto Rico.24
But the greatest push for what became Puerto Rico’s 1947 migration policy 
came from outside Puerto Rico. It came from events happening in New York 
City. Here and in Puerto Rico it became known as the “Puerto Rican problem.”
THE PUERTO RICAN PROBLEM IN NEW YORK CITY
From conservative tabloids to the liberal New York Times, an adverse public 
campaign against the entry of Puerto Ricans emerged in the city’s media in 
1947. This campaign concentrated on a number of “problems” posed by the 
entrance of the new migrants to the city: housing overcrowding, unemploy-
ment, crime, illnesses, and particularly this group’s lack of capacity to assimi-
late to the new society. News articles emphasized the “tropical” character of 
these people, their inclination to go into welfare, and their ignorance of the 
English language. One issue of concern was the rapid and growing numbers 
of Puerto Ricans coming to the city; another was the support given by Puerto 
Ricans to Congressman Vito Marcantonio (a political issue that worried both 
the city’s and the Puerto Rican governments).25
The “Puerto Rican problem” began in earnest in early February, when the 
New York tabloid PM began a series on Puerto Ricans in the city. It argued that 
in the previous six months, some fifty thousand Puerto Ricans had entered the 
city. Calling it “the first airborne migration of history,” the report compared 
Puerto Ricans to the depression “Okies” that roamed the Southwest during 
the thirties (immortalized in John Steinbeck’s Grapes of Wrath). The news-
paper criticized the Puerto Rican government for not controlling this mas-
sive exodus of people and publicized the complaints by the city’s welfare and 
service agencies said to be overwhelmed by the sheer numbers of migrants. It 
announced the formation of a New York Welfare Council committee to study 
the disconcerting situation created by and facing Puerto Ricans in the city. 
New York government officials deplored the problem Puerto Ricans presented 
for adaptation and assimilation: they came from a different culture and spoke 
a different language, were mostly unskilled laborers, moved to overcrowded 
areas, and had no traditions in basic health and education standards.26 These 
ideas are, in a nutshell, the basic elements of what became known as the 
“Puerto Rican problem” in New York City. The issue took on a new perspec-
tive when the prestigious New York Times also reported on the situation of 
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Puerto Ricans in the city, particularly their substandard living conditions in 
El Barrio, claiming that their numbers reached three hundred fifty thousand.27
Meanwhile, the island’s resident commissioner, Antonio Fernós-Isern, 
announced in New York the government’s intention to open a “recoloniza-
tion” program to supervise migration to the mainland. One office would be 
opened in San Juan to advise prospective migrants and another one in New 
York to help them in their adaptation to the city. He emphasized the need for 
migrants to relocate outside New York City. The news report indicated that 
“Dr. Fernós elaborated his plan after consultation with New York’s welfare 
agencies, which took place last fall.”28
By late May, another actor in the “Puerto Rican problem” campaign in 
New York entered the fray. The New York World Telegram launched a series on 
Puerto Ricans in the city, mostly reiterating the issues already presented to the 
public. One segment of the series paid attention to the relationship of Puerto 
Ricans to Marcantonio, whose district included the Puerto Rican El Barrio. 
The report indicated that there was no tangible evidence that he was financ-
ing Puerto Rican migration for his own electoral purposes, as was proclaimed 
by his opponents. It also confirmed city government functionaries’ assertions 
that Puerto Ricans were not (yet) a “problem.”29
The campaign took a new turn with a series by the New York Times in 
August, this one more virulent than the previous one. It began by estimat-
ing the numbers of Puerto Ricans in the city at an astronomic six hundred 
thousand and reported the public hysteria created by the avalanche of new-
comers. The report stated that this “situation is causing New York City author-
ities increasing concern because of the housing, health and other problems 
involved.” It characterized migrants as “ill and destitute,” moving to over-
crowded neighborhoods and causing problems in areas such as health and 
crime. It cited government officials declaring that Puerto Ricans constituted 
a welfare problem: “Within a day or two after arrival many migrants seek 
assistance from the City Welfare Department.” Relief rolls were said to have 
increased dramatically with the arrival of Puerto Ricans and some charged that 
“many of the migrants continue on relief while they return to Puerto Rico.” 
Furthermore, as citizens, Puerto Ricans had no difficulty registering to vote, 
which meant that Marcantonio—by then a “persona non grata” in New York 
and American politics—“has been able to benefit by the extra registration.”30
The “Puerto Rican problem” became a national issue in the United States, 
as reflected in the publication of several articles in noted magazines with 
nationwide circulation. In late March, Newsweek reported that island migrants 
were reaching the city at a rate of eight thousand per month and that one 
out of twenty-two New Yorkers was then a Puerto Rican. In August, Time 
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published an article provocatively titled “Sugar-Bowl Migrants,” characteriz-
ing Puerto Ricans as “the 1947 version of the Okies” and asserting that their 
migration to the United States “was at flood tide.” The article argued that the 
“Okies were mainly California’s problem. The problem of Puerto Ricans is 
chiefly New York’s.” It criticized the Puerto Rican government for not doing 
enough to control the migrant tide.31
The 1947 “Puerto Rican problem” campaign lasted until the end of the 
year. By that time, Puerto Rico’s government had formulated its migration 
policy. But the Puerto Rican government’s counterattack to the “Puerto Rican 
problem” began in August. The government’s ad hoc Migration Advisory 
Committee was meeting regularly to decide on measures to counter the situ-
ation. The government also decided to use the American media to defend 
their positions. An example is the well-known letter to the New York Times by 
Fernós-Isern, where he called Puerto Rico’s economic and political situation a 
“national responsibility” and argued that Puerto Rican migration was neces-
sary for the island’s well-being.32
Also, Puerto Rican government functionaries announced in early August 
1947 that Columbia University would conduct a “survey” of Puerto Rican 
migrants in New York to assess their situation there and make recommen-
dations to solve the “problem.” By commissioning Columbia University, the 
Puerto Rican government was trying to appease public opinion in New York 
City by hiring one of its outstanding academic institutions to carry out a “sci-
entific” study of Puerto Ricans there. The study’s conclusions were welcomed 
by the Puerto Rican government: Puerto Ricans went to New York looking 
for jobs, not welfare; their socioeconomic characteristics were higher than 
the general standards in Puerto Rico; and their numbers had not surpassed 
two hundred thousand in New York City. The so-called Puerto Rican Study 
later became The Puerto Rican Journey, written by C. Wright Mills, Senior, and 
Rose K. Goldsen.33
As acknowledged by José Monserrat, director of the Migration Division 
in the United States for many years, the “Puerto Rican problem” in New York 
City had a major impact on how Puerto Rican and U.S. policy makers viewed 
Puerto Rican migration afterward and played a determining role in the for-
mulation of Puerto Rico’s migration policy.34
EXAMINING MIGRATION IN 1947
As migration became an issue of debate in the Puerto Rican media and in 
government circles, policy recommendations began to emerge from within 
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several government entities. For example, Julio Machuca, from the Depart-
ment of Labor, included an analysis of “emigration under a scientific basis” in 
a policy paper submitted to government leaders on the situation of the work-
ing class in Puerto Rico. Emigration—a solution to Puerto Rico’s biggest prob-
lem, overpopulation—had to be planned; workers should be given adequate 
preparation and receiving destinations carefully studied. Machuca proposed 
emigration to Latin America as the best alternative.35
An ardent promoter of migration as a solution to Puerto Rico’s economic 
woes was Don O’Connor, an economic adviser at Puerto Rico’s Office in Wash-
ington. In a March 1947 policy paper, O’Connor argued that a “guided and 
encouraged removal and relocation” program was the only rational alternative 
to the island’s population pressure and that, “whatever the unpleasant conno-
tations and implications are, the advocacy of seeking jobs elsewhere than in 
Puerto Rico is a counsel of necessity.” He concluded by calling for an effective 
public policy to improve the island’s ills, arguing that “voluntary removal and 
relocation guided and initially underwritten by government should serve to 
ameliorate the prospective conditions of life in Puerto Rico.”36
O’Connor expanded his ideas on a “guided” migration in another paper, 
claiming that the “fear of political repercussions is proper” and that these 
would occur if “relocation” of migrants concentrated in one area, like New 
York City; he proposed that migration be diverted to several places in the 
United States. “But,” he added, “repercussions, local and national, are a part 
of any significant program. They might be lessened if emphasis is given to 
the long history of internal migration” in the United States. Common ele-
ments like American citizenship should be stressed to diminish opposition in 
the mainland. O’Connor also suggested that the migration of women should 
be encouraged as a means of reducing population growth, if “public opinion 
permits”: “The most assured way to reduce population, as Ireland did, is to 
remove the child-bearers to this mainland.”37
O’Connor also proposed a plan for the relocation of Puerto Ricans to 
the Dominican Republic. In exchange for the free entry of Dominican goods 
to Puerto Rico, the Dominican government would agree to allow the reset-
tlement of six hundred thousand Puerto Ricans over a period of ten years. 
The plan included a $40 million loan to buy some 2.5 million acres and to 
provide transportation costs. O’Connor’s plan was vetoed by the U.S. State 
Department.38
O’Connor presented another plan for the resettlement of Puerto Rican 
farmers in Venezuela, in which this government would provide three million 
acres for the settlement and would allow the immigration of twenty thou-
sand “certified” Puerto Rican farmers a year, up to a net total of five hundred 
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thousand; Puerto Rican settlers would become Venezuelan citizens after seven 
years of residence. The U.S. government would create a Resettlement Corpo-
ration that would “prepare, select and certify” Puerto Ricans for immigration 
to Venezuela. It would also provide a $50 million loan to the corporation for 
transportation, housing, and infrastructure costs and to finance professional 
services. O’Connor’s proposal found resistance in Puerto Rico and the United 
States.39 Nevertheless, his plans for emigration programs to the Dominican 
Republic and Venezuela would be discussed in the coming weeks by the gov-
ernment’s Emigration Advisory Committee.
By the autumn of 1947, another perspective on migration was published in 
Puerto Rico. This was the highly circulated Puerto Rican Emigration by Clar-
ence Senior, director of the Social Science Research Center at the University 
of Puerto Rico and later director of the Migration Division in New York. This 
work is regarded by many as highly significant in delineating Puerto Rico’s 
migration policy during this time—a misguided view, as will be clarified later 
in this chapter. For now, I would like to summarize some of Senior’s most 
important findings in Puerto Rican Emigration. Senior proposed emigration 
within a broader program of economic and social development and not as a 
comprehensive solution to Puerto Rico’s overpopulation problem. He argued 
that migration “can make a contribution only if it is part of a broad program of 
population adjustment. . . . Raising levels of living, education, planned parent-
hood and emigration are all inter-related and must be advanced vigorously.”40
The first part of the publication is devoted to a study of past Puerto Rican 
migrations to the United States; the second part examines concrete plans for 
Puerto Rican “colonization” projects in Latin America. No concrete program 
of migration to the United States is discussed. Senior argued that in confront-
ing Puerto Rico’s “desperate” situation, emigration “must be pushed inten-
sively, with enthusiasm, initiative and imagination but also with balanced 
judgment. .  .  . Emigration must be organized.” Like O’Connor and other 
government functionaries before him, he proposed that migrants must be 
selected, and conditions of migration—including the places of reception—
must be carefully considered. Although he acknowledged that “migration to 
the continental United States seems to offer the best immediate opportunities,” 
migration plans to Latin America “should not be neglected.”41
Perhaps the most often quoted recommendation of Senior’s work was his 
proposal to create an “Emigration Office,” usually understood as the precursor 
idea to the Migration Office in New York.42 But in fact, the idea of an emigra-
tion office pertaining to migration to the United States was not extensively 
discussed in Senior’s report, nor were its functions and objectives detailed. 
It is not evident that Senior was proposing the institution that would be cre-
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ated months later. Furthermore, Senior presented the idea for an emigration 
office while reviewing “colonization” plans for Puerto Ricans in Latin Amer-
ica, although in the conclusions he proposed that the office could also deal 
with migration to the United States. The office—to be attached to the Gover-
nor’s Office—would report on “any definite possibilities for colonization with 
a specific program, including direct costs” and should gather information “on 
jobs and settlement possibilities in Latin America.” Colonization projects in 
Latin America should be carefully considered, since “migration for settlement 
may offer far greater possibilities for ‘export’ of men and women.”43 Senior 
proposed a migration program to Venezuela as a possible alternative.
The idea that Senior played an influential role in the formulation of Puerto 
Rico’s migration policy, including in the creation of the Migration Division, 
needs to be questioned. The ideas he presented in his emigration report 
might have had some influence in the debates held at the Governor’s Advi-
sory Committee on Migration, of which he was a member. But the idea to 
create a government office in charge of migration had been already presented 
in the debates related to the “Puerto Rican problem” in New York. Further-
more, Senior was never a member of the small circle of policy makers close 
to Muñoz Marín that formulated public policy in Puerto Rico at the time. 
Commissioner of Labor Sierra Berdecía was, and he played a central role in 
the formulation and implementation of the government’s migration policy for 
several decades.
DEBATING POLICY: THE MIGRATION ADVISORY COMMITTEE
The creation of the Migration Advisory Committee by Governor Piñero at the 
height of the “Puerto Rican problem” in July 1947 signaled the government’s 
acknowledgment of the need to develop a course of action to define a policy 
regarding Puerto Rican migration. Acting governor Juan A. Pons asserted in 
the letter creating the committee, “I think the moment has come to begin to 
make decisions that serve as guide to a program of migration.” The “aspects of 
the problem” that required “careful consideration” were “encouragement and 
aid that must be provided by the Insular Government; the extent and direc-
tion of the program; areas that must be considered to provide good oppor-
tunities for employment; if the Federal government should be approached 
regarding a colonization program, or if we should limit ourselves to what can 
be done through our own effort even if it is on a smaller scale.” The govern-
ment officials appointed to the committee were Governor’s Assistant Daisy D. 
Reck, Planning Director Rafael Picó, EDA’s Moscoso, Secretary of Education 
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Mariano Villaronga, Ramón Colón Torres, Senior, and Géigel Polanco. The 
committee was presided over by Sierra Berdecía and met for the first time on 
July 21.44
Minutes of the first two meetings were not found in archival research. But 
related correspondence indicates that some of the issues discussed in the first 
meeting included the migration of female domestic workers to the United 
States and plans for migration to Brazil and Venezuela.45 The committee’s 
third meeting was held on August 18, and the “Puerto Rican problem” in New 
York was extensively discussed: “copies of reprints from New York newspa-
pers, concerning Puerto Rican immigrants, were distributed to the members.” 
Correspondence between Dr. Raymond Crist and Picó concerning migration 
to Venezuela was discussed. A report by “the Sub-committee of Long Range 
Emigration”—which recommended that the governor request the U.S. gov-
ernment to study the possibility of Puerto Rican migration to Brazil—was 
reviewed. Senior presented a report on his conversations with Brazilian offi-
cials regarding their economic development programs. A subcommittee of 
Sierra Berdecía, Senior, and Rafael Fernández García was created to discuss 
with Fernós-Isern the feasibility of talks with U.S. government officials regard-
ing Puerto Rican migration to Venezuela.46
The committee’s fourth meeting was held in late August. Fernández Gar-
cía and Senior reported on their meeting with Fernós-Isern, “who has been 
spending a considerable amount of time and energy in Washington on prob-
lems arising from Puerto Rican emigration to the United States and has been 
discussing possible emigration to other places with government officials.” The 
“most important projects under discussion in Washington” were (1) the pos-
sibility of “mixing” Puerto Ricans with some four hundred thousand displaced 
persons from Europe if they were to be relocated in the Americas, (2) the 
plan to provide free trade to the Dominican Republic in exchange for admis-
sion of Puerto Rican farmers (the O’Connor plan), and (3) colonization plans 
in Venezuela. The first and second projects had been discussed at the State 
Department, the third at undisclosed Washington circles. Fernández García 
recommended that Fernós-Isern gave some thought to colonization plans in 
Brazil. Finally, “it was voted to arrange for an appointment with the Gover-
nor, Senator Muñoz Marín and Dr. Fernós to discuss further activities of the 
Committee.”47
The fifth committee meeting, held on September 11, was an important 
one that included the participation of Piñero, Muñoz Marín, Sierra Berdecía, 
Géigel Polanco, Senior, Francisco Collazo (Department of Education), Reck, 
Moscoso, and Picó, among others. The presence of Muñoz Marín, Piñero, 
and other top government officials denoted the significance of this meeting: 
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a course of action was required. Fernós-Isern indicated that the possibility 
of mixing Puerto Ricans with displaced persons from Europe, specifically in 
Venezuela, was discussed at the State Department. Several objections were 
raised to this proposal; the committee agreed that although talks with Wash-
ington might be held on this issue, “it would be highly undesirable to try to 
mix the two groups in the actual colonization efforts.” Piñero disclosed that 
representatives of the Dutch government had conveyed their willingness to 
accept Puerto Rican workers in the banana plantations of Surinam and in the 
oil refineries of Curaçao.
Piñero also shared that the government of the Dominican Republic had 
expressed its disposition to accept Puerto Rican farmers and had offered one 
hundred thousand acres to be distributed in family farms of one hundred 
acres each. Muñoz Marín questioned the viability of Puerto Rican families 
working such vast farms and also was concerned with the costs of such a ven-
ture to the Puerto Rican government. The committee agreed that “in spite of 
the dictatorship, the Dominican possibilities should be carefully investigated,” 
although several objections were raised concerning this government’s policy 
of accepting only “white” Puerto Ricans, and a small number at that. Finally, 
Muñoz Marín “raised the question of the need for the immediate organization 
of an Emigration office,” as recommended in Senior’s “Puerto Rican Emigra-
tion” report. The committee agreed to have Sierra Berdecía draft a plan that 
“after consultation with Senators Géigel Polanco, Muñoz Marín and Governor 
Piñero would be presented to the Executive Council” at its next meeting.48
What is the meaning of these discussions held by the Migration Advi-
sory Committee? First of all, the incorporation of Muñoz Marín and Piñero 
into the last meeting denoted the urgency of developing a course of action to 
deal with the issue of Puerto Rican migration to the United States. Second, 
most committee discussions centered on migration plans to Latin America 
and not to the United States. It appears that Puerto Rican government officials 
intended to defuse the “Puerto Rican problem” by directing migration away 
from the U.S. mainland. Finally, it is evident that no specific course of action 
was taken during these meetings. It could be assumed that the committee 
could not come to a decision then as to a particular policy.
By the end of the summer of 1947, the Puerto Rican government realized 
the significance of the migration problem for its future economic and politi-
cal reform programs. The very existence of the governor’s Migration Advisory 
Committee, as well as the debates that ensued within it, signaled a shift in the 
direction of the government’s attention on the topic: while in early August the 
government was still arguing that Puerto Rican migration was a “national” 
issue for the United States that required federal attention and action,49 by Sep-
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tember, the focus had shifted to a more active stance on the problem. By the 
end of December, the government approved its migration policy. It was for-
mulated by Commissioner of Labor Sierra Berdecía.
FERNANDO SIERRA BERDECÍA AND PUERTO RICO’S 
MIGRATION POLICY
On June 30, 1947, Piñero appointed Sierra Berdecía commissioner of labor. 
He was a loyal PPD member and government functionary, and a close ally of 
Muñoz Marín, with whom he shared many experiences (he was a journalist 
and a writer, had lived in the United States, and was attracted to leftist ideals 
in his youth). Like Muñoz Marín, Sierra Berdecía had been an independen-
tista in the Liberal Party; he followed him in forming the PPD in 1938, and 
he would eventually abandon independence as a goal and support the cre-
ation of Commonwealth status.50 His designation as commissioner of labor 
represented a new chapter in Puerto Rico’s migration history: he became the 
architect of the government’s postwar migration policy. After a two-month 
journey throughout the United States, Sierra Berdecía’s late 1947 report to the 
governor provided the framework for the government’s migration policy as 
established in the Migration Law of December 1947. By the end of the year, the 
department’s team in charge of migration was in place, with the appointment 
of Petroamérica Pagán de Colón as director of the BEM.51 This bureau—along 
with the Migration Division in the United States, the Farm Placement Pro-
gram, and the campaign to have Puerto Ricans declared domestic labor in the 
United States—carried Sierra Berdecía’s intellectual signature. It is clear that 
no other government functionary influenced the government’s migration pol-
icy as he did as commissioner of labor from 1947 to 1960—the heyday of not 
only the Commonwealth status and Operation Bootstrap but also of Puerto 
Rican migration to the United States.52
Most of organized labor in Puerto Rico welcomed Sierra Berdecía’s 
appointment as commissioner of labor. His previous tenure at the Minimum 
Wage Board and the Labor Relations Board had made him sympathetic to 
labor demands and needs.53 His philosophy for guiding the department was 
based on his belief that the state in Puerto Rico had historically guaranteed 
basic rights for labor, like organizing and negotiation of contracts, and that 
the PPD government had recognized the rights of workers to jobs and decent 
wages. So, there was no reason why workers should follow dangerous dema-
gogues who wanted them to go “from justice to the area of privileges.” Accord-
ing to Sierra Berdecía, the primary function of his department was to promote 
All Rights Reserved. Copyright © The Ohio State University Press, 2017. Batch 1.
 T H E MA K I N G O F P U E R TO R I CO ’S  M I G R AT I O N P O L I C Y •  65
industrial peace among employers and workers through collective bargaining 
and the implementation of laws protecting workers.”54
How did migration fit in this scheme presented by Sierra Berdecía? He 
argued that the government’s labor policy was fourfold. It needed “to create 
jobs through the promotion of new industries and other programs,” “to main-
tain industrial peace through the promotion of better employer-labor rela-
tions” by enforcing labor laws, and “to establish social security programs” to 
protect unemployed workers. Finally, the department was to “take advantage 
of available employment opportunities by a well-planned placement program 
in Puerto Rico itself designed to fill each vacant job with the workers best 
suited to it and by a search for jobs in other parts of the nation.”55 Migration, 
by reducing unemployment on the island, would be an important element in 
the promotion of “industrial peace” in Puerto Rico. Since the “promotion of 
new industries” through the government’s economic development program 
(Operation Bootstrap) failed to create the necessary number of jobs to reduce 
unemployment and promote the desired industrial peace, the migration of 
workers to the United States grew in importance for the PPD government.
THE MAKING OF PUERTO RICO’S MIGRATION POLICY
At the end of September 1947—after the last meeting of the governor’s Advi-
sory Committee on Migration—Sierra Berdecía began a journey of nearly two 
months in the United States devoted to the investigation of the “Puerto Rican 
problem” on the mainland. He visited those states in which Puerto Ricans 
were settling and working in agriculture, services, and industry. Having the 
island’s commissioner of labor away for nearly two months reflected the top 
priority given to this issue by the government. Puerto Rico’s new migration 
law came out from Sierra Berdecía’s journey in the United States. His report to 
governor Piñero—“Migration of Puerto Rican Workers to the United States”—
became the blueprint for the migration law. This document is without any 
doubt the most important text on the definition of Puerto Rico’s migration 
policy.
Before leaving for the United States, Sierra Berdecía advanced several 
norms the Department of Labor would follow in supervising the employment 
of Puerto Rican workers in the United States. It would provide information 
and its expertise to workers regarding “all the possibilities of jobs or employ-
ment that could exist in Puerto Rico, in the United States or in any country 
of South America where the workers wish to move voluntarily in search for 
better means of life.” The norms to be followed by the department were to 
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ensure (1) provision of the labor force required for Puerto Rican industry, (2) 
that Puerto Rican workers would migrate only to areas where there was a real 
demand for labor, (3) that they would receive the same salary for the same 
work as workers in the area, and (4) that they would accept union organizing 
in industries where such institutions were prevalent.56 Such norms became 
part of Puerto Rico’s migration policy.
After taking part in a conference for state and federal labor officials in 
North Carolina on September 23, Sierra Berdecía visited farms employing 
Puerto Rican farmworkers in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, investigated the 
situation of female domestic workers in Chicago and Philadelphia, and met 
with city officials in New York City.57 On October 28, he joined a conference 
devoted to the situation of island children in city schools with officials from 
the city’s Education Department, teachers, and Puerto Rican representatives. 
Social integration and lack of English proficiency were the main issues dis-
cussed at the meeting. Sierra Berdecía insisted that the island’s school system 
had “not been created with a perspective to prepare Puerto Ricans to emigrate 
in search of better opportunities.” He asserted that as long as this migrant flow 
could not be prevented, “a plan will be created to help them with an aim to 
eliminate in all we can the inevitable conflicts of adaptation and readjustment 
to the new environment.”58
The day after participating in this conference, Sierra Berdecía announced 
in New York that on his return to Puerto Rico, he would recommend “radical 
changes in the management of Puerto Ricans that migrate to the continental 
United States before they leave San Juan.” Adding that the articles in the New 
York City press (referring to the “Puerto Rican problem”) had induced him to 
take an interest in their situation, the commissioner insisted that “we believe 
that we should get into this migratory movement. .  .  . It is our obligation to 
try to give [migrants] some guide for them to adjust.” He also claimed that 
Mayor O’Dwyer had offered his cooperation to improve the migrants’ condi-
tions in the city and that he would recommend the creation of an Identifica-
tion Office in New York to deal with the readjustment problems of Puerto 
Ricans there.59
Sierra Berdecía subsequently traveled to Washington, DC, to discuss with 
government, labor, and employment officials, as well as representatives of 
private institutions, the possibilities of finding jobs for Puerto Ricans on the 
mainland. Among others, he met with U.S. Labor Secretary L. B. Schwellem-
bach to discuss possibilities for Puerto Ricans’ employment on the mainland.60 
Sierra Berdecía maintained that his meetings with people directly involved 
with Puerto Rican migrants had given him “an invaluable aid for the planning 
of the Insular government’s program.” He insisted that Puerto Rican migra-
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tion to the United States had to be approached from two perspectives: (1) 
migrants should leave Puerto Rico well aware of working and living condi-
tions on the mainland and with some vocational training and (2) the commu-
nities in which they settled must understand the migrants’ backgrounds and 
help them adjust to the new environment.61
On his return to Puerto Rico, Sierra Berdecía announced in a press con-
ference the results of his two-month investigation of the situation of Puerto 
Ricans in the United States. He declared that the problems faced by island 
migrants in New York City were “problems of adjustment to a foreign envi-
ronment” and reflected the same obstacles faced by all previous immigrants 
arriving in the city. He praised the Puerto Rican community in New York City 
for its honest work, for building a decent living in a different and difficult 
environment, and for making a great contribution to the economic welfare of 
the city.62 Days later, the local press reported that Sierra Berdecía was hold-
ing periodic meetings with Piñero, Muñoz Marín, and Fernós-Isern on how 
to confront the problems facing Puerto Ricans in New York City and how to 
increase their possibilities of success there.63
Sierra Berdecía submitted his report to governor Piñero on November 17, 
1947. Its recommendations would be transferred—almost word by word—to 
the new migration law to be approved in December. The report concentrated 
on the situation of female domestic workers in Philadelphia and Chicago, the 
prospects for employment of agricultural workers, and the situation of Puerto 
Ricans in New York City. It highlighted the encouraging possibilities for the 
employment of Puerto Ricans in agriculture since the suspension of the U.S. 
government program for hiring foreign agricultural workers from Jamaica 
and Mexico, and it suggested that workers could be mobilized for seasonal 
work on the mainland during the sugar industry’s tiempo muerto (dead sea-
son) (9–12).64
Sierra Berdecía devoted a long section of his report to the situation of 
Puerto Ricans in New York City. He observed that migration there had led to 
a widespread campaign in the city press “clearly aimed at achieving one way or 
the other that this migration be restricted.” He mentioned his talks with rep-
resentatives of many city government and private institutions concerned with 
the situation of Puerto Ricans, including Mayor O’Dwyer and Commissioner 
of Welfare Franklyn Fielding. According to Sierra Berdecía, the “problems that 
Puerto Ricans residing there confront are the typical problems of the groups 
that migrate to societies ethnologically different” (13). He contended that the 
greatest problem faced by Puerto Ricans in New York City was their lack of 
English proficiency, which “makes it impossible for them to get quickly in 
contact with the city agencies, private or public, that exist to solve the social 
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problems” of city residents (14). The commissioner proclaimed that O’Dwyer 
and Fielding considered the “Puerto Rican problem” as one of education and 
not of “relief.” He concluded that the three areas in which Puerto Ricans faced 
an “adjustment problem” were education, welfare, and employment (17).
The conclusions and recommendations of Sierra Berdecía’s report were the 
most significant part of this report and became an integral part of the Puerto 
Rican government’s migration policy. The report elucidated what would 
become the government’s migration policy central aspect:
A more active participation of the Government of Puerto Rico is necessary 
in this spontaneous migration of Puerto Ricans. We think that the govern-
ment’s policy should be that of neither encouraging nor discouraging the 
migration of Puerto Rican workers; but once it is spontaneously and freely 
initiated, it is the government’s duty and it must be its policy to provide the 
best help and orientation so that migrants know beforehand the problems 
of adjustment that they will confront and that they can confront and solve 
them with the greatest success, reducing to a minimum the natural difficul-
ties that every migratory movement faces. (18)
It must be Puerto Rico’s government “public policy” to cooperate with govern-
ment agencies in those areas where Puerto Ricans decide to work or settle. The 
government’s involvement should cover two areas: (1) in Puerto Rico itself, 
where prospective migrants should be provided with the necessary informa-
tion regarding U.S. working conditions, social and climatic environment, liv-
ing and housing conditions, and so on, and (2) in migrants’ settlement sites in 
the United States, where the Puerto Rican government should cooperate with 
state and local governments and private agencies for the “fastest and most 
efficient adjustment to the life of the community in which they will work or 
live” (19).
Sierra Berdecía’s report recommended the elimination of the Identifica-
tion Service in New York (ascribed to Puerto Rico’s Office in Washington) 
and the reorganization of the department’s Employment Service Office in 
order to create the Bureau of Employment and Migration within the Depart-
ment of Labor. The bureau would administer all legislation regulating private 
employment agencies and the hiring of workers migrating to the United States 
or any other country. Among its functions would be (1) coordinating with 
federal and state employment agencies to obtain information regarding the 
demand for labor in the United States, (2) gathering information of prospec-
tive migrants to New York City and other areas, (3) providing information 
to migrants on the conditions they would face on the mainland, (4) opening 
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and maintaining an information center for those interested in migrating, and 
(5) keeping an Identification Service center to provide official identifications 
to those wishing to migrate. Furthermore, the bureau would offer the neces-
sary information to Puerto Ricans interested in working in the United States, 
whether they were hired by private, federal, or state employment agencies or 
moved to the U.S. mainland on their own. The bureau would also cooperate 
with all employers interested in hiring Puerto Rican workers: it would main-
tain contact between employment specialists and Puerto Ricans workers in 
the sectors of agriculture, industry, and domestic service for cooperation in 
the solution of any grievances. Finally, the bureau would maintain a record of 
migration (18–22).
The other important recommendation of Sierra Berdecía’s report was to 
open an “office” in New York that would function
as a contact agency between Puerto Ricans that go to reside in that city and 
government agencies from the city, the state, and the Nation, and private 
institutions of social welfare; with jurisdiction in the problems of adjustment 
that recently arrived Puerto Ricans confront there, giving these all kinds of 
cooperation in their effort to adapt to the new environment. (20–21)
This office would focus on the areas of education, welfare, and employment. 
The commissioner ended by stating that these recommendations were pre-
sented and approved by the mayor of New York and the city’s Department of 
Welfare, among other institutions and personalities (22).65
PUERTO RICO’S MIGRATION LAW
On November 28, the Senate had approved a bill determining the govern-
ment’s policy henceforth regarding migration of Puerto Rican workers to the 
United States. Essentially institutionalized by the bill were the recommenda-
tions of Sierra Berdecía’s report. First of all, the bill established what became 
the leading discourse of the Puerto Rican government’s migration policy: that 
it did not “encourage nor discourage” the migration of Puerto Rican workers 
to the United States or any other country, but that it understood as its duty to 
orient those workers who chose to migrate to the conditions and “problems of 
adjustment” found in an “ethnically different environment.” It also states that 
since Puerto Ricans migrated to the United States in an exercise of their right 
as citizens, and that such voluntary migration had caused some problems in 
New York as result of adjustment problems, the government assumed its duty 
All Rights Reserved. Copyright © The Ohio State University Press, 2017. Batch 1.
70 •  C H A P T E R 2 
to orient these migrants and to cooperate with federal, state, and private agen-
cies interested in attenuating the problems of adjustment that such migration 
could cause. This cooperation would respect the jurisdiction of these agencies 
and aim to provide means of contact between the migrants and the agen-
cies. The government’s function of orientation and guidance would follow the 
principles enumerated in Sierra Berdecía’s report. The bill created the BEM 
and established its functions and responsibilities, as specified in Sierra Ber-
decía’s report.66 Law 25, better known today as Puerto Rico’s migration law, 
was approved on December 5, 1947.67 Besides institutionalizing the recommen-
dations of Sierra Berdecía’s report, the law revised previous legislation regard-
ing the Department of Labor to create the BEM and to open an office by this 
agency in New York City.
At the center of Puerto Rico’s migration policy was the position that the 
government would neither “encourage nor discourage” migration. This policy 
statement ran contrary to all the actions that were taken by the government 
in the following decades, a period during which it not only encouraged the 
migration of Puerto Ricans to the United States but also facilitated and orga-
nized it. As Sierra Berdecía acknowledged years later, the government’s policy 
of “not encouraging” migration to the United States was part of its “public 
relations” campaign to prevent opposition to Puerto Rican migration in the 
United States. Commenting on a proposal by O’Connor to create a public 
agency to finance transportation for migrant workers to the United States, 
Sierra Berdecía opposed the idea, arguing that “the change in the govern-
ment’s policy of ‘not encouraging nor discouraging migration’ for another of 
openly encouraging it could create very serious opposition and obstacles from 
the American communities where Puerto Ricans settle.” This could “seriously 
delay if not permanently obstruct the employment program of Puerto Rican 
workers in the United States, which we are developing under the most desir-
able public relations in the Mainland.”68 But even a staunch supporter of the 
PPD government like A. W. Maldonado would recognize years later that this 
policy of “neutrality” on the issue of migration was contradicted by the gov-
ernment’s actions:
If birth control clinics and outreach programs were not possible [for pop-
ulation control], the only obvious alternative was massive migration. But 
Muñoz and the Populares’ attitude toward migration was the same as toward 
birth control: neutrality—to neither discourage nor promote it. . . . But when 
a government makes it easy as possible for its people to migrate, when it 
trains them, gives instructions in new living conditions, provides basic Eng-
lish classes, battles the airlines to keep the fares low, and establishes employ-
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ment offices at their destination, isn’t it in effect sponsoring a policy that 
encourages migration?69
The idea that the Puerto Rican government was neutral in the migration of 
Puerto Ricans to the United States was a reaction to the “Puerto Rican prob-
lem” in New York City and elsewhere in the United States. The government 
argued for decades that although Puerto Ricans were migrating on their own, 
the government was helping them in their “adjustment” to the United States 
so that they would not become a “problem” there. Nevertheless, as Maldonado 
pointed out, there was no hiding the fact that the Puerto Rican government 
was promoting migration as a state policy, whether directly or indirectly.
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C H A P T E R  3
Puerto Ricans as Domestic Workers 
and the Farm Placement Program
THE PUER TO RIC AN  government’s approval of the migration law in Decem-
ber 1947 signaled its intent to advance organized migration as a solution to 
the perceived major problem of the island: overpopulation. Once the deci-
sion for this policy was made, the government began to explore programs 
and ideas that could facilitate the movement of people out of Puerto Rico. 
This issue became an important part of the government’s policies and its day-
to-day affairs even though concerns like economic development and status 
politics dominated the government’s public agenda and the public’s attention.
This chapter discusses the Puerto Rican government’s actions to advance 
the employment of Puerto Rican labor in the United States. Many U.S. employ-
ers preferred foreign workers who could be deported after their work was 
complete. The Puerto Rican government intervened with federal agencies and 
agricultural employers in the United States to encourage them to use Puerto 
Ricans workers. The government’s claim was based on the status of Puerto 
Ricans as “domestic labor,” with preferential treatment over foreign workers. 
The notion rested, of course, on their U.S. citizenship. The debate on Puerto 
Ricans as domestic labor illustrates how the privileges of citizenship—like 
having priority over alien labor—was not a given for these colonial citizens.
The chapter also discusses the Puerto Rican Farm Placement Program 
(FPP; also known as the Farm Labor Program), one of the most significant 
projects of Puerto Rico’s migration policy. This program illustrates the role of 
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the colonial government as a provider of labor to U.S. agricultural employers 
and places the government at the center of the movement of labor from the 
island to the U.S. mainland. The FPP remains the best example of an orga-
nized migration by the Puerto Rican government. But this program was also 
based on the notion that these migrants required special protection from the 
Puerto Rican government because, as a consequence of their racial and cul-
tural characteristics and their place of origin, they were not acknowledged as 
U.S. citizens with a right to work and settle in the U.S. mainland.
Lastly, the chapter addresses the government’s migration plans to Latin 
America. Although migration to the United States became the accepted course 
of action after 1947, the Puerto Rican government kept exploring other pos-
sible migration sites for Puerto Ricans, specifically countries in Latin Amer-
ica. This should be understood, among other things, as an attempt by policy 
makers to deal with the continuing “Puerto Rican problem” in the United 
States. But U.S. government institutions like the State Department constantly 
opposed these proposals of planned migrations to Latin America because it 
would have involved the mass movement of U.S. citizens to foreign countries. 
This is one more instance where U.S. citizenship largely oriented the migra-
tion of Puerto Ricans to the United States.
By examining the issue of Puerto Ricans as domestic labor and the FPP, 
one can understand more clearly the role played by the Puerto Rican gov-
ernment in migration and how it used citizenship as a tool to move forward 
its migration policy. This topic can also illuminate how U.S. citizenship for 
Puerto Ricans on the island or in the U.S. mainland was reexamined in post-
war Puerto Rico.
PUERTO RICANS AS DOMESTIC LABOR
The government of Puerto Rico began to foster the orderly migration of 
Puerto Ricans to the United States after approving the migration law in 
December 1947. The government’s FPP was aimed at not only selecting work-
ers in Puerto Rico but also placing them where labor was needed. Island 
policy makers sought to move Puerto Rican migrants away from New York 
City and place workers in areas where they would be welcomed. But as Presi-
dent Harry Truman’s Commission on Migratory Labor concluded, there was 
ambivalence among many American employers and some U.S. policy makers 
regarding Puerto Ricans: they were accepted as workers to satisfy immediate 
labor demands in agriculture, but they were not accepted as community mem-
bers. Many employers were reluctant to hire Puerto Ricans because, as U.S. 
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citizens, they could not be deported at the end of their contract and were not 
as docile a labor force as foreign workers.1 For many years, Puerto Ricans were 
characterized by U.S. government officials and employers as “foreign workers” 
and had to compete with Mexican and West Indian labor for jobs in American 
agriculture. This situation became an important obstacle in the Puerto Rican 
government’s effort to promote migration to the United States.
The issue of Puerto Ricans being accepted as domestic labor in the United 
States places U.S. citizenship in the middle of the island’s migration debate. 
Some scholars argue that while citizenship is not the only thing that distin-
guishes Puerto Ricans from other “immigrants” in the United States, it is the 
one advantage Puerto Ricans have when it comes to their entry and incorpo-
ration into American society.2 But citizenship was not immediately acknowl-
edged for these migrants, either from agricultural employers who preferred 
foreign noncitizen workers or from the federal government agencies in charge 
of supplying labor to U.S. farms. For Puerto Ricans at this time, citizenship 
was a contested area, one that had to be fought for in order to have spaces 
open for them to work in the United States. The colonial nature of Puerto 
Ricans’ U.S. citizenship became a central issue in the migration project. Puerto 
Rico’s status as “foreign in a domestic sense” applied to Puerto Rican labor as 
well: although citizens, these subjects were deemed by U.S. employers and by 
the federal government as foreign to the domestic labor market.3 The colonial 
state assumed the representation and protection of its “citizens” in the United 
States, confronting labor-related agencies within the metropolitan state with 
the right of these subjects to have job priority on the mainland as U.S. citizens.
The confusing positioning of Puerto Ricans regarding U.S. citizenship 
became evident in the report by President Truman’s Commission on Migra-
tory Labor. It acknowledged that 
Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens and that from the standpoint of citizenship, it 
is inappropriate to discuss Puerto Ricans in a chapter dealing with contract 
aliens. However . . . since they now find themselves in competition with alien 
labor, there is obviously a functional relationship which requires their being 
considered in this context.
After examining the Puerto Rican government’s policies on migration and the 
reasons for the U.S. Bureau of Employment defining them as domestic labor 
in 1949, the report indicates another peculiarity of Puerto Rican labor migra-
tion to the United States. Because Puerto Ricans are citizens, their employ-
ment “does not require negotiation of work contracts or prior certification 
of labor shortage” as alien labor does. It then adds that, nevertheless, “in its 
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desire to protect its citizens as much as possible, the Puerto Rican government 
has insisted on both work contracts and certification of labor needs before 
approving recruitment of its people. The Puerto Rican work contract is negoti-
ated between farm employers on the mainland and the Puerto Rican Depart-
ment of Labor,” as other foreign government do.4 The report acknowledged 
that even though Puerto Rican farmworkers were U.S. citizens, they were still 
treated as alien workers and that, furthermore, in order to minimize the hard-
ships they faced on the U.S. mainland, the Puerto Rican government took care 
of “its citizens” like the Mexican government did: by requiring a contract, by 
negotiating directly with employers, and by requiring a certification of labor 
needs in order to authorize the movement of labor to the United States.
By 1950, Puerto Rican farmworkers were already part of the class of agri-
cultural workers in the United States known as “migratory farmworkers,” in 
large measure due to the policies of the Puerto Rican government under the 
FPP. In 1940, there were about one million domestic migrant workers, a fig-
ure that decreased during the war as the number of alien workers increased. 
After the end of World War II, according to President Truman’s Commission 
on Migratory Labor, the number of migrant workers increased again to one 
million, out of which “domestic migrants represent only about one half. The 
other half is made up of approximately 100,000 Mexicans legally under con-
tract, a relatively small number of British West Indians and Puerto Ricans, and 
by far the most important, illegal Mexican workers who in recent years have 
amounted to an estimated 400,000.”5 The commission, like other agencies of 
the U.S. government dealing with the management of the agricultural labor 
force, had trouble acknowledging Puerto Ricans as part of the domestic labor 
force, even though one of its recommendations was to have them recognized 
as such, with preference over foreign labor.
Puerto Ricans were in a disadvantaged position compared to foreign 
workers when the war ended since one “of the outstanding features of the 
wartime labor program was the neglect of Puerto Rico,” according to Presi-
dent Truman’s commission. The reason for the neglect of Puerto Ricans 
during this period “was the reluctance of farm employers to accept Puerto 
Ricans.” According to statements made during hearings by the president of a 
Florida growers association, “The vast difference between the Bahama Island 
labor and the domestic, including Puerto Rican, is that labor transported 
from the Bahama Islands can be diverted and sent home if it does not work, 
which cannot be done in the instance of labor from domestic United States 
or Puerto Rico.”6 According to the president’s commission, the “demand for 
migratory workers is thus essentially twofold: to be ready to go to work when 
needed; to be gone when not needed.”7 As U.S. citizens, Puerto Rican work-
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ers presented a dilemma to the farmers and their communities who did not 
want them to stay.
By 1947, Congress had ended the recruitment of foreign workers under a 
federal program to assist American agriculture. The Puerto Rican government 
lobbied the Division of Territories and Island Possessions of the U.S. Depart-
ment of the Interior in vain to have the program reinstated and applied once 
again to Puerto Rico. Division officials nevertheless encouraged the Puerto 
Rican government to develop their own migration program to the mainland 
to alleviate the unemployment problem on the island.8 Raymond Barr, chief 
of the division’s Caribbean branch, suggested sending Puerto Ricans workers 
to California, where there was a dire need of farm labor, and recommended 
that the Puerto Rican government make direct arrangements with the farm-
ers’ associations and visit the farms to examine the working conditions there.9
Puerto Rican policy makers consistently complained about the refusal 
of U.S. government agencies and agricultural employers to give priority to 
Puerto Rican workers over foreign workers, citing it as a major impediment 
to the success of their migration program.10 On February 10, 1949, Sierra Ber-
decía’s intense lobbying efforts resulted in an agreement with the director 
of the Bureau of Employment Security, Robert Goodwin, to have the U.S. 
Department of Labor declare Puerto Ricans part of the U.S. domestic labor 
force with preference over foreign workers. The agreement stipulated that the 
movement of island workers to the United States would be through the U.S. 
Employment Service (USES). U.S. employers were required to request work-
ers from their local USES office; if the office certified that no local workers 
were available, the request would be sent to the Puerto Rico office, which 
would do the screening and preselection of workers to be hired by the U.S. 
employer. This agreement specified that Puerto Rican workers would go only 
where there was a certified need for labor, that they would not displace local 
workers, and that their wages would be the prevalent ones in the area—that is, 
that they would not depress wages in the United States.11 However, the agree-
ment was not strongly binding for the federal agency, demanding only that 
U.S. employers be advised that there was Puerto Rican labor available if they 
desired it, and allowing employers to hire foreign labor if hiring Puerto Ricans 
caused them “undue hardships.”12
The Puerto Rican government had to keep lobbying U.S. agencies for 
many years after the 1949 agreement in order to protect Puerto Rican workers 
against foreign competition for jobs in the United States. This is evidenced in 
an August 1949 memo from Sierra Berdecía to Governor Muñoz Marín, where 
he commented on a bill to empower the Federal Security Administration to 
coordinate the contracting of foreign labor in order to supplement domestic 
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labor in the United States. He questioned the bill’s alleged purpose, arguing 
that the “use of foreign workers who are already in the United States results in 
discrimination against domestic workers particularly Puerto Ricans who are 
classed as domestic workers.” He suggested that the term “domestic labor” “be 
defined . . . to include those workers in the mainland as well in the territories 
and possessions on the United States [sic].” Sierra Berdecía charged that “not 
enough of an effort has been made to secure domestic labor of which there is 
an abundant supply in Puerto Rico.”13
On October 21, 1949, Resident Commissioner Fernós-Isern, along with 
labor advisors Alan Perl and Estella Draper, met with USES officials in Wash-
ington to discuss the issue of West Indians competing for jobs with Puerto 
Rican workers in the Northeast. The Puerto Rican delegation expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the number of Puerto Ricans employed in relation to the 
high number of foreign workers contracted that year. USES officials stated 
that the resistance to hiring Puerto Rican workers was due to the employers’ 
reluctance to have a labor contract—which other domestic workers did not 
have—and the need to advance transportation expenses to island workers, as 
required by the island government. According to Draper’s memo, USES direc-
tor Robert Goodwin stated that “congressional opinion was that the Puerto 
Ricans might stay in this country and create an unemployment problem, and 
therefore foreign workers should be allowed in.” Fernós-Isern explained that 
Puerto Ricans on the island or the mainland were U.S. citizens who needed 
protection. He advanced his intention to convince the New York congres-
sional delegation to favor “a policy of excluding foreign workers in favor of 
Puerto Ricans. He would explain to the congressmen that Puerto Ricans will 
migrate to New York City, unless other sections of the country are opened up 
to them.”14
In January 1950, another Puerto Rican delegation composed by Perl, 
Draper, and José Cabranes, from New York’s Migration Office, met in Wash-
ington with USES officials and representatives of agricultural employers. All 
farm interests present there defended the use of imported labor. According to 
Draper, Perl indicated that the Puerto Rican government was “willing to nego-
tiate the contract to fit the need of employers in particular areas. (Despite this 
invitation, not one single member approached us at the end of the meeting).” 
Draper concluded that “it was the unanimous opinion of the group that the 
use of foreign labor should be continued,” giving USES “ample justification for 
the use of foreign workers and resisting any attempts to place Puerto Rican 
labor.”15 Perl’s assessment of the meeting was harsher, calling it a “disgusting 
spectacle .  .  . a regular love-fest with all the employers cheering the perfor-
mance of the USES and ending up saying we love you, we love you, we love 
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you.” He proposed taking a more active approach, including lobbying mem-
bers of Congress to put pressure on Labor Secretary Tobin, getting support 
from American labor unions, and encouraging the governor of Puerto Rico 
to be more active on this issue.16
The judgment of USES by the Puerto Rican functionaries was in agree-
ment with the conclusions presented by Truman’s Commission on Migratory 
Labor. Its report reasoned that the displacement of domestic labor by foreign 
workers could be reduced or even eliminated 
by separating the employment service function for domestic workers from 
the administrative responsibilities for contracting and importing foreign 
labor. When the agency which certifies a labor shortage also is the agency 
which fills that shortage by importation, it is much too easy to offset an inef-
fective recruiting and placement job at home by importing more workers 
from abroad.17
USES director Goodwin rejected the accusations of conflict of interest raised 
by the commission’s report, arguing that the needs of agribusiness had to be 
taken into consideration and that foreign labor fulfilled a demand for labor in 
American agriculture.18 The influence of big agribusiness on U.S. labor policy 
and its reluctance to restrain the use of foreign labor is reflected in the fact the 
even after the president’s Commission on Migratory Labor urged ending the 
use of alien labor, Congress did not put an end to this practice.19
Despite a 1950 memo from Labor Secretary Tobin insisting on the need to 
hire island workers, opposition to the use of Puerto Rican labor by U.S. labor 
agencies and agricultural employers continued. The memo itself was con-
fusing. Tobin maintained that USES must give preference to domestic labor 
when possible, but added: “If and when domestic workers on the continent are 
insufficient to meet agricultural needs, preference should be given to the use 
of our citizens from Puerto Rico.”20 Puerto Ricans were again differentiated 
from other “domestic workers.”
Perl’s advice for U.S. policy makers to pressure Tobin on the use of Puerto 
Rican labor was apparently followed. For example, Raymond M. Hilliard, 
chairman of the Mayor’s Advisory Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs in New 
York City, questioned Tobin regarding why West Indians were still employed 
in agricultural jobs when large number of Puerto Rican citizens on the island 
and the mainland—particularly in New York City—were unemployed. “The 
fact that 90% of migrating Puerto Ricans locate in the City of New York com-
pels our interest in this matter,” he stated.21 In April 1950, efforts by the Puerto 
Rican government led to an agreement by the U.S. Department of Labor and 
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the state of New York to bar the use of West Indian labor in that state; the 
agreement explicitly benefitted Puerto Rican workers.22
The aggressive campaign by the Puerto Rican government to procure 
employment for its migrants in American agriculture raised concerns among 
several groups. Some labor organizers declared Puerto Ricans to be aliens 
displacing the domestic African American agricultural workers, while others 
accused the Puerto Rican government of racism for its campaign to substitute 
Puerto Ricans for West Indian labor.23 Sierra Berdecía justified the latter policy 
on the basis that West Indians depressed wages for American workers, and 
that Puerto Ricans should work in the United States as a right of citizenship. 
He contended that admitting foreign workers “is not only an invasion of the 
rights of citizens but also the perpetuation of a serious American unemploy-
ment problem.24
Citizenship became instrumental in the government’s migration policy 
after it began framing Puerto Ricans’ status as domestic labor as a right of 
their U.S. citizenship. The fact that U.S. federal and state agencies and employ-
ers refused to recognize Puerto Ricans as citizens or acknowledge their right 
to work as domestic labor with preference over foreign labor led the Puerto 
Rican government to fight these institutions for the recognition of these 
migrants as U.S. citizens. Puerto Ricans’ U.S. citizenship did not automatically 
guarantee them access to the U.S. labor market; citizenship was not a given, 
but something that had to be sustained and affirmed in the United States, in 
this case by the Puerto Rican government. If the U.S. citizenship of Puerto 
Ricans is a colonial or territorial citizenship that was constructed during sev-
eral decades by U.S. congressional legislation, Supreme Court decisions, and 
executive polices, then by 1950, the colonial state was immersed in the process 
of using and redefining the meaning of that citizenship for Puerto Ricans to 
make policy and to extend the rights of Puerto Ricans as U.S. citizens on the 
mainland. The PPD, which years earlier had briefly supported Puerto Rico’s 
independence, was now compelled to use American citizenship as an impor-
tant tool to make migration possible, particularly after migration became an 
integral part of its social and economic development program. Once migra-
tion and Operation Bootstrap became central policies of the PPD government 
in 1947, U.S. citizenship became essential to the projects of modernization and 
state control. Citizenship was the fundamental basis for the Commonwealth 
constitution approved in 1952. The capacity to have Puerto Ricans move to the 
United States and the making of migration as a state policy certainly played a 
role in this new perspective by the PPD.
Correspondence between Sierra Berdecía and Tobin shows how the 
Puerto Rican government insisted that the U.S. government give priority to 
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Puerto Rican labor. Sierra Berdecía expressed his concern about statements 
by Tobin regarding the employment of Puerto Ricans only if they were on the 
mainland. He insisted that “Puerto Ricans as American citizens are entitled 
to every right that citizenship confers them regardless of whether they live 
in San Francisco, New York, Boston or San Juan.” Sierra Berdecía indicated 
that “although it has never been our idea to displace foreign workers, we do 
not want to be displaced ourselves” and argued that if twenty thousand West 
Indians working in the United States were replaced by “American citizens liv-
ing in Puerto Rico, .285 per cent of the United States unemployment situation 
in this Island would be alleviated.”25 Tobin replied to Sierra Berdecía that his 
statement was only to reaffirm that island workers in the United States “are 
entitled to the same rights and privileges accorded to any other citizens,” and 
that such differentiation did not constitute a “distinction as to degree of citi-
zenship status.” He affirmed, however, that “it is desirable to concentrate on 
job placement of unemployed workers within the State before turning to dis-
tant sources for filling requirements.”26
In September 1950, Congress created the U.S. Bureau of Employment Secu-
rity with the passing of the Wagner-Peyser Act. The bureau’s functions were 
extended to the island after the Puerto Rican legislature approved its local 
implementation in December. In February 1951, the Puerto Rico Employment 
Service, affiliated with USES, was created by the island government. The exten-
sion of the Wagner-Peyser Act to Puerto Rico, which Sierra Berdecía called 
“the most important event in the Employment and Migration Bureau dur-
ing the fiscal year 1950–51,”27 no doubt was the result of, among other things, 
the lobbying and political maneuvers of the Puerto Rican government during 
the previous two years. This law provided Puerto Rico with federal funds to 
operate the Bureau of Employment and Security (BES) within the Bureau of 
Employment and Migration (BEM). Consequently, the BEM was divided into 
two separate programs: BES and the newly restructured Migration Division, 
financed with funds from the Puerto Rican government. As Joseph Monser-
rat stated, the Wagner-Peyser Act “expands Puerto Rico’s job market to areas 
beyond the island and it clearly established that Puerto Rico’s work force is 
part of the U.S. domestic labor force.”28 The act incorporated Puerto Rico into 
the national employment system and the labor interstate clearance system. It 
allowed the employment of foreign workers only when domestic labor was 
unavailable, as established by the U.S. Department of Labor. As part of USES, 
local state offices were urged to hire Puerto Rican workers when there was a 
certifiable need of labor. Because of these efforts, according to Sierra Berdecía 
immediately after the act was approved, “our Employment and Migration 
Bureau is receiving an increasing number of orders for agricultural workers.”29 
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As the statistics for the Farm Placement Program indicate, the number of 
Puerto Ricans working in agriculture increased dramatically after 1952.
Nevertheless, the Puerto Rican government had to continue lobbying in 
the United States to convince federal labor agencies to enforce the priority 
employment of Puerto Rican workers. This was true even after the approval 
of the Wagner-Peyser Act, and even after the report by President Truman’s 
Commission on Migratory Labor, which recommended in its conclusions 
that when facing labor needs, “preference be given to citizens of the offshore 
possessions of the United States, such as Hawaii and Puerto Rico,”30 given 
the continued preference for alien labor by agricultural employers. This issue 
came to the fore again when, in the spring of 1951, Congress began to dis-
cuss the Ellender-Poage bill that allowed the use of Mexican braceros and 
undocumented workers in American agriculture. This bill not only reflected 
the power of agribusiness in U.S. politics but also openly contradicted the 
recommendations of Truman’s Commission on Migratory Labor.31 In May 
1951, Sierra Berdecía met with Goodwin, who had been recently appointed by 
President Truman to assess the manpower needs during the war, to urge him 
to enforce the employment of Puerto Ricans based on the fact that they were 
U.S. citizens and Puerto Rico was the only region in the United States with a 
declared surplus of labor.32
Still, by 1952, Secretary of Labor Tobin was hesitant to defend the use of 
Puerto Rican labor in American agriculture. In a letter to Hubert Humphrey 
from the Senate Labor Committee during hearings on the status of migra-
tory labor in the United States, Tobin noted that several factors prevented 
further use of Puerto Rican labor on the continent, including the island’s 
distance from agricultural areas where labor was needed, the difference in 
language, and the limitations imposed by the government of Puerto Rico on 
the recruitment of island labor through its labor contract.33 During a previ-
ous Senate hearing Senior, director of the Migration Division, had urged the 
approval of strict limitations on the use of alien labor in the United States, 
arguing that as U.S. citizens, Puerto Ricans must have preference over foreign 
labor.34 Discrimination against the use of Puerto Rican labor in agriculture 
continued through the 1950s. For example, in 1958, the commissioner of labor 
from New Jersey, Carl Holdeman, complained to then secretary of labor James 
P. Mitchell that West Indian labor was still used instead of available Puerto 
Rican labor. The reason for this was that farmers could exploit West Indians 
more openly, while Puerto Ricans were protected by a contract secured by the 
Puerto Rican government.35
Even after the Wagner-Peyser Act led to the restructuring of the Bureau 
of Employment and Migration, the Puerto Rican government kept its bureau-
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cratic institutions in charge of implementing its migration policy intact. 
The reason for this, according to Sierra Berdecía, was that even though the 
Wagner-Peyser Act declared Puerto Rican workers to be part of the Ameri-
can domestic labor force, Puerto Ricans were different from other American 
workers and required aid and protection when moving to the United States in 
search for jobs. For him, Puerto Rico’s BES involved a different function from 
that in the United States: it
involves such work as providing special information to migrant workers 
from Puerto Rico to the mainland to assist them in facing new situations 
in an environment which is ethnologically different. It aims to reduce to a 
minimum those natural problems of adjustment for the individual and for 
the community to which he goes.36
Sierra Berdecía reaffirmed his government’s policy of playing an important 
role in the migration process of Puerto Ricans due to the fact that these were 
considered as foreign to the United States, not only culturally and linguisti-
cally but also in citizenship rights.
THE BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT AND MIGRATION AND  
THE FARM PLACEMENT PROGRAM
Puerto Rico’s 1947 migration law expanded already established policies of the 
Puerto Rican government, like oversight over labor contracts and the main-
tenance of offices in the U.S. mainland. What had changed was the perspec-
tive on Puerto Rican migration to the United States and the correspondent 
bureaucratic structures created to deal with that migration. In his report to the 
governor that led to the 1947 migration law, Sierra Berdecía argued that there 
were two separate and distinct migration flows from Puerto Rico to the United 
States: migration of individuals going to the U.S. mainland on their own, like 
the one causing the “Puerto Rican problem” in New York City during the 
summer of 1947, and organized contract migration going mostly to provide 
cheap labor to U.S. agriculture.37 The two flows had distinct social bases and 
destinations: the former had largely a urban character (as The Puerto Rican 
Journey indicated years later) and went mostly to urban areas like New York 
City, while the latter came from rural agricultural areas and searched for jobs 
in U.S. farms, mostly in the Northeast. The goal of the new migration law was 
to regulate migration so that it would be not only a continuous and organized 
movement of people away from the island but also one that would satisfy the 
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needs of U.S. employers and cause the least problems for the adaptation of the 
migrant workers as well as for their U.S. communities.
To fulfill this goal, the law created two separate but interrelated bureau-
cratic structures within the Department of Labor: the Bureau of Employment 
and Migration in San Juan and the Migration Office in New York (later to 
become the Migration Division). The former was in charge of managing the 
recruitment and selection of workers going mostly to U.S. agricultural jobs, 
while the latter dealt with the migrants’ needs and adaptation for those already 
in the United States. In short, BEM organized the movement of contract labor 
while the Migration Office addressed issues related largely to individual migra-
tion. Most scholars studying the government’s role in migration have focused 
on the Migration Division following Lapp’s influential study, reproducing the 
mistaken notion that the Migration Division and Senior were crucial in mak-
ing Puerto Rico’s migration policy. Migration policy was made in San Juan by 
Sierra Berdecía and a few other policy makers close to the center of power, 
Muñoz Marín. This was never truer than in the workings of the Farm Place-
ment Program (FPP), managed by BEM in San Juan under the direction of 
Petroamérica Pagán de Colón and the supervision of the commissioner of 
labor. This was the agency in charge of recruiting, selecting, and then directing 
migrant workers from Puerto Rico’s rural areas to farms in the United States. 
Initially, it regulated the contract labor agencies recruiting farmworkers on 
the island, but it later expanded its functions to enter into agreements directly 
with U.S. farmers employing Puerto Ricans.38
BEM’s goals and procedures followed the guidelines of the 1947 migra-
tion law.39 Its rationale was to aid the labor surplus population in finding jobs, 
whether in Puerto Rico or in the United States. Migration to the United States 
became an important outlet for the unemployed in Puerto Rico, particularly 
those from rural areas. First by regulating labor contractors and making sure 
farmworkers left the island with a labor contract approved by the govern-
ment, and then by taking over the negotiation of contracts directly with U.S. 
employers, BEM sought to provide a regulated and reliable source of labor for 
U.S. agriculture. Additionally, the protection of farm labor by Puerto Rico’s 
government made it possible for Puerto Rican farmworkers to look at migra-
tion to “the North” as a worthwhile endeavor, one that was protected by their 
government.40
The name itself—Bureau of Employment and Migration—pointed to 
the close relationship that existed in the minds of Puerto Rican policy mak-
ers between providing employment for island workers and migration to the 
United States: after a few years of operation, most of the job placements by 
BEM were in the United States. As several migration policy makers used to 
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say, the FPP was the other side of Operation Bootstrap, the PPD’s economic 
development program.41 Furthermore, BEM was in full agreement with the 
broader goal established by Sierra Berdecía when he took over the Depart-
ment of Labor: to provide “industrial peace” in Puerto Rico by managing the 
relationship between labor, the state, and capital (be it in Puerto Rico or in 
the United States).42
In his first report to the governor after BEM was created, Sierra Berdecía 
justified the FPP on the basis of a surplus labor from the sugar cane industry 
in Puerto Rico (particularly during the tiempo muerto—the dead season—
when there was no harvest and no jobs) and the need for agricultural labor 
in the United States; Puerto Rican farmworkers would be employed in those 
areas where they were needed instead of foreign workers. In its first year of 
operation, the commissioner of labor boasted that “for the first time in the 
history of agricultural labor in the continent, a minimum guaranteed period 
of employment of 160 hours for every four week period was included in the 
contract for Puerto Ricans.” Other achievements were the placement of labor-
ers in the Midwest and the Northeast regions of the United States, and the 
opening of a migration office in Chicago.43 Migration officials liked to point 
out the benefits of this program, particularly its economic impact on the 
island as a consequence of the remittances sent to the island by migrants and 
the impact on the unemployment rate and related social issues (education, 
social services, etc.) on the government’s finances.44
One of the most important achievements for the BEM and the Depart-
ment of Labor was the acceptance of a labor contract by both workers and 
U.S. employers. The required labor contract for migrants going to work in 
the United States was implemented in September 1947, months before the 
approval of Puerto Rico’s migration law in December. Puerto Rican migration 
policy makers liked to boast that the Puerto Rican farmworkers’ contract was 
the best one protecting migratory labor in the United States.45 Migratory labor 
in the United States was laxly regulated throughout the first half of the twen-
tieth century by a diverse set of federal and state laws and policies, usually 
in favor of farmers to the detriment of laborers. The latter composed a com-
plex and diverse force, including the government-regulated Mexican bracero 
program, West Indian contract labor, undocumented Mexican workers, and 
the diverse domestic labor force largely consisting of U.S. peoples of color.46 
Puerto Ricans were particular in their membership as domestic labor in the 
migratory labor economy: they were the only domestic group openly pro-
tected by state (in this case, a U.S. territory) government contract, quite like 
the labor contracts protecting foreign labor from Mexico and the West Indies. 
Most of the central aspects of the Puerto Rican labor contract were similar to 
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the contracts required by the Mexican and West Indian governments allowing 
their workers to come to the United States in terms of regulating wages and 
working conditions, transportation costs, and so on.47 In this sense, Puerto 
Ricans were “foreign in a domestic sense” to the U.S. agricultural labor system 
in the same way that the U.S. Supreme Court had declared Puerto Rico to be 
in relationship to the United States in Downes v. Bidwell.
BEM director Pagán de Colón stated in her review of the FPP that both 
state and federal employment services and agricultural employers were 
strongly opposed to the contract enforced by the Puerto Rican government, 
arguing that as U.S. citizens they had no need for a formal contract as required 
for foreign workers (like the bracero program). She argued that U.S. laws did 
not protect agricultural workers and that, in addition, her department held 
“that the Puerto Rican worker is in a disadvantage with regards to local work-
ers because of the difference in language, their ignorance of the traditions of 
work and housing, and for a lack of knowledge on the resources that com-
munities have to benefit its citizens.”48 While claiming preference for Puerto 
Ricans as U.S. citizens over foreign workers, Department of Labor officials 
argued that they nevertheless required special attention in the United States 
because they were treated like foreign workers due to their different culture 
and language and their lack of knowledge and connection to U.S. culture, hab-
its, language, laws, and social traditions. They contended that island workers 
were citizens of a different kind that needed the protection of Puerto Rico’s 
government because there was no state structure in the United States to pro-
tect them and guarantee their rights as U.S. citizens.49 That is, Puerto Rico’s 
colonial state had to fight the metropolitan state over meanings of citizenship 
for Puerto Ricans.
According to Monserrat, the demise of FPP in the late 1970s was due to 
both the election of the New Progressive Party in Puerto Rico, whose pro-
statehood ideology refused to sustain any kind of migration program, and 
to the strong opposition by U.S. farmers to employing Puerto Rican workers 
as domestic labor with preference over foreign labor. In 1976, apple farmers 
in the Northeast refused to hire Puerto Rican farmworkers on the basis that 
the contract required by the Puerto Rican government was too onerous for 
them and U.S. Department of Labor regulations prevented them from hiring 
cheaper foreign labor. Federal courts supported the claims of the apple grow-
ers and put a de facto end to Puerto Rico’s FPP; Puerto Ricans’ U.S. citizen-
ship no longer provided them with preferential treatment over foreign labor.50
In its first year of operation, the BEM had four field offices in Puerto Rico 
and two main offices in San Juan and New York, with an additional office in 
Chicago. It enforced a contract between workers and employers guaranteeing 
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not only minimum hours of work but also wages, transportation costs, living 
and working conditions, workmen’s compensation, and a prohibition of any 
kind of discrimination.51 During FPP’s history, BEM never allowed the legal 
hiring of Puerto Rican workers in the South due to the region’s widespread 
racism.52 Another important part of the contract was that Puerto Rican work-
ers would earn the prevalent wage in the region, that is, no higher but not 
less than the wages earned by the established workers in any specific area. 
This stipulation, as reported by Truman’s Commission on Migratory Labor, 
was similar to other “foreign labor agreements.”53 This policy, along with the 
ones requiring that Puerto Rican workers would go where there was a certi-
fied need for workers and that they would support unions where they existed, 
was an attempt to prevent conflicts with U.S. organized labor in those regions 
where island workers migrated to work.54 As in many other instances, Puerto 
Ricans were not included in the determination of a domestic labor shortage 
in American agriculture; like foreign labor, they would be called to fill the 
labor shortage of domestic workers.55 Furthermore, Sierra Berdecía concluded 
in his first-year report that “for the first time, the Bureau was faced with the 
necessity of itself doing the recruitment which was carried on the year before 
by private employment agents.”56 That is, in order to guarantee an organized 
and selective process of migration, BEM assumed the role played before by 
private labor contractors, whose lack of selectivity and protection of workers 
in the United States had caused many problems for the workers and for the 
government.57 The Puerto Rican government, then, became a labor contrac-
tor—an intermediary between the Puerto Rican worker and the U.S. agricul-
tural employer. (This subject will be discussed further in chapter 7.)
During its first year of operations, the bureau placed 11,820 workers in 
jobs in Puerto Rico and the United States. While the overwhelming majority 
of the 6,024 placements in Puerto Rico were in industrial jobs (satisfying the 
labor needs of Fomento manufacturing plants), most of the 5,796 jobs found 
in the United States were in agriculture, a pattern that would not change in 
decades to come. The annual report stated that the net migration from Puerto 
Rico to the United States that year was 33,053; in other words, most Puerto 
Ricans going to the United States were individual migrants. The report also 
made note of the counseling services and warnings given to this group as they 
moved to the U.S. mainland.58
The Farm Placement Program came to be the most complex and impor-
tant of BEM’s programs in Puerto Rico, which included industrial and agri-
cultural employment on the island, workers’ compensation and arbitration 
(including the regulation of wages by specific industries), and unemployment 
benefits, among others.59 By 1950, the recruitment process was carried out 
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in twenty-eight offices working on the registration and orientation of work-
ers. The bureau also carried out a coordinated media and publicity program 
to advise farmworkers not to migrate on their own, to avoid dishonest con-
tractors and travel agencies, and to refrain from engaging in farm labor in 
the United States if they were not up to that kind of work.60 According to 
Sierra Berdecía, the department’s 1951 records showed “abundant proof .  .  . 
that workers were recruited from agricultural areas and not from larger met-
ropolitan districts.”61
In 1950, almost two-thirds of BEM’s job placements were for jobs in the 
United States: by this time, migration was considered the best means for 
reducing agricultural unemployment on the island. For the fiscal year 1951–52 
there were 424,797 visits to local offices in Puerto Rico, with 42,420 new job 
applications; in addition, some 24,331 people were interviewed for employ-
ment in the Migration Division in the United States. The total number of 
placements made in Puerto Rico that year was 12,263, out of which 11,457 
were in nonagricultural jobs, a reflection of the growing impact of Operation 
Bootstrap on the island. On the other hand, 12,491 agricultural workers from 
the island went to the United States under the FPP, and 8,108 were placed by 
the Migration Division on the mainland.62
The FPP continued to grow in the coming years and decades, reaching 
its peak in the late 1960s when close to twenty thousand farmworkers would 
go to U.S. farms yearly under the auspices of the program. According to esti-
mates by Monserrat, from 1948 to 1990, some 427,604 Puerto Rican migrant 
workers were recruited and placed in agricultural jobs in the United States 
under the FPP.63 This program had an important impact on the development 
of Puerto Rican communities in the United States, as Pagán de Colón claimed, 
by procuring “job opportunities in areas outside of New York” and was also 
helpful to the island by finding “job opportunities for residents of the rural 
areas in Puerto Rico.”64 The farmworkers moved to the United States by the 
government’s program were crucial in the making of Puerto Rican commu-
nities in places like Chicago, Philadelphia, Hartford, and many other cities 
around the Northeast.65 The emergence and development of these communi-
ties was influenced by the migration of rural workers, overwhelmingly male, 
mostly unskilled and uneducated, with limited or no urban background, 
going first to do farmwork and then moving to urban areas in search of better 
jobs. Recruitment of prospective farmworker migrants in Puerto Rico’s rural 
areas also had a significant impact on the social and economic development 
of these regions.66
Many agricultural employers in the United States resented the contract 
and the intervention of the Puerto Rican government, particularly small farm-
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ers who could not afford the costs related to the government contract. In order 
to avoid the illegal hiring of workers by labor contractors and farmers, the 
Department of Labor entered directly into labor agreements with U.S. agri-
cultural employers, particularly with farm cooperatives or associations. Where 
these associations were nonexistent, the Puerto Rican government encour-
aged their formation to collectively guarantee fulfilling the requirements of 
the labor contract. Several farm cooperatives and associations were created 
in those states where Puerto Rican farmworkers became an important source 
of labor, including New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and New York.67
By the early 1950s, a growing number of farmers in the Northeast began 
to depend on Puerto Rican labor to harvest their crops due to the reduction 
of domestic and foreign labor available at the time. Pagán de Colón indicates 
that in 1948, 2,382 Puerto Rican farmworkers were hired by just four U.S. 
employers; by 1951 some 11,725 Puerto Ricans were providing their services 
to thirty-six U.S. farmers and by 1954, 14,153 island workers were laboring for 
ninety-six U.S. farmers.68 But there was another reason for the increased hir-
ing of island farmworkers: the reliability of the Puerto Rican labor force guar-
anteed by the Puerto Rican government. The contract benefitted both parties, 
not only the workers; some of the most important contracts were supervised 
by Governor Muñoz Marín directly and guaranteed a reliable and screened 
labor force with stipulated labor costs.69 By the early 1950s, federal and local 
functionaries agreed that the Puerto Rican government’s migration program 
could provide jobs for some one hundred thousand Puerto Rican workers in 
the United States; they acknowledged that migration would be the best solu-
tion to solve the local unemployment problem and provide the needed labor 
in U.S. agricultural enterprises.70
MIGRATION PLANS TO LATIN AMERICA
After the approval of the December 1947 migration law, the accepted idea 
was to organize the migration of Puerto Ricans to the United States. Still, 
even after specific programs were implemented to coordinate and encourage 
migration to the mainland, island government officials considered the idea of 
advocating migration and colonization projects in Latin America. Although 
none of these projects was ever realized, the discussion around them never-
theless proves the government’s interest in redirecting migration away from 
the United States. There are several plausible explanations for this position. 
Migration to Latin America could be seen as a mechanism to reduce the out-
flow to the mainland and thus prevent the emergence or recurrence of “Puerto 
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Rican problem” campaigns in areas where Puerto Ricans settled. This situation 
hurt the image of the Puerto Rican government in the United States and in 
Puerto Rico; it also hindered the entrance of new migrants to the mainland. 
Furthermore, during this time there was still opposition by some sectors in 
the United States to the continued entrance of Puerto Ricans.71
Latin America was seen by some Puerto Rican decision makers as an out-
let where the government could promote the outflow of the island’s excess 
labor force. Although migration to the United States was the official policy, 
some inside the government still questioned its merits. There were legitimate 
concerns with the adaptability of Puerto Ricans to American society in terms 
of culture, language, climate, and ideas. Some PPD leaders believed that Latin 
American societies would be more compatible for the adaptation of island 
migrants, while questioning migration to the United States based on the cul-
tural and linguistic rejection faced by islanders on the U.S. mainland, along 
with the acute experiences of racism, prejudice, and discrimination. They 
also decried the status of Puerto Ricans in the United States as “second-class 
citizens.”72
During the summer and fall of 1947, several proposals to allow the migra-
tion of Puerto Rican workers and families to the Dominican Republic and 
Venezuela were discussed by top government officials, including the gover-
nor’s Migration Advisory Committee. There was opposition to these migra-
tion projects to Latin America from U.S. government functionaries, based 
on economic and political considerations. For H. Rex Lee, from the Depart-
ment of Interior, migration to Latin American countries “seems to us to offer 
very little hope because of the many diplomatic and political factors involved. 
However, we agree with you that the whole subject should be explored thor-
oughly.” Lee captured the prevailing sentiment for U.S. policy makers when 
he argued that
it seems to us that the most hope lies in sending workers to the continent 
under a plan which would take them to cities, other than New York City, 
where there are job opportunities, and where there are reasonable chances 
for their integration into community life.73
Although consideration of these migration plans to Latin America by 
island government officials continued well into the mid-1950s, none of the 
plans ever materialized and migration to the United States remained the gov-
ernment’s policy. One crucial reason for not implementing migration plans to 
Latin America was the opposition of the U.S. government. The colonial gov-
ernment could not implement these plans on its own. The major reason U.S. 
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government officials rejected the idea was, of course, because Puerto Ricans 
were U.S. citizens. The possible diplomatic entanglements of having U.S. citi-
zens colonizing lands in postwar Latin America was simply too much trouble. 
This is one more example of how colonialism and citizenship determined the 
trend of Puerto Rican migration in just one direction: to the United States. 
But it also shows how Puerto Rican functionaries assumed the “relative auton-
omy” of the colonial state in the area of migration and how they kept pushing 
the limits of the colonial relationship with the United States by discussing 
emigration plans with Latin American governments.
Brazil was the country that received the sharpest attention from Puerto 
Rican government officials as a potential site for migration and colonization 
by island labor. In August 1946, El Mundo revealed that Brazilian representa-
tives had expressed interest in receiving workers from Puerto Rico.74 A year 
later, economic advisor Donald O’Connor informed government officials 
of a proposal to develop the San Francisco River Valley in Brazil; he hoped 
that “some arrangement for admitting Puerto Rican farmers can probably be 
effected.”75 In early January 1949, geographer Earl Parker Hanson, responding 
to a request made by the recently elected governor Muñoz Marín, submitted 
a proposal for the study of a planned migration program to Brazil, specifically 
in the San Francisco River Valley and the Amazon area. Hanson asserted that 
“the fact that U.S. capital and technology are themselves beginning to flow 
into the expanding economies of Latin America will eventually mean that 
Puerto Rican emigration will flow in the same direction.”76 Ventura Barnes, 
an adviser to the Planning Board, supported Hanson’s proposal to send Puerto 
Ricans to the San Francisco River Valley, whose future development he char-
acterized as “a kind of TVA [Tennessee Valley Authority].” Barnes proposed 
that the Puerto Rican Land Authority could buy vast tracts of land that could 
serve “as outlet to the tremendous population excess that we actually experi-
ence.” He also supported the idea of sending migrants to the Amazon Basin. 
He concluded that the situation required “an educational development to 
forge in the minds of Puerto Rican generations the idea of migration” to more 
prosperous places that could sustain them.77 Planning Board president Rafael 
Picó called Hanson and Barnes’ support for this proposal “a bit too optimis-
tic,” although he added that “it is worthy to study all the possibilities, no mat-
ter how remote the solution is, to our awful population problem.” At this time, 
Governor Muñoz Marín was very interested in the realization of this study by 
Hanson.78 Puerto Rican and Brazilian officials also discussed a possible colo-
nization plan for the State of Pará during the summer of 1949. Sierra Berdecía 
supported examining the idea but insisted on maintaining the government’s 
strict guidelines for sending migrants to other places. During this time, the 
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governor was still pushing for the realization of Hanson’s study; financing it 
seems to have been the major obstacle.79
Despite the attention given to these proposals by top decision mak-
ers, other officials questioned the validity of the Brazilian migration plans. 
Attached to Hanson’s proposal mentioned earlier are some typed notes that 
are very critical of this plan. The unknown author noted that the population 
required by the Brazil project would remove a very productive labor sector 
from the island and that the operation would be very costly to the island gov-
ernment; the notes further cautioned about migrant adaptation to the new 
environment and a lower standard of living and salaries than in the United 
States. The detractor warned that any “discontent that could emerge in the 
emigrant class could be used and exploited as a political weapon by the oppo-
sition” and argued that the current migration program by the Department of 
Labor “is approaching the problem in a realistic way.”80 The Brazilian coloni-
zation plan was also questioned by O’Connor, who argued that the costs of 
transportation and family settlement were too high and that migration to the 
United States and population control measures “appear to be more economi-
cal, more feasible, more constructive and more desirable.”81
In 1951, Fomento director Teodoro Moscoso began to seriously consider 
renewed suggestions by Brazilian officials for a Puerto Rican colonization pro-
gram in their country. He convinced Muñoz Marín to send Fomento’s Rafael 
Fernández García to Brazil to study the possibilities of such a plan. After 
meeting with Brazilian government officials, including advisers to President 
Getulio Vargas, Fernández García found the “ideal” place in an area south of 
Sao Paulo along the Ribeira River and close to the Bay of Cananeia, where he 
envisioned a well-developed Puerto Rican colony of three hundred thousand. 
He drafted a sixteen-point plan stipulating that Brazil would provide some 
six thousand square kilometers of land while Puerto Rico would finance the 
transportation costs of migrants and administer the colony. The total cost of 
the project for Puerto Rico would be $100 million over a ten-year period. Two 
events prevented the project from further consideration: Muñoz Marín was 
too occupied in the political debate that led to the creation of the Common-
wealth in 1952, and President Vargas was later removed from power in August 
1954 by a military coup.82 Another colonization plan to Brazil was presented 
in 1954 by Brazilian senator Assis Chateaubriand. News accounts reported 
that the government of Puerto Rico was discussing the details of implement-
ing such a plan with the Brazilian government.83 As with earlier colonization 
plans in Brazil, Chateaubriand’s plan was not implemented.
Other Latin American countries were also considered by Puerto Rican 
decision makers as sites for possible migration and colonization by Puerto 
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Ricans. By late 1947, El Mundo revealed that Venezuela’s consul in Puerto Rico 
announced that a high-level government delegation would visit Puerto Rico 
in search of an agreement with the island government. Venezuela was par-
ticularly interested in sugar cane workers, who could get year-round work on 
Venezuelan plantations. In February 1948, Venezuela’s consul met with Gov-
ernor Piñero and Muñoz Marín to discuss a concrete migration plan. The 
Venezuelan project envisioned the entrance of five million migrants during 
a twenty-year period. No agreement was reached, nor was any Puerto Rican 
worker ever sent to Venezuela by the island government.84
Surinam was also among the sites considered by Puerto Rican officials 
for a colonization project. In March 1947, several members of the island’s 
House of Representatives submitted a resolution supporting a plan wherein 
the United States would buy the territory of Dutch Guiana (Suriname) and 
establish a Puerto Rican colony there. The idea was advanced by the For-
eign Policy Association in the United States (which also proposed granting 
the island its independence). By the summer of 1948, the idea of a coloniza-
tion and emigration program to Surinam was still under consideration by the 
Puerto Rican government; it was also an idea supported by the Caribbean 
Commission.85 In March 1955, a government delegation from Costa Rica vis-
ited Puerto Rico to discuss the possible migration of Puerto Rican farmers to 
the Central American country. After meetings with Puerto Rican government 
officials, both parties agreed that an island delegation would visit Costa Rica 
to have further discussions on the project. But increasing opposition in Costa 
Rica and among Puerto Ricans detained the project.86
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There Ain’t No Buses from San Juan 
to the Bronx
Postwar Migration and Air Transportation
PUER TO RIC AN postwar migration is the first airborne migration in Ameri-
can history: this notion is a staple of most textbooks and studies dealing with 
Puerto Rican migration. Today, notions like la guagua aérea (the airbus) or 
the more scholarly concepts of the “commuter nation” or “the nation on the 
move” reflect the commonly accepted idea that moving by air from Puerto 
Rico to the United States is a common, safe, and affordable practice.1 All indi-
cate that air transportation allowed in the past and sustains today the massive 
movement of people between Puerto Rico and the United States. Although 
the study of the Puerto Rican experience in the United States has grown in 
quantity and quality during the last four decades, the issue of air transporta-
tion in the migration process has not been addressed. Even scholars focusing 
on Puerto Rican migration policy have paid no attention to the role played by 
the colonial state in this important policy area.
The increased regulation of air transportation, particularly to ensure 
greater flight safety, the entry of major airlines into the profitable Puerto Rican 
air space with scheduled flights, and the expansion and modernization of the 
air transportation infrastructure—including a modern international airport—
were all areas where the Puerto Rican government intervened significantly to 
ensure the fastest and safest movement of people out of the island. That is, 
the modern, safe, and regular air transportation system that emerged in post-
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war Puerto Rico needs to be linked to the migration process experienced by 
Puerto Ricans in that period, as well as to the government’s migration policy.
The Puerto Rican government—including the prominent participation of 
Governor Muñoz Marín—became concerned with the issue of air transporta-
tion after it took a more active approach in the management of migration in 
late 1947. Providing stable and safe air transportation for the tens of thousands 
of Puerto Ricans who decided to migrate on their own or through government 
programs every year became an important policy issue for the government. 
Securing safe air transportation became part of the government’s agenda after 
numerous air accidents took place in the late forties, most of them linked 
to the “non-scheduled” or “irregular” airlines that provided the bulk of air 
transportation at that time. Air transportation emerged as one of the domains 
where the Puerto Rican government assumed greater responsibilities.
But air transportation in Puerto Rico reflects the dilemmas of the govern-
ment’s relative autonomy in a colonial context. Air transportation in all of the 
U.S. territory is in the jurisdiction of the federal government; the Puerto Rican 
government had no legally binding jurisdiction on this matter. This is another 
area where the colonial government had to lobby the federal government to 
implement policies that would further facilitate the movement of people out 
of the island. If migration is understood as a mechanism to further social and 
economic stability in the territory, the government’s intervention to expand 
air transportation infrastructure and services is one more example where the 
colonial state was furthering U.S. rule on the island. In those areas where the 
colonial government did not require the extensive intervention of the federal 
government, like the construction of the international airport, it took the ini-
tiative to advance this project on its own.
This chapter examines the actions of the Puerto Rican government to 
influence the regulation of air transportation in Puerto Rico and to provide 
a more efficient movement of migrant labor to the United States. It looks at 
the role played by the government in the air transportation of workers. The 
government intervened to reduce the high number of air crashes that were 
negatively affecting the public’s notion of air travel, it took the initiative to 
construct a modern and efficient airport to handle the increasing number 
of flights and passenger cargo, and it strove to assure the safe travel of island 
migrants to the mainland. This chapter also questions and debunks the widely 
accepted idea that tourism was the factor propelling the modernization and 
expansion of the island’s air transportation system and infrastructure in the 
postwar period.
By March 1949, the Puerto Rican Labor Department had established a set 
of requirements for the transportation of workers from Puerto Rico to the 
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United States. These included the care and handling of passengers, like the 
number of workers delivered per day, as specified by the labor contract and 
the employer; the services provided to passengers during flights or delays, 
including food and water; and the provision of flight insurance acceptable to 
the department. There were also guidelines for carrier service, including that 
all planes had to have approval of the federal air transportation regulatory 
agencies (like the Civil Aeronautics Board [CAB] and the Puerto Rico Trans-
portation Authority [TA]) and adequate facilities for the transport of workers; 
that workers had to be delivered at the specific site determined by employers; 
and that the carrier company had to post a bond of at least $50,000 with the 
contractor.2
AIR TRANSPORTATION OF LABOR
In its seminal work on Puerto Rican migration, the Centro History Task Force’s 
Labor Migration under Capitalism set the basis for future migration studies by 
defining Puerto Rican migration as a labor migration. However, this text was 
silent on the role played by the Puerto Rican government in this process. Fur-
thermore, although the book called for the study of migration as a movement 
of labor from one underdeveloped region to a more advanced one, no atten-
tion was paid to how the actual movement of people was carried out. That is, 
neither Centro’s nor any other later study of Puerto Rican migration has so far 
focused on the transportation of labor from Puerto Rico to the United States.
Air transportation became an essential issue in hiring Puerto Rican labor-
ers in the United States, not only in terms of the overall costs for this labor 
force but also regarding their availability and reliability. Air transportation in 
general has reduced the costs involved in hiring workers from faraway places 
for employers in the advanced economies of the postwar period, as Button 
and Vega argue. They postulate that as air transportation becomes cheaper 
and more reliable, it lowers the costs for the movement of labor and increases 
its mobility.3 Air transportation not only allowed Puerto Ricans to move to 
the United States relatively cheaply and quickly but also made the idea of 
migration itself more acceptable, including specific patterns of migration like 
return migration and circular migration so characteristic of—but not unique 
to—the Puerto Rican experience. What Button and Vega do not consider is 
the role played by the state in this process through its regulations and policies. 
The Puerto Rican government was instrumental in making air transportation 
cheaper, safer, and more reliable in order to satisfy the needs of U.S. employers 
and jobs for Puerto Rican workers.
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In his study of the “economic aspects” of migration, Belton Fleisher tackles 
the question of why migration of Puerto Ricans increased dramatically after 
1945 and not in the 1920s, when U.S. immigration quotas created a vast need 
for cheap labor in the United States, particularly in agriculture. He argues 
that Puerto Rican workers were worse off in 1945 than in the 1920s as a conse-
quence of the decline of the sugar industry and a rapid population growth that 
increased the labor force, in conjunction with an increasing urbanization of 
the population. These factors increased the pool of people inclined to migrate, 
which corresponded with a growing need for labor in the United States. 
Fleisher adds a second determining factor in explaining why Puerto Ricans 
decided to migrate after 1945: the increasing availability of air transportation 
along with declining airfare costs. He contends that there was a bottleneck in 
transportation before 1945, when transportation out of the island was limited 
due to the war and the highly restricted air transportation system. After the 
war, surplus airplanes and pilots allowed the nonscheduled charter airlines 
to expand. This coupled with the entry of major airlines and lower airfares 
meant the number of people leaving the island by air increased dramatically. 
Fleisher also discusses the nature of the flow of air travelers on the island, 
whether it was mainly of mainland tourists or migrants. He concludes that 
the seasonal behavior of air transportation was related to migration flows and 
airfare costs. Fleisher points out two factors that influenced what he calls the 
migration “costs” for the prospective migrant: increased information regard-
ing migration and cheaper transportation.4 What Fleisher fails to mention is 
that these two variables used to explain the potential costs of migration for 
likely migrants were influenced and employed by the Puerto Rican govern-
ment to promote migration.
In his 1953 article on the economic links between Puerto Rico and the 
United States, Walton Hamilton called upon the Puerto Rican government 
to focus on three significant policy issues: population control, migration, and 
industrial development. Migration was central to the other two: by reduc-
ing population pressure and the labor market, it allowed those staying on 
the island to have better jobs and incomes. For Hamilton, transportation was 
essential to the migration of Puerto Ricans to the United States: he explained, 
“If migration is to provide a safety valve, passage must be available, reliable, 
and cheap—and Puerto Rico must consciously strive to make it so.” Hamilton 
saw “the movement of people” as an essential instrument of policy, an impor-
tant “bridge” between Puerto Rico and the United States. “It is impossible to 
think of an item in the government’s far-reaching and forward-looking pro-
gram which for its realization does not demand access to adequate, inexpen-
sive, reliable, and economical means of carriage,” he wrote. Air transportation 
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became an indispensable tool in the movement of Puerto Ricans to the United 
States, the most efficient and effective means to achieve mass migration: 
“Between the island and mainland, the railroad does not run; automobiles, 
whether of modern design or ancient vintage, are not available; and as the 
Governor [Muñoz Marín] paraphrased Kipling, ‘There ain’t no buses running 
from the Bronx to Mayagüez.’” While ocean transportation was most desirable 
for the movement of goods, air transportation was the best and most reliable 
means of moving massive amounts of people. Hamilton acknowledged that 
“the government of Puerto Rico has been engaged in a struggle to secure to 
its people adequate and reliable air transport at rates they can afford to pay.”5
In effect, the Puerto Rican government urged the federal government to 
implement measures to provide a greater air transportation system for Puerto 
Rico immediately after the end of World War II. In July 1948, Governor Piñero 
filed a complaint with the CAB demanding the expansion of air transporta-
tion in Puerto Rico. The complaint supported Eastern’s petition to operate 
along the profitable New York–San Juan route; until then, Pan Am was the 
only major airline allowed to operate flights on that route. The Puerto Rican 
government argued that this situation was limiting the air transportation ser-
vices on the island, curtailing competition and thus allowing Pan Am to main-
tain high-priced airfares. The complaint contended that Puerto Ricans had a 
right to cheap air transportation to the U.S. mainland, something equivalent 
to ground transportation between the continental states.6
In reaction to this complaint, the CAB held hearings in San Juan on the 
island’s air transportation needs. In February 1949, Puerto Rico’s governor 
and other top functionaries deposed before CAB representative William 
Madden. According to a news report, all government representatives agreed 
on three issues that required a greater and cheaper air transportation sys-
tem: agriculture, migration, and industrialization. Muñoz Marín argued that 
although Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens, Puerto Rico occupies a “precise 
position within the American federal system and the economy of the United 
States.” The fact that the island is miles away from the U.S. mainland presents 
a “peculiar situation . . . a hurdle that must be overcome or defeated.” Puerto 
Rico’s situation is quite different from that of any other state in the conti-
nental United States, where land transportation can satisfy economic links. If 
Puerto Ricans were to be on an equal basis with other U.S. citizens, then their 
transportation needs had to be adequately addressed. For the governor, “the 
airplane provides the safe and cheap service that the train, buses, trucks, and 
passenger cars provide to other citizens of the United States.” Air transporta-
tion was vital to the island’s economic development and continued economic 
links with the United States, including migration. Muñoz Marín framed the 
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demand for air transportation services between the island and the U.S. main-
land within the framework of the rights of Puerto Ricans as U.S. citizens: 
“What more natural thing that people move from where the jobs are scarce 
to where they abound? And Puerto Ricans have as much a right as citizens 
of any state in the Union to be able to move to places where there are new 
job opportunities.” Referring to the nonscheduled air carriers, he pointed out 
that among Puerto Rico’s air transportation needs was a good “second class” 
system that should be adequate “in matters of security”; in the previous year, 
the CAB had imposed stricter regulations on their flights to the island. Con-
scious of the security concerns with these air carriers, linked to several deadly 
accidents during that time, the governor asserted that these companies “have 
made in the past a valuable service to Puerto Rico.” Although these carriers 
should comply with the same safety regulations as other airlines, their “pio-
neering work” in linking the island to the continental U.S. “should not be lost.” 
He also insisted that the “first class” system of air transportation between the 
island and the mainland needed to be expanded, referring to the scheduled 
carrier service provided by the major airlines. For Muñoz Marín, new devel-
opments in air transportation should provide a more efficient linkage between 
Puerto Rico and the United States. “Puerto Rico’s future rests heavily on the 
economy, efficiency, and breadth of facilities for air transportation.”7
The CAB announced its response to the complaint by the Puerto Rican 
government later that year. Not only did the agency maintain restrictions 
of nonscheduled airlines flying to Puerto Rico but it also rejected Eastern’s 
petition to fly the New York–San Juan route. In reaction to this action, the 
Puerto Rican government filed a petition with the CAB in May 1949 demand-
ing reforms to improve the “highly inadequate” air transportation services 
between the island and the U.S. mainland. It demanded that “another certi-
fied airline besides Pan Am” be allowed to have regular direct flights between 
Puerto Rico and New York, Washington, and Baltimore; that Pan Am be 
allowed to have direct flights to Puerto Rico from the latter two cities; and 
that smaller airlines with cheaper airfares be allowed to fly between New York 
and San Juan. The government’s petition claimed that Puerto Rico “is not get-
ting from Pan Am the quality air service that is justified by the significance of 
the island’s air traffic, nor the quality of the regular service that is required by 
Puerto Rico in view of its complete dependence on air service.”8
In response to the Puerto Rican petition, the report by CAB’s Madden in 
March 1950 sustained its previous conclusions. The government countered 
that Madden’s recommendations “fail to provide a passenger service at low 
cost. Therefore, Puerto Rico would have no assurance of receiving low-cost 
air service for migrants and middle-income passengers, which according to 
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the same examiner is ‘vital to the welfare of the island.’” The government’s 
claim argued that the CAB should give Puerto Rico a different treatment than 
the rest of the nation, arguing that the island’s insular condition was not the 
same as that of the states. The CAB opposed the government’s petition for a 
low-airfare airline due to its implications in the American domestic market 
for the major regular airlines. Pan Am was strongly opposed to the Puerto 
Rican position. The Puerto Rican government argued that the proliferation of 
nonscheduled airlines in the Puerto Rican market was a reaction to Pan Am’s 
inadequate service and high airfares.9
Muñoz Marín reiterated the same argument to the CAB chairman, Oswald 
Ryan, in August 1950. The transportation needs of Puerto Rico increased in 
the postwar period due to greater economic production, tourism, and, par-
ticularly, migration. The governor declared that “the whole economy of 
Puerto Rico, indeed the very continuance of its existence, is at the mercy of 
its external transportation facilities—sea and air.” After recalling the German 
submarine blockade that almost starved Puerto Rico during the war years, 
he reminded Ryan that the circumstances had not changed dramatically in 
the Cold War era as a consequence of Puerto Rico’s strategic position in the 
Caribbean:
Of overwhelming importance is the air transportation link between the 
United States mainland and Puerto Rico in the carriage of people. . . . [I]t is 
in this field more than in any other that Puerto Rico can make its contribu-
tion to an integrated all-out American emergency effort.
The governor claimed that the island’s surplus labor could satisfy U.S. labor 
needs in the face of the Korean War. For him, in an era of increased migration 
from the island, “air transportation is the only satisfactory method of effecting 
a movement of people between Puerto Rico and continental United States.”10
One year earlier, Resident Commissioner Fernós-Isern pled before the 
House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee for the CAB to expand 
the air and sea transportation system in Puerto Rico: “Low-cost air carriage 
and dependable and alert regular air carriage are indispensable to the people 
of Puerto Rico. And they have not, on a satisfactory basis had either the one 
of the other.” He emphasized the importance of air transportation for Puerto 
Rican migration to the United States: “It is expected that this movement of 
people will continue for several years. If it does, it will have to be largely by 
airplane.” He also pointed out that most air transportation of passengers at the 
time was done by nonscheduled airlines that provided cheap airfare but “oper-
ated with too few efforts at enforcement of proper safety precautions.”11 The 
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numbers provided by the resident commissioner on the flow of air passengers 
indicated the importance of air transportation for migration even then and 
predicted what was to come after 1950. Some 144,455 persons came to Puerto 
Rico by air from January 1945 to June 1948, while 231,542 departed by air in 
the same period.12 The high number of departures indicated the rising impor-
tance of air travel for Puerto Rican migration. As Fernós-Isern stated in the 
New York Times in 1950: “The masses must move by air or they must stay at 
home unemployed.”13
The CAB eventually accepted the wishes of the Puerto Rican government 
to improve air transportation services on the island, leading to an increase 
in the number of flights and to lower airfares.14 All of this was in great mea-
sure made possible by the constant lobbying and efforts of the Puerto Rican 
government.
THE BATTLE FOR THE PUERTO RICAN SKY:  
REGULAR VERSUS NONSCHEDULED AIRLINES
The air transportation system in Puerto Rico before World War II was basi-
cally similar to what Dierikx describes as the modern means of connecting 
the colonial metropolis with its territories. He argues that during the 1930s, 
the airplane provided a more efficient and fast means of transportation for 
European colonial administrators, businessmen, military personnel, and tour-
ists.15 The same thing could be said about Puerto Rico; flying was limited to 
those categories mentioned above and the affluent on the island since very 
few Puerto Ricans could afford the cost of a plane ticket. To the overwhelm-
ing majority of Puerto Ricans, moving to the U.S. mainland implied going by 
sea transport. Pan Am’s first flight to Puerto Rico from Miami was in 1929; by 
1940, it had just four weekly flights on this route.16
The end of the war created a huge market for used warplanes; most of 
these were sold to independent companies that fueled the nonscheduled 
charter flights market. Many national governments created their own publicly 
owned airlines; others, like the United States, promoted and gave extensive 
benefits to their own major private airlines. After an end-of-war decrease in 
production, big airplane manufacturers like Boeing and McDonnell Doug-
las found a very profitable niche in selling modern airplanes to the major 
airlines providing regularly scheduled flights. Leading the pack of U.S. air-
lines expanding their services and fleets was Pan Am, which was extending 
its global reach with many international routes, including the Caribbean and 
Puerto Rico. The number of air passengers increased dramatically in the post-
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war period, from 2.5 million in 1940 to 8.2 million in 1945, 27.3 million in 1950, 
and 68 million in 1955.17
In 1945 only nine scheduled airlines provided air service to Puerto Rico 
and the Caribbean. By 1955, eight scheduled airlines flew to Puerto Rico, 
including Pan Am, Eastern, Delta, Southern, Air France, and Iberia; five non-
scheduled airlines also provided service to Puerto Rico at that time.18 Pan Am 
and Eastern took the lion’s share of the Puerto Rican market after 1950. Soon 
after, Puerto Rico became one of the most profitable routes for Eastern, and 
the New York–San Juan route became one of Pan Am’s “busiest north-south 
routes.” By 1952, Pan Am had seventy weekly flights on this route. In 1948, Pan 
Am had offered one of its first “tourist” rates worldwide in its New York–San 
Juan route, lowering the fare from $133 to $75.19
On July 1, 1946, Pan Am made its first nonstop flight from New York to 
San Juan. The four-engine DC-4 took some eight hours to make the route, 
and the lowest-priced ticket cost $130; this was also the first flight of Pan Am’s 
daily schedule.20 On March 27, 1950, Eastern made history in Puerto Rico’s air 
transportation system with the first nonstop flight by jet from New York to 
San Juan. The plane, aptly named “The Puerto Rican,” made the flight in five 
hours and forty-one minutes. Passengers included Vincent Impelliteri, mayor 
of New York City, who went to Puerto Rico to celebrate the historic event and 
to meet with the top echelons of the Puerto Rican government.21 New York 
City became the most important destination for air travelers coming from 
Puerto Rico, which was no coincidence: its Puerto Rican settlement was the 
largest in the United States.
The New York Times declared 1950 as “the best year for the airlines” world-
wide; the next year it claimed that 1951 was “the best year in their history” 
for U.S. commercial airlines.22 Much of this success was attributed to the 
expansion of tourism after the war. Puerto Rico benefitted from the expan-
sion of both winter and summer tourism to the Caribbean. Tourist traffic 
to Puerto Rico, for example, increased from 77,457 in 1949–50 to 85,954 in 
1950–51.23 Tourism was a factor in explaining the increase in air travel to and 
from Puerto Rico, no doubt. But I will argue in the following sections that the 
expansion of air travel in Puerto Rico, the increase in the number of airlines 
and flights to and from the island, the modernization of the airport, and the 
reduction in airfares was not due to an increase in tourism but to the dramatic 
rise in migration after the war.
The number of nonscheduled airlines increased after the war when the U.S. 
government sold its huge supply of warplanes to private investors and former 
war pilots. As the major U.S. airlines controlled regularly scheduled flights, 
including the lucrative overseas market, the nonscheduled airlines expanded 
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in the domestic market and the overseas territories. The nonscheduled air-
lines were not regulated as strictly as the regular scheduled airlines and were 
not included in international agreements regulating global air transportation. 
They were not allowed to cater to individual passengers like the major airlines, 
and they had to depend on flights chartered by specific groups or travel agen-
cies.24 The increase in the number of these airlines increased CAB oversight 
in their services. For example, in October 1947, the CAB suspended forty-two 
nonscheduled airlines in the United States, including some flying to Puerto 
Rico, for failure to comply with federal regulations.25
Nonscheduled airlines provided most of the air transportation after the 
war ended, just as thousands of Puerto Ricans began to move to the United 
States in search of jobs. According to a CAB report, these airlines came to the 
island after 1945 to serve “a large backlog of prospective passengers who were 
unable to obtain transportation whether by boat or by the regular service of 
Pan American. The demand for space was so great that these nonscheduled 
carriers had no difficulty filling their aircraft at the same rates charged by 
Pan American.” The number of flights increased after these carriers began 
making flights to and from Puerto Rico.26 Another observer described the 
status of air transportation in Puerto Rico around 1945 in the same terms, 
asserting that Puerto Rico “was badly served” by Pan Am: “Rates were very 
high, schedules were inconvenient and not lived up to; and accommodations 
were bad and hard to get. There was in Puerto Rico a backlog of passengers 
for whom it would have taken months to find seats.” Nonscheduled carriers 
entered into the Puerto Rican market offering more flights and cheaper air-
fares. The Puerto Rican government intervened in 1946 to prevent the CAB 
from grounding these carriers in Puerto Rico. In 1948 it requested the CAB to 
certify several nonscheduled carriers so they could compete with Pan Am and 
provide cheaper fares and more flights out of the island.27 By 1950, the rhetoric 
coming from Puerto Rican government officials began to change. That year, 
Fernós-Isern publicly criticized Pan Am’s service and airfares in Puerto Rico. 
Writing after a spate of air crashes by nonscheduled airlines that shocked the 
Puerto Rican and American public, he argued that the entry and dominance 
of these carriers in the Puerto Rican market was due to Pan Am’s resistance to 
providing a larger number of flights and cheaper fares.28
After 1947, major airlines like Pan Am and Eastern saw an opportunity to 
expand their markets in Puerto Rico. But their expansion came not because 
of their low fares and competitive advantage in free market competition with 
nonscheduled airlines, but in large part as a result of the intervention of the 
Puerto Rican government in its attempt to deal with one of its most press-
ing issues in one of its most important public policies: air security. The high 
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number of casualties caused by air crashes rocked public opinion in Puerto 
Rico, particularly when migration to the United States was on the rise. Safety 
in air transportation became a major issue of the Puerto Rican government’s 
migration policy.
AIR CRASHES AND AIR TRANSPORTATION SAFETY
On July 13, 1947, a DC-3 carrying thirty-three passengers and a crew of three 
crashed in the vicinity of Melbourne, Florida, at 4:30 in the morning. Twenty-
two Puerto Rican passengers were killed, thirteen survived; they were all liv-
ing in the New York City area and were going back to visit or return to the 
island. The flight left from Newark to Miami, with a refueling stop in Augusta, 
Georgia, on its way to San Juan. A travel agency in New York catering to 
Puerto Ricans had chartered the nonscheduled flight. It was the deadliest air 
tragedy in Puerto Rico’s history to that point. El Imparcial reported “shocking 
and moving scenes of grief ” at the Isla Grande Airport in San Juan among the 
relatives waiting to pick up their loved ones that morning. Similar scenes of 
despair and grief were reported by the Puerto Rican daily from the relatives 
of the dead in New York.29
The grief caused by the accident in Puerto Rico turned into rage when 
news reached the island that the flight was overweight. Puerto Rico’s Sen-
ate initiated an investigation of the accident, and Fernós-Isern went to Mel-
bourne to learn more. The CAB and the Civil Aeronautics Administration 
(CAA) also began investigations. The arrival of the bodies in San Juan was 
described as the most “tragic and painful” event ever witnessed on the island. 
A riot erupted when the police tried in vain the prevent the relatives of the 
dead from seeing and identifying the remains of their loved ones.30 El Impar-
cial questioned why there was no oversight on flights to and from Puerto 
Rico and called for an investigation of the nonscheduled airlines, particularly 
along the New York-San Juan route.31 A federal investigation concluded that 
the causes for the accident were the overweight plane and overworked and 
unrested pilots. In addition, a U.S. Senate investigator concluded that the lax 
maintenance of the airplane was a threat to the security of the passengers.32
Six months after the Melbourne accident, another air crash perturbed the 
Puerto Rican public. On January 7, 1948, the day after the Three Kings Day 
celebration, another C-47 converted into a DC-3 crashed in the marshes of 
Savannah, Georgia, killing fifteen Puerto Ricans on their way to the island 
from Newark. As on the Melbourne flight, most of the Puerto Rican passen-
gers were from the New York area. Out of the twenty-six passengers, seven-
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teen died in the crash, including the pilot. This time, the airplane was owned 
by Coastal Airways, from Teterboro, New Jersey; most of the tickets had been 
sold by Manuel Casiano’s travel agency in the Bronx, who had chartered the 
flight to Coastal. The CAA announced that it would undergo an investigation 
into the causes of the crash, as did a U.S. Senate subcommittee on air safety 
and regulation. An El Mundo editorial called on the Puerto Rican govern-
ment to pressure the federal government to determine the specific causes of 
the crash and to enforce more strict regulation of nonscheduled chartered 
flights.33
The plane that crashed in Savannah was carrying five more passengers 
than regulations allowed. While El Mundo’s front page that day was domi-
nated by the news of the crash, two other headlines announced that 300 work-
ers were going to Lorain, Ohio, under the government’s migration program 
and that Muñoz Marín was receiving Venezuela’s consul in Puerto Rico to dis-
cuss migration plans to that country.34 The CAB denounced Coastal Airways 
for numerous safety infractions and noted that the CAA had not acted on 
them, nor had it reported these infractions to the Puerto Rican government. 
The U.S. Senate investigator on air safety reported that irregular nonscheduled 
airlines did not have to go through the more stringent safety regulations that 
scheduled airlines faced.35
During the CAB’s hearings on the accident, the copilot confirmed earlier 
reports by survivors that the two engines had stopped working before the air-
plane fell. He also mentioned that the Puerto Rican passengers did not under-
stand the safety warnings given by the English-speaking crew, which could not 
speak Spanish. The president of Coastal Airlines admitted that he did not have 
any permits to fly into San Juan but that since he had never been stopped, he 
presumed that he could do it. He argued that any mechanical problem with 
the aircraft was the pilot’s responsibility and that any extra passengers above 
those allowed by regulations were the responsibility of the travel agency that 
chartered the plane. Casiano replied that his responsibility was to take the pas-
sengers to the plane, and did not include the aircraft’s safety; he acknowledged 
that he paid from $2,000 to $2,200 per charter plane (so, any extra passengers 
would add to his profit margin). The CAB stated that it had no idea why the 
two engines failed at the same time.36
The Savannah air crash was not the only accident in 1948 involving Puerto 
Rican passengers. There was a series of air accidents and crashes in that year. 
On May 28, 1948, a World Airways four-engine Boeing flying from San Juan 
to New York experienced a forced landing on the outskirts of the Baltimore 
airport due to the bad weather conditions.37 Another close call happened 
on the night of October 4 on another nonscheduled flight from Teterboro, 
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New Jersey, to Miami en route to San Juan. The pilot, also the owner of New 
England Air Express Company, decided to emergency land the plane on a 
Bahamas beach near Nassau when he realized he was off course to the Miami 
airport. The plane, which carried “nineteen Puerto Rican farmhands, who 
were booked by Puerto Rico World Airways, a travel agency,” was the com-
pany’s only aircraft.38
The year 1948, which had begun in tragedy with the Savannah air crash, 
ended with another calamity. On the night of December 28, another DC-3 
disappeared into the night as it emitted an emergency call at 4:13 a.m.; it had 
left the San Juan airport at 10 p.m. the night before. Like the ones involved 
in earlier crashes, this Airborne Transport airplane was on a nonscheduled 
flight from San Juan to New York via Miami. It carried thirty passengers, 
twenty-seven of them Puerto Ricans on their way back to the New York area 
after spending the Christmas holidays on the island. Thus began “one of the 
biggest air search operations since the end of the war,” involving over fifty air-
planes from the navy, the coast guard, and the air force, plus scores of smaller 
private planes. The search extended one thousand miles from Miami in all 
directions. The airline’s representative on the island declared that the plane 
was inspected and authorized to fly by West Indies Air Service, a company 
of private mechanics used by nonscheduled airlines to certify their planes; 
he also asserted that the plane was making its first flight after spending two 
months under repairs.39 The usually calm El Mundo requested an investiga-
tion by federal and local authorities on nonscheduled flights, noting that all 
except one of the recurring air tragedies in the last years were on these char-
tered planes. It claimed that Puerto Ricans were fed up with the claims by the 
island government that it was taking all possible measures to safeguard lives 
on flights from San Juan to New York.40 On July 18, 1949, the CAB closed its 
investigation into the Airborne Transport tragedy, stating that it would reopen 
the case if the remains of the airplane were ever discovered; its final report 
indicated that the tragic flight did not fulfill the requirements to operate when 
it departed from San Juan.41
On the night of June 7, 1949, a C-46 airplane owned by Strato Freight 
crashed in Punta Salinas, in the municipality of Toa Baja, west of San Juan. 
The cargo aircraft converted into a passenger plane left the San Juan airport 
at 12:21 a.m. and sent a distress signal at 12:23 a.m. Of the eighty-one per-
sons aboard, fifty-three—all of them Puerto Ricans—died in the accident, 
making it the worst air accident in Puerto Rican history to date. Passengers 
and crew members acknowledged that there were only sixty-five seats, so the 
nineteen children aboard had to sit on their parents’ laps, and several adult 
passengers sat on boxes or stood up during the short flight. Crew members 
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later declared that there were not enough life vests for all the people aboard. 
The CAB reported that Strato Freight was allowed to fly from New York and 
Pennsylvania to San Juan and that no violations had been reported against 
the company; it was also allowed to fly both cargo and passengers using the 
same plane. As usual, the CAB announced its routine investigation into this 
air crash. It reported that the flight manifesto was false, understating its total 
weight.42
In Puerto Rico, Muñoz Marín ordered an exhaustive investigation of the 
tragedy to be led by the attorney general, also stating his direct involvement in 
the process. In Washington, Congressman Marcantonio requested an investi-
gation of the crash on the House floor.43 On June 10, Marcantonio made public 
a CAB secret report on the tragedy, which detailed the irregularities and fed-
eral violations incurred by Strato, including submitting a false report on the 
cargo and passenger weight. That same day, the governor ordered the TA to 
carry out exhaustive checks on any plane departing from Puerto Rico, while 
the Justice Department opened an investigation on the generalized practice 
by travel agencies of overselling plane tickets for a single flight. On June 16, 
the governor approved an insular regulation requiring all nonscheduled flights 
flying to and from the island to be approved by the TA.44
On July 14, the CAA “invoked its most dramatic authority to ground 
the airplanes of Strato Freight.” It suspended the airline for thirty days and 
requested that the CAB put the company out of business permanently, stat-
ing that the plane that crashed on June 7 was overloaded and its flap was not 
working properly. Other charges included the use of overworked pilots, car-
rying passengers on planes certified only for cargo, and recording incorrect 
weights and balance data in the flight manifests for previous flights on the 
same route. The CAA stated that this company “manifests an attitude of indif-
ference for the safety of others and a disregard of the civil air regulations.”45 
During the CAB hearings on the Punta Salinas tragedy, the flight’s copilot 
declared that the crew had been informed by West Indies Aviation Services 
that one of the engines was defective. The copilot also acknowledged what 
survivors had declared earlier, that smoke was coming from one of the engines 
even before the airplane took off. The CAB’s final report on the Punta Salinas 
air crash declared engine failure and overload as the causes of the accident. 
The CAB charged Strato Freight with negligence and revoked its license to 
operate in October 1949.46
On June 9, El Imparcial published two editorials: one on the Punta Salinas 
tragedy and another on the problems facing Puerto Rican migrants in the 
United States. Its editorial the next day complained about the lack of regula-
tions on travel agencies selling overbooked flights on charter airlines; these 
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agencies had been involved in all of the air crashes to that point.47 It would 
take El Imparcial and many others in Puerto Rico one more tragedy to con-
firm the relationship between the recurring air crashes and the expanding vol-
ume of migration to the United States, and for the Puerto Rican government 
to take a more active role in the regulation of nonscheduled airlines. On June 
5, 1950, a C-46 plane owned by the nonscheduled Westair Lines crashed on 
the Florida coast, killing twenty-eight passengers, all of them Puerto Ricans. 
The plane had been chartered by the Michigan Field Corporation, the Michi-
gan sugar beet producers’ association, taking sixty-one Puerto Rican farm-
workers under a contract approved by the Puerto Rican government. (This 
incident will be discussed further in chapter 6.) The CAA had previously 
requested that the CAB suspend Westair from flying passengers, charging the 
airline with gross negligence on safety regulations. After the Florida accident, 
El Imparcial editorialized that the real cause of the accident was the govern-
ment’s migration policy. This time it was impossible to avoid making the con-
nection between migration and the air crashes, as well as noting the role the 
Puerto Rican government played in this exodus of people. As a consequence 
of this accident, government officials—headed by Muñoz Marín—engaged in 
more active and aggressive lobbying of the federal air transportation agencies 
in advocating the entry of the two major regular-schedule airlines, Pan Am 
and Eastern, into the Puerto Rican market. A new era of air transportation in 
Puerto Rico had begun.
The expansion of the two major airlines into the Puerto Rican market did 
not eliminate the nonscheduled airlines’ movement of Puerto Ricans to the 
United States. The Puerto Rican government allowed the continued service of 
nonscheduled companies in Puerto Rico in order to maintain cheap airfares 
and facilitate a greater movement of people to the U.S. mainland. Further-
more, the fact that the two regular-schedule airlines increased their share of 
the air transportation market in Puerto Rico did not eradicate air accidents. 
For example, on March 11, 1952, a Holy Friday, a Pan Am DC-4 carrying sixty-
two passengers and five crew members crashed immediately after taking off 
in San Juan, killing fifty-two people, most of them Puerto Ricans returning to 
their homes in the New York area. Even though the pilot had requested emer-
gency measures before landing the plane because of engine trouble, the aircraft 
was allowed to return to New York, having been certified by Pan Am mechan-
ics. Two engines failed immediately after takeoff, causing the plane to crash in 
the outskirts of the San Juan harbor, where a shocked multitude watched the 
latest air tragedy in Puerto Rico. After announcing a routine investigation, a 
CAB representative declared that the agency had increased its manpower in 
San Juan due to the high number of accidents on the island. From July 1947 
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to the Pan Am crash in 1952, 204 persons died in airplane disasters in Puerto 
Rico.48 From January 1 to April 15, 1952, there were five crashes by U.S. airlines 
worldwide, with 118 dead; Puerto Rico’s Holy Friday crash was the deadliest 
of them all. All five planes were from major, scheduled U.S. airlines; during 
that period, ironically, no nonscheduled plane had crashed.49 By 1956, of the 
twenty-seven air accidents with more than fifty dead in the world, two had 
happened in Puerto Rico.50
Puerto Rican migration might be the first airborne migration to the United 
States, but it came with a price. This is a lesson that should not be forgotten 
because this, too, is part of Puerto Rico’s migration history.
AIRFARES
Cheap airfares became an important issue in the government’s project of mov-
ing people away from the island to work in the United States. In his response 
to Pan Am’s claim that its $75 “tourist” fare was the cheapest it could offer, 
Fernós-Isern insisted that “the great masses of people moved at present belong 
to income classes which cannot afford to pay this $75 rate. They must have 
cheaper transportation if they are to find work in the mainland.”51 The Puerto 
Rican government had to actively engage with federal regulators and air-
lines—both scheduled and nonscheduled—in the determination of airfares. 
Its officials argued that cheap airfares were fundamental in allowing the great-
est number of people to move off the island to the United States, a process 
that had significant benefits for both the Puerto Rican and the American 
economies.
The Puerto Rican government became directly involved in the negotiation 
of agreements with airlines regarding schedules and airfares. Many of these 
agreements where overseen by BEM director Pagán de Colón, who coordi-
nated the government’s migration programs. For example, a 1949 letter from 
a Pan Am representative to Muñoz Marín stated that after a discussion with 
Pagán de Colón, the airline offered bigger planes for the San Juan to New York 
route and that these “will be made available” to the BEM “for their exclusive 
use on a charter basis.” The total flight cost was $3,600, or approximately $57 
per passenger.52 Pagán de Colón was also in constant communication with 
the Puerto Rico’s TA making sure nonscheduled carriers were checked for 
compliance with safety measures and government standards. In a June 1950 
memo by Sierra Berdecía, she stated that this procedure was meant to show 
the measures taken by the BEM “to assure compliance by airlines with all 
safety regulations.”53 The governor was kept informed of issues regarding air 
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transportation for migrants and of negotiations with air carriers. For example, 
in a June 15, 1950, meeting he instructed Sierra Berdecía to get a better offer 
on airfares from Eastern or Pan Am and to try to procure additional air trans-
portation with other nonscheduled carriers.54
In 1951, under intense pressure from the Puerto Rican government, the 
CAB allowed Eastern to expand its services to the island and compete with 
Pan Am. Eastern immediately offered a $64 airfare to Puerto Rico, forcing 
Pan Am to lower theirs. Even at these “lower” rates, the two airlines made 
huge profits in the Puerto Rican market. As economist Walton Hamilton 
argued, “the tourist services thus forced upon Pan American and Eastern by 
the Government of Puerto Rico have served the reluctant carriers well.” The 
“tourist” airfare was nothing more than a euphemism for cheap airfares ben-
efitting migrants. Hamilton concluded that the $64 airfare “is far more than 
the masses of the people can afford to pay, leaves huge layers of potential traf-
fic untapped, and imposes a barrier against the migration of workers to the 
mainland and the creation of new jobs at home.”55
The government of Puerto Rico, through the actions of the Department 
of Labor, was engaged in airfare negotiations with airlines, agricultural con-
tractors, and federal agencies. Pagán de Colón devoted a long section in her 
review of the Farm Placement Program to the issue of air transportation of 
migrant workers. She described how already by 1949 the responsibility for 
the issue of air transportation had been assumed by the BEM as part of the 
implementation of Puerto Rico’s migration law. By that date, the air transpor-
tation of workers to the United States was included in the labor contract that 
was required by the Puerto Rican government—that is, it was regulated by the 
BEM. The government also compelled all airlines flying Puerto Rican workers 
to the United States to be certified by Puerto Rico’s TA and required that their 
airfares were the cheapest available if these were to be paid up front by the 
worker. By 1949, the Department of Labor was encouraging farmers interested 
in hiring Puerto Rican workers to group into associations that could enter into 
contract negotiations directly. The most controversial issue was air transpor-
tation, since these associations usually wanted to hire their own unscheduled 
airline, while Puerto Rican functionaries insisted on hiring one of the sched-
uled carriers.
In 1950, the Department of Labor signed a contract with the Michigan 
Field Corporation allowing the transportation of workers on an unscheduled 
airline, Westair. The first flight to Miami ended in a tragic accident with over 
fifty dead. After this incident, the Puerto Rican government allowed the trans-
portation of workers only in flights by Pan Am and Eastern.56 In June 1956, it 
reached an agreement with the major airlines, the CAB, and the Garden State 
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Service Cooperative Association to reduce airfare from $59.50 to $52.50 in 
travel from San Juan to the East Coast.57 Two years later, in June 1958, Puerto 
Rico was involved in intense negotiations with the major airlines for airfare 
reduction. The airlines had reduced their regular airfare from $52.50 to $45 
along the San Juan–New York route, and the government wanted the same 
rate for their charter flights with these airlines. When the airlines refused, the 
government stopped sending workers on charter flights, which reduced the 
number of workers moving to the United States.58
The Puerto Rican government also mediated with federal air transporta-
tion regulatory agencies in favor of the nonscheduled, or irregular, carriers. 
These carriers, which provided charter flights on their own or by contract 
with agricultural employers on the mainland, provided cheaper airfares to 
migrants. In December 1948, Governor Piñero asked the CAB to grant per-
mission to World Airways to fly to Puerto Rico, arguing, 
More than 50,000 people moved into and out of Puerto Rico by non- 
scheduled carriers last year. This movement was in a very large measure a 
matter of economic life and death to job-seekers. This large movement could 
not have taken place at rates charged by scheduled airlines who have, until 
this month, ignored the island’s glaring need for low-priced air service to 
the mainland.
He asserted also that the elimination of these carriers from Puerto Rican 
routes would lead to higher airfares from the major airlines. The CAB 
responded positively to the governor’s request.59
In 1952, the government of Puerto Rico filed a motion to the CAB in sup-
port of a petition by Flying Tigers, a nonscheduled carrier, for authorization 
to fly farmworkers from Puerto Rico to the United States; both Pan Am and 
Eastern opposed this petition. The government’s motion argued that there 
were eighteen thousand farmworkers ready to move to the United States, but 
that Pan Am and Eastern’s refusal to lower their airfares made this uncertain; 
Flying Tigers proposed an airfare of $40 to $45, almost $20 below what the 
two major airlines had offered. The government argued that the CAB had 
previously established that a cheap air service was an “imperative” need for 
the Puerto Rican economy and that migrant workers could not afford the 
high airfares charged by Pan Am and Eastern.60 In 1953, the CAB approved 
Eastern’s request for lowering its Miami–San Juan airfare from $64 to $43, a 
petition supported by the Puerto Rican government.61
Puerto Rico’s extensive dependence on irregular carriers to transport 
migrants to the United States became a policy issue. Some favored a ban on 
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these carriers, while others supported their continued use. O’Connor had 
endorsed the latter position as early as 1948, when he was working on matters 
related to airfares and the air transportation of migrants.62 O’Connor argued 
that cheap transportation was necessary for Puerto Ricans to remain competi-
tive on the mainland, and this meant resorting to the use of irregular carriers. 
He claimed that air safety “is a relative matter” and that no matter what pre-
cautionary measures are taken, “risks to life are inherent in speedy transpor-
tation,” whether performed by the major airlines or the irregulars. O’Connor 
concluded that irregular carriers “should still have a place in our scheme of 
things.”63
THE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
The rising exodus of people—which contributed to the increase in the number 
of flights to and from the U.S. mainland—justified the construction of a mod-
ern airport capable of sustaining the large volume of air passengers and the 
growing number of flights. The international airport, in turn, made it possible 
for more flights and more modern airplanes to fly to Puerto Rico and thus 
to facilitate the ever-increasing outflow of people. The Puerto Rican govern-
ment played a central role in the construction of the international airport, a 
role that needs to be understood within the context of its migration program.
In May 1946, while celebrating the approval of Pan Am’s direct route 
between San Juan and New York, El Mundo reported that the “rise of large 
proportions” in the island’s air transportation system was due to the “unprec-
edented exodus” of Puerto Ricans going to New York City. The greatest limita-
tion to the expansion of air transportation in Puerto Rico then was the very 
limited airport infrastructure on the island. The main facility, the Isla Grande 
Airport next to the San Juan Bay, was shared by civilian and military flights. 
The report concluded that “it was essential to construct a civilian airport” in 
San Juan that could be characterized as an “international airport.” Later that 
year, El Mundo regretted the slow progress in the planning of the new airport 
that was to be constructed in the area of Isla Verde, in the municipality of 
Carolina, next to San Juan. This situation was due mostly to the opposition 
of the U.S. Navy to transferring the lands to Puerto Rico. The editorial also 
noted that Pan Am was threatening to reduce its flights from the United States 
because the existing airport at Isla Grande could not accommodate its newer 
and bigger airplanes.64
By 1948, the government of Puerto Rico and the CAA had agreed on a 
plan to build the new airport in Isla Verde. This plan was opposed by the 
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navy on the basis that it would interfere with a naval radar station near the 
projected construction area. Instead, the navy proposed that the new airport 
be built in Palo Seco, in the municipality of Cataño, also next to San Juan. The 
CAA refused to provide any funding for the construction until the opposition 
by the navy was resolved.65 After failed negotiations with the navy, Governor 
Piñero requested that President Truman intervene. Truman sent Admiral Wil-
liam Leahy, the former governor of Puerto Rico, to assess the situation. Leahy 
sided with the Puerto Rican government and said that he saw no reason for 
the navy’s position. On July 7, 1948, Truman ordered the secretaries of the 
interior and the navy to begin negotiations between the navy and the Puerto 
Rican government to transfer the navy’s land in Isla Verde to Puerto Rico and 
land in Sabana Seca to the navy. Earlier that year, on June 1, the CAA had 
approved the construction of an international airport in Isla Verde. Accord-
ing to government officials, the construction of the airport at Isla Verde would 
cost $12,612,000, with federal funds amounting to just $5 million.66 The Puerto 
Rican government was the main force behind the construction of the inter-
national airport.
Construction of the new airport began on August 17, 1949. Puerto Rico’s 
TA was in charge of its construction and management. The cost for the first 
phase of construction was $3.5 million, coming mostly from local funds; by 
this time, the total cost of the project was estimated at $15 million.67 Later that 
year, the journal Aviation Operations estimated that nine hundred thousand 
persons would fly to and from Puerto Rico in 1949. Among the causes for this 
rise in air traffic was “the strong migratory flow of Puerto Ricans to New York 
since the end of the war.”68 A 1949 study of Puerto Rico’s future international 
airport indicated that passenger traffic to the United States would increase 
from 314,346 in 1949, to 665,000 in 1960, to 968,000 by 1970. It estimated 
that the biggest share of passenger traffic would be due to family visits to and 
from Puerto Rico, followed by permanent and temporary worker migration 
to the mainland.69
By mid-1951, the construction of the airport was already behind the ini-
tial plans. The Puerto Rican government complained that one reason for this 
situation was that the federal government was retracting from its original 
financial commitment. In August of that year, the CAA and the Puerto Rican 
government were able to convince Congress to advance the promised funding 
by emphasizing the military uses of the new airport. Federal appropriations 
increased for 1951 and 1952, but not to the levels promised initially by the fed-
eral government. In March 1952, TA director Salvador Caro announced the 
beginning of the second phase in the construction of the airport; up to that 
date, the Puerto Rican government had invested $3.83 million, while federal 
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funds amounted to $2.2 million. Caro restated the urgency of the new airport 
based on the unprecedented number of air travelers, claiming that 434,631 
passengers used the Isla Grande Airport in 1951—104,292 more than in the 
previous year. He displayed the model for the new airport, showing its six-
floor terminal with offices for federal and local government agencies, airlines, 
stores, and waiting areas.70 When the airport was inaugurated in May 1955, 
the government reported that its original estimates for the airport’s passenger 
traffic—508,000 travelers in 1955 and 665,000 in 1960—were already outdated. 
In 1953, 605,000 passengers used air transportation to and from Puerto Rico.71
In August 1952, Caro stated that of the estimated $15,062,848 final cost 
for the airport construction, the Puerto Rican government would provide 
$10.312 million, while the federal government would give only $4.75 million.72 
In early October 1952, Fernós-Isern requested from Congress the approval of 
the remaining $2.46 million of the funds promised to Puerto Rico in order to 
accelerate construction. He emphasized the increasing number of industries 
opened in Puerto Rico by U.S. investors in recent years, the increase in cargo 
trade with the United States, and the rising number of tourists coming from 
the U.S. mainland. Missing from the resident commissioner’s account, as with 
other public pronouncements on the need for the new airport during this 
period, was migration.73 Why?
Migration was presented as the main reason for new and modern air 
transportation facilities, including the airport, immediately after the end of 
the war. The shift in emphasis away from migration might be explained by the 
attitudes toward Puerto Rican migrants in the United States and the Puerto 
Rican government’s migration policy. The “Puerto Rican problem” in New 
York City never went away; it surfaced repeatedly in the coming decades, and 
it also extended to other communities like Chicago, Hartford, and Philadel-
phia, where Puerto Ricans began to arrive in increasing numbers after 1948. 
The Puerto Rican government did not want to appear to be “encouraging” 
migration, the cornerstone of its public relations on this matter.
“VISITORS,” TOURISM, AND AIR TRANSPORTATION
When the Isla Verde International Airport began its operations in May 1955, 
it was heralded as one of the biggest and most modern facilities in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, a symbol of Puerto Rico’s modernization and 
economic development.74 Already by this time, the idea that the moderniza-
tion and expansion of the air transportation system and infrastructure was 
linked to tourism and the economic development program in Puerto Rico was 
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widely accepted and reproduced in the media.75 This idea, actively promoted 
by the Puerto Rican government at the time, is still prevalent today, even in 
academic circles.76 I argue here that the major force behind the expansion and 
modernization of the air transportation infrastructure actually was migration: 
the number of airlines and flights, airline regulations, airfares, the interna-
tional airport—all of these elements were linked to the dramatic increase in 
the number of Puerto Ricans leaving the island for the United States to live or 
work and those returning to see relatives during the holidays.
I will examine briefly the role of tourism and tourist travel in Puerto Rico 
at that time so the ahistorical and misguided notion that tourism promoted 
the increase in air transportation on the island can finally be dispelled. In 
doing so, I will address only two issues regarding tourism in Puerto Rico dur-
ing the late 1940s and 1950s that are relevant to this book. First, the impact of 
tourism on the expansion and modernization of the air transportation infra-
structure in the early 1950s was not very significant. Second, the increase in 
tourism in Puerto Rico came after the expansion of the air transportation 
infrastructure (number of flights, airport, etc.) from 1948 to 1955 and, very 
importantly, after the 1959 revolution closed the U.S.-financed American tour-
ism industry in Cuba. That is, tourism was not the cause in the expansion of 
the air transportation system in Puerto Rico but vice versa: it was only after 
this infrastructure was modernized and expanded that tourism in Puerto Rico 
began to expand significantly. Furthermore, by the late 1950s and early 1960s, 
an important segment of the “visitors” (the official designation of tourists) 
traveling to Puerto Rico were Puerto Ricans living in the United States who 
went back to see relatives and enjoy their holidays on the island.
Tourism in Puerto Rico was minimal before the Puerto Rican government 
began in 1947, as part of its economic development program, to promote the 
construction of new hotels through direct investments by Fomento or by giv-
ing incentives to U.S. investors.77 Still, by the end of the 1940s, the number 
of tourists coming to Puerto Rico was insubstantial, so it does not explain 
the increasing number of air passengers leaving the island at that time. Fur-
thermore, and very importantly, a considerable number of tourists coming to 
Puerto Rico were doing so by sea and not by air. When the resident commis-
sioner gave a deposition to Congress in 1949 on the “transportation needs of 
Puerto Rico,” he argued for more support not only for air transportation but 
also for sea transportation; the most important reason to expand sea trans-
portation was its direct impact on the island’s tourism.78 A survey by Puerto 
Rico’s Tourism Office in 1949 supported the resident commissioner’s claim for 
tourists’ preference for traveling by sea.79
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As shown in table 1, the movement of people to and from Puerto Rico 
increased dramatically during the 1950s, increasing fourfold between 1950 and 
1960. The overwhelming majority of travel to and from Puerto Rico was to the 
United States (by 1960 two-thirds of all departures and arrivals). Almost 98 
percent of these passengers traveled by air. That is, between 1955—the year the 
international airport was inaugurated—and 1960, the air movement of pas-
sengers almost doubled. The government’s yearly figures for passenger move-
ment in Puerto Rico show that between 1950–51 and 1960–61, some 4,101,684 
passengers arrived on the island, while 4,568,892 departed. Of this number, 
2,982,750 arrived from the United States, while 3,442,772 departed to the 
United States. Based on this data, the net migration to the United States was 
460,022 passengers.
Estimating the number of tourists is trickier since the government at this 
time used the category of “visitors.” As shown in table 2, although the number 
of visitors to Puerto Rico increased from 1946–47 to 1955–56, the numbers 
more than doubled by 1960–61, and again by 1965–66. These figures indicate 
two important things: first, although the number of visitors rose steadily dur-
ing the 1950s, this figure increased dramatically after 1960, and second, the 
TABLE 2
NUMBER OF VISITORS TO PUERTO RICO, 1946–65
YEAR 1946–47 1950–51 1955–56 1960–61 1965–66
Number of Visitors 40,380 78,367 162,522 354,963 723,543
From the U.S. 32,405 65,636 147,219 232,343 613,641
Percentage 80.25% 83.75% 90.58% 65.46% 84.81%
Source: Albors and López Mangual, Selected Statistics, selected data from pp. 8–9.
TABLE 1
ARRIVALS TO AND DEPARTURES FROM PUERTO RICO, 1950–60
1950–51 1955–56 1960–61
Total Arrivals 146,979 319,303 667,081
From the U.S. 92,956 230,585 500,641
Percentage 63.24% 72.22% 75%
Total Departures 188,898 380,950 680,843
To the U.S. 136,101 287,325 517,409
Percentage 72% 75.42% 76%
Source: Albors and López Mangual, Selected Statistics, selected data from pp. 2–5.
All Rights Reserved. Copyright © The Ohio State University Press, 2017. Batch 1.
116 •  C H A P T E R 4 
overwhelming number of visitors came from the United States. From 1950–
51 to 1960–61, there were 2,102,812 visitors in Puerto Rico, the vast majority 
(1,545,838) coming between 1955–56 and 1960–61. But from 1961–62 to 1965–66 
alone, there were 2,714,809 visitors to the island.
Table 3 shows how the same pattern of growth is reflected in the num-
ber of hotel registrations in San Juan during the period, if this category can 
be used as a reflection of tourism. In 1950 there existed almost no difference 
between local and foreign tourism. By 1955, however, the numbers were dif-
ferent: hotel registrations in San Juan by “nonresidents” more than doubled 
those of “residents of Puerto Rico.” The gap between local and foreign hotel 
registrations widened after that year, more than doubling in numbers between 
1955 and 1960; the numbers almost doubled again between 1960 and 1965. 
An important reason for this, no doubt, was the dramatic jump in the total 
number of rooms available to visitors in tourist hotels, commercial hotels, 
and guest houses in Puerto Rico from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s: from 
a total of 1,730 in 1955, to 3,323 in 1960, to 6,777 in 1965.80 But other factors 
need to be considered to explain more comprehensively the rise of “visitors” 
in this period.
The traditional discourse on the rise of the tourist industry in Puerto Rico 
focuses on the growth of the U.S. tourist market based on the expansion of 
hotels owned or managed by the United States following the collapse of the 
U.S.-financed tourist industry in Cuba after the revolution in 1959.81 This per-
spective of the development of the Puerto Rican tourist industry is not wrong, 
but it is too limited. It fails to take into consideration how migration promoted 
the expansion and modernization of the air transportation infrastructure that 
made possible the growth of the traditional tourist industry in the 1960s ori-
TABLE 3
HOTEL REGISTRATIONS IN SAN JUAN BY ORIGIN, 1950–65
YEAR 1950 1955 1960 1964–65
Total 54,832 99,478 217,035 387,287
Puerto Rico Residents 26,858 31,843 34,617 49,638
Percentage of Total 49% 32% 16% 13%
Nonresidents 27,994 67,635 182,418 337,649
Percentage of Total 51% 68% 84%  87%
Source: Albors and López Mangual, Selected Statistics, selected data from pp. 20–25.
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ented to U.S. tourism in U.S.-owned or U.S.-managed hotels. It also fails to 
acknowledge that, beginning in the 1950s, a very significant number of the 
“visitors” going to the island were Puerto Ricans living in the United States.
The pattern of tourism in Puerto Rico for decades to come was already 
established by 1955: the majority of tourists came from the United States. In 
1954–55, 52,399 of a total of 94,316 hotel registrations were from the “U.S. 
mainland.” The numbers for other years were 165,890 out of 219,058 in 1960–
61 and 341,227 out of 433,341 in 1965–66. By 1955, another pattern of tourism 
in Puerto Rico was emerging: most hotel registrations in San Juan hotels were 
from states with a growing Puerto Rican population. Table 4 shows the top 
eight states with hotel registrations in San Juan from 1954–55 to 1965–66. By 
1963, the three major U.S. airlines flying to Puerto Rico had established three 
main routes in flights to the island, all of them in cities with heavily popu-
lated Puerto Rican communities (or a major transfer airport, in the case of 
Miami): the Northeastern United States (New York, Newark, Philadelphia, 
etc.), with Pan Am having 1,815 flights, Eastern 1,256, and Trans-Caribbean 
Airways (TCA) 213; Chicago, with 200 Eastern flights; and Miami, with 463 
flights by Pan Am and 498 by Eastern.82 This pattern connecting Puerto Rico 
to major Puerto Rican communities in the United States remains the same 
to this day.
These numbers reflect another important factor of tourism in Puerto Rico 
that the literature on the subject usually neglects: a significant number of “vis-
TABLE 4
TOP EIGHT HOTEL REGISTRATIONS IN SAN JUAN, BY U.S. STATES ORIGIN, 1955–65
YEAR 1954–55 1960–61 1965–66
New York 16,474 75,395 149,857
Florida 4,547 12,611 16,375
Illinois 3,439 5,604  —
New Jersey 3,335 13,311 32,343
Pennsylvania 2,653 8,716 17,956
California 2,526 3,941 11,913
Ohio 2,173 3,454 7,298
Massachusetts 1,872  — 14,871
Connecticut  — 4,581 11,343
Source: Albors and López Mangual, Selected Statistics, selected data from pp. 27–28.
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itors” coming to the island were Puerto Ricans living in the United States.83 A 
study of the tourism and travel industry in the 1960s concluded:
The number of visitors arrivals is very large in Puerto Rico; in 1963 it was 
over half of the total population of the island. Perhaps an unexpectedly small 
proportion of these visitors comprise the most noticeable group, those who 
stay in the hotels and guests houses, about 18 percent. .  .  . Other visitors, 
staying in apartments with friends or relatives, or elsewhere, comprise a very 
important group (36 percent . . . ).84
According to this study, the impact on the economy of these nontraditional 
tourists who did not stay in hotels and guest houses was greater than that 
of the more traditional tourists attracted by government publicity.85 By the 
1960s, the largest number of “visitors” traveling to the island were Puerto 
Ricans living and working in the United States who came to stay with friends 
or relatives. A significant number of those considered in official statistics as 
traditional “tourists” came from states with a large number of Puerto Rican 
residents, probably islanders vacationing in Puerto Rico.
During the fiscal year 1956–57, the Department of Labor began to pub-
lish more detailed information coming from its Bureau of Labor Statistics on 
migration and the number of air passengers moving to and from the United 
States. This data provides a more accurate perspective on the character of the 
movement of people and the kinds of passengers involved in Puerto Rico’s 
air traffic. The department’s annual report for this fiscal year indicated that 
332,400 persons left the island and that 69 percent (97,800) of the nonresidents 
departing had stayed in private residences during their visit to the island, 
while only 26.1 percent stayed in hotels. The department’s 1958–59 annual 
report begins to offer more detailed information on the travel of residents 
and nonresidents. As table 5 clearly shows, already by this time the pattern of 
air travel was clearly defined: two-thirds of all departures and three-fourths 
of all arrivals were from nonresidents. But contrary to the official discourse, 
most air travelers going to or leaving the island were Puerto Ricans living in 
the U.S. mainland, not foreign tourists. The most important reasons for resi-
dents of Puerto Rico to fly to the U.S. mainland were to look for jobs, to move 
there permanently, and to see or accompany friends and relatives there. The 
most important reasons for nonresidents to fly to the island were to see or 
accompany friends and relatives and tourism.
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TABLE 5
AIR TRAFFIC MOVEMENT IN PUERTO RICO, 1956–61, BY CATEGORY
YEAR 1956–57 1958–59 1960–61
Departures 332,400 281,300 368,200
RESIDENT S OF PUERTO RICO N/A 38% 34.3%
Reason for Departing
To work or search for jobs 33.8% 29% 21.8%
To see relatives and friends 34.1% 15.9% 20.9%
To accompany friends or relatives N/A 12.8% 13.9%
Moving to the U.S. permanently N/A 25% 27.3%
NONRESIDENT S N/A 62% 65.7%
Reason for Visit
To work or search for jobs — —
To see relatives and friends 43% 38.4%
To accompany friends or relatives 7.4% 8.4%
Tourism 25.5% 28.4%
Business 8.5% 7.1%
Arrivals 281,700 285,500 382,500
RESIDENT S OF PUERTO RICO N/A 24.9% 22%
Reason for Travel to U.S.
To visit relatives and friends 45.7% 35% 40.6%
To work or search for work 16% 34.8% 27.5%
To accompany relatives — 8.6% —
Tourism 12.4% 7.9% 8.8%
Business — 5.8% 9.4%
NONRESIDENT S N/A 75% 77.6%
Reason for Visit
To visit relatives and friends 34% 32.3%
Tourism 19% 25%
To accompany relatives 11% 11%
Business — 6.4%
Sources: GPR, Comm. Labor, Twenty-Third Annual Report 1956–57, 74–75; Twenty-Fifth Annual Report 1958–
59, 87–88; and Twenty-Seventh Annual Report 1960–61, 90–91. The Commissioner of Labor’s annual reports 
for the years 1956–57, 1957–58, and 1958–59 were incorrectly numbered in the original documents. The 
numbers 23, 24, and 25 were repeated. To avoid further confusion, hereafter we will use both the number 
and the year of the report as reference for these documents.86
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TRAVEL AID AND SAFETY
Providing aid to the migrants who left for the United States on their own 
was an issue that occupied the government for many years. By the mid fifties, 
those who migrated to the United States through the auspices of the Labor 
Department reached some fourteen thousand a year, while those who left on 
their own reached between forty to fifty thousand.87 In January 1950, the BEM 
opened an office at the international airport to orient migrants in problems 
they could face in the United States.88 Furthermore, in January 1954, Sierra 
Berdecía announced the opening of an office to provide travel aid to Puerto 
Ricans at Idlewild International Airport in New York City. He said the idea 
came from Muñoz Marín after hearing of the economic exploitation and 
problems faced by Puerto Ricans when they arrived in New York. Following 
its policy of not “duplicating services” offered by established agencies in the 
United States, the government decided to provide these services through the 
Travel Aid Society of New York. The airport office was staffed by two Spanish-
speaking social workers reporting to the Migration Office. The staff provided 
information, among other things, to help migrants move to other areas of the 
mainland apart from New York City. The existence and function of the airport 
office was publicized in Puerto Rico by the BEM and by the Migration Office 
in New York.89
Perhaps the most troubling issue for the government regarding individual 
migrants was the “smuggling of workers.” The Department of Labor, together 
with the Justice Department and the Public Service Commission (PSC), began 
a campaign in May 1952 against the illegal hiring of workers. Thousands of 
migrants went to the mainland through the mediation of travel agencies on 
the island working with contractors in the United States; many workers were 
scammed in the process. Other workers were hired on the island by contrac-
tors not regulated by the Department of Labor, a practice that violated Puerto 
Rico’s migration law.90 The legislature passed a law that required travel agen-
cies to register with the PSC after May 1948; their licenses could be revoked 
if they were found guilty of illegal trafficking of workers. Nevertheless, many 
travel agencies still worked as intermediaries in recruiting workers for U.S. 
labor contractors and agricultural employers, placing ads in newspapers and 
redirecting workers to U.S. contractors and employers. This practice became 
common in the early 1950s in areas of the American South, particularly in 
Florida, after the government had prohibited the legal hiring of farmwork-
ers in the region. Many working there would later ask the government for 
protection. According to Pagán de Colón, “the situation that had occurred 
in the north in 1947 was reproduced in the southern states,” referring to the 
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“Puerto Rican problem” in New York years earlier. Sierra Berdecía requested 
El Mundo and El Imparcial not to publish ads used for illegal recruiting, a 
petition accepted by the two major dailies.91 In March 1953, Sierra Berdecía 
denounced the “contraband of agricultural workers” by New Jersey’s Gar-
den State Cooperative Association, one of the biggest employers of island 
migrants; the association refused to accept the contract’s medical insurance 
clause. Eastern Airlines was providing air transportation for these workers.92
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“Every Puerto Rican a Potential 
Migrant”
Migrant Education and the English Language Issue
ONE OF THE areas of Puerto Rican life that was significantly impacted by the 
growing level of migration from Puerto Rico to the United States was public 
education. The government’s goal of easing the incorporation of its migrants 
into American society influenced the policy of intensifying English teaching 
in the public school system. After 1953, the expansion of the English program 
in the public school curriculum was closely associated with the government’s 
migration policy. The Puerto Rican government used the educational sys-
tem in Puerto Rico to further the adaptation of Puerto Ricans to the “eth-
nologically different environment” that awaited them in the United States. 
The Department of Education’s program to teach English for adults gradually 
transformed into one designed to teaching English to prospective migrants.
Furthermore, the Puerto Rican government used the public educational 
system to encourage the migration of its people to the United States. The gov-
ernment used public schools to promote and encourage migration among 
thousands of school students and adults through the expansion of programs 
created to provide “orientation” and “advice” to prospective migrants. The 
relationship of the educational system to migration is also important for 
other reasons. Puerto Rico’s migration policy was not only implemented by 
the Department of Labor; it also engaged the government’s largest and most 
important bureaucratic institution, the Department of Education. One of the 
reasons for the rejection of island migrants in many communities throughout 
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the United States was their foreign culture and language. As part of its migra-
tion policy, the Puerto Rican government implemented several programs to 
educate prospective migrants; these programs sought not only to teach the 
fundamentals of the English language but also to provide migrants with a 
basic background of American culture and society.
This policy is linked to two of the most contentious issues on the island 
since its U.S. occupation: the teaching of English in the public school system 
and its relationship to the United States’ Americanization policy.
ENGLISH EDUCATION, AMERICANIZATION, AND 
MIGRATION
The use of English as the language of instruction in the educational system 
became a political issue as soon as the colonial government was established in 
Puerto Rico under the Foraker Act of 1900. This policy was usually perceived, 
by supporters and detractors alike, as a means of Americanization in a pre-
dominantly Spanish-speaking society. According to Ismael Rodríguez Bou, 
in order to understand the “development of education in Puerto Rico since 
1898,” one needs to realize “that the central theme has been the language prob-
lem . . . , the result of an ill-advised and short-sighted policy of Americaniza-
tion.”1 Alicia Pousada argues that “to study the history of English on the island 
is to study the history of Puerto Rico’s uneasy relationship with the U.S. and 
its political, economic, and cultural implications.”2 Roamé Torres González 
contends that the history of the English language in Puerto Rico’s educational 
system is related to the island’s colonial status and U.S. colonial policies, call-
ing this relationship “highly troubled and not very harmonious.”3
The 1900 Foraker Act established a Department of Education; its presi-
dentially appointed commissioners saw in the educational system a tool to 
further U.S. rule on the island. The policy of Americanization was to turn 
these backward, uncivilized Spanish-speaking people into colonial subjects 
imbued with the values and ideals of the great American nation. The imposi-
tion of English as the language of instruction in the public school system was 
understood by U.S. colonial functionaries as the best means of implementing 
the policy of Americanization.4 The importance given to education by the 
new colonial authorities was reflected in its size and budget: for the first thirty 
years of U.S. rule in Puerto Rico, the Department of Education had the larg-
est government bureaucracy and represented one-third of the government’s 
budget.5 The number of students enrolled in the school system increased from 
95,342 in 1910 to 286,098 in 1940; the number of teachers rose from 1,623 to 
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6,294 during the same period.6 Still, by 1920, 61 percent of Puerto Ricans over 
the age of ten years and 74 percent of the adult rural population were illiter-
ate, according to a government report.7 In 1903, the University of Puerto Rico 
was created to provide teachers for the Education Department; it would also 
provide the managerial and professional class essential for an expanding capi-
talist economy. The university followed the goal of Americanization in its cur-
riculum; classes were taught in English, and graduating teachers were required 
to master the language.8
The granting of citizenship to Puerto Ricans by the Jones Act of 1917 
had a clear impact on language policy. Although the act did not include any 
requirement of English knowledge among the population to extend citizen-
ship to Puerto Ricans, colonial functionaries on the island understood that 
Americanization of the population was more necessary than ever before.9 
The turn to a stronger use of English in public schools was made by the first 
Puerto Rican ever appointed as commissioner of education, Juan B. Huyke, 
a prominent Republican who saw the public school system as “an agency of 
Americanization.” Huyke’s policy was revised by José Padín, appointed com-
missioner in 1930. A strong believer in the role of Spanish in early education 
as the native and dominant language of Puerto Ricans, Padín made Spanish 
the language of instruction through grade 8, with English as a special subject; 
in high school, English was the language of instruction, while Spanish became 
a special subject.10
By the 1930s, Puerto Rican and American functionaries began to promote 
the idea that knowledge of both languages could be beneficial to Puerto Ricans 
and to the United States. The idea of “Panamericanism” and of Puerto Rico 
as a “bridge” between the United States and Latin America became popular 
among government and educational functionaries. Spanish-speaking Puerto 
Ricans could be of benefit to United States interests in Latin America, after all. 
During this period, U.S. functionaries began to emphasize the “functionality” 
of the English language in Puerto Rico rather than Americanization.11 One 
area in which English could be beneficial to Puerto Ricans was in the area 
of migration to the United States. Victor S. Clark, a former commissioner of 
education and a strong believer in Americanization policy, argued in Puerto 
Rico and Its Problems that one of the island’s major “problems,” as was to be 
expected, was overpopulation. For Clark, knowledge of English would allow 
Puerto Ricans to migrate to the United States in search of jobs. Thus, he sup-
ported the idea of strengthening the teaching of English at all levels of the 
school system, contrary to Padín’s policy.12 Commissioner Padín’s reply was 
to indicate that “it was not convenient to complicate and delay the education 
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of all the Puerto Rican public to benefit the few who could immigrate to New 
York.”13
In 1937 President Roosevelt appointed Manuel Gallardo as commissioner 
of education and, in his letter of appointment, stressed the importance of 
teaching English in the public school curriculum. He considered it “regret-
table” that after twenty years of U.S. citizenship, “hundreds of thousands of 
Puerto Ricans have little and often virtually no knowledge of the English lan-
guage.” According to Roosevelt, mastery of the English language was central 
to the meaning of American citizenship in Puerto Rico since it would allow 
“Puerto Rican Americans [to] secure a better understanding of American ide-
als and principles.” He emphasized that Spanish would remain the language 
of Puerto Ricans and that there was “no desire or purpose” to diminish the 
Spanish culture in Puerto Rico. Roosevelt accentuated the “functionality” of 
the English language for Puerto Ricans by emphasizing “that the American 
citizens of Puerto Rico should profit from their unique geographical situation 
and the unique historical circumstance which has brought to them the bless-
ings of American citizenship by becoming bilingual.” Furthermore, he was 
emphatic in pointing out another important function of English in Puerto 
Rico: allowing Puerto Ricans to migrate to the United States. It is only by 
mastering English, he said,
that the Puerto Ricans will be able to take full advantage of the economic 
opportunities which became available to them when they were made Ameri-
can citizens. . . . Puerto Rico is a densely populated Island. Many of its sons 
and daughters will desire to seek economic opportunity on the mainland. . . . 
They will be greatly handicapped if they have not mastered English.14
The 1930s were characterized by an intensification of nationalism in 
Puerto Rico, both politically and culturally. In the midst of this movement 
was the language debate: Spanish represented the most important symbol of 
the Puerto Rican nation and culture. The movement to have Spanish declared 
the language of instruction at all levels of the educational system intensified 
in this period. The PPD’s 1940 platform included the demand to make Span-
ish the official language of education in Puerto Rican public schools. This 
was one of the first laws approved by Puerto Rico’s first elected governor, Luis 
Muñoz Marín, in 1949. However, right after this historically important law was 
passed, the PPD government began to intensify the instruction of English in 
public schools. This shift in policy was due to the new political direction of 
the PPD toward a more “permanent union” with the United States and the 
creation of the Commonwealth in 1952, as well as an increased awareness by 
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government officials of the “functional” benefits of English in Puerto Rico. 
Perhaps the most important benefit was migration.
During the 1948 campaign for Puerto Rico’s first elected governor, Muñoz 
Marín promised that he would make Spanish the language of instruction 
through all grades of the school system his government’s official policy. One 
of his first appointments as elected governor in 1949 was Mariano Villaronga 
as commissioner of education. On August 10, 1949, by an executive order, Vil-
laronga established Spanish as the official language of education in all grades 
of the public school system, with English as a preferred subject in all grades.15 
According to Torres González, there was no contradiction between the PPD 
government’s language policy in the public school system and its new politi-
cal standing in favor of Commonwealth. The Spanish language policy pre-
sented the party and the government as supporters of cultural nationalism at 
a time when it was abandoning political nationalism, that is, independence. 
Furthermore, at the same time that Villaronga was making Spanish the lan-
guage of instruction in public schools, he also announced the intensification 
in the teaching of the English language in Puerto Rico’s schools. The policy of 
intensifying English teaching was related to the need for more educated and 
trained workers and the government’s economic policy of Operation Boot-
strap, as well as the island’s growing integration with the American economy. 
But Torres González provides another element to explain the intensification 
of English teaching in Puerto Rican public schools after 1949: migration.16
Even if the 1949 language policy in public schools was defined by other 
factors besides migration, by 1953 the situation would be different. That year, 
the government of Puerto Rico, through public statements by Governor 
Muñoz Marín himself, again announced its intention to intensify the teach-
ing of English in public schools. But this time, the reason given for this policy 
was the need to prepare migrants going to the United States. Already by this 
date, migration was an integral part of one of the most contentious debates in 
Puerto Rican society since the United States imposed its colonial regime: the 
language of instruction in public schools.
POSTWAR MIGRATION AND THE TEACHING OF ENGLISH IN 
PUERTO RICO
Culture and language were significant factors in the emergence of the “Puerto 
Rican problem” in New York City after 1946. Puerto Rican migrants were seen 
as foreigners, as alien in language and culture to the United States. Their lack 
of knowledge of the English language was an important element in this char-
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acterization. The several public and private institutions in the city that took 
an interest in the incorporation of these migrants pointed to language as an 
important obstacle in this process: their need to learn English as a path toward 
assimilation into American society. When the New York City Welfare Com-
mittee created its committee in 1947 to study the flow of Puerto Ricans to the 
city, its first recommendation was to provide them with English classes. One 
year later, its report made the same recommendation.17 A few weeks later, Dr. 
Clare Baldwin, assistant superintendent for schools in Harlem, pointed out 
the large number of Puerto Rican children registered in the city schools and 
how they had “created an unusual problem in specialized education.” Baldwin 
stated that the problems faced by those children were similar to those con-
fronting immigrants from countries with a different language and customs 
than those of the United States. Knowledge of English was essential for these 
children to function in American society and assimilate.18 When the World 
Telegram began its inflammatory series on the “Puerto Rican problem” in New 
York City, one of the first articles was on the problems that Puerto Rican chil-
dren were creating for the city’s school system, which was unprepared to deal 
with so many children lacking a basic knowledge of English.19
The English issue became a major concern for the government function-
aries in charge of implementing Puerto Rico’s migration policy. When Sierra 
Berdecía traveled to the United States in December 1947—to, among other 
things, organize the new migration office in New York, as required by the 
Migration Law approved weeks earlier—joining him was Assistant Commis-
sioner of Education Francisco Collazo. The main goal of the trip was to dis-
cuss migration issues with U.S. functionaries, particularly in New York City. 
Collazo was there to talk about education matters, particularly how to ease 
the adjustment of Puerto Rican children to their new environment.20 In his 
review of Puerto Rico’s migration policy, Sierra Berdecía devoted more than a 
few pages to the issue of English and migration, underscoring the importance 
he and his department gave to the matter:
It is a reality that the greatest problem faced by Puerto Ricans when they 
move themselves to the United States is their ignorance of the English lan-
guage. . . . So as to be able to work and advance like all his other fellow citi-
zens in the United States, the Puerto Rican migrant must know English, he 
must learn it, and the quicker he learns it the more marked the development 
of his own welfare shall be.21
Although the Migration Office in New York began to promote English classes 
for migrants immediately after it opened its doors in 1948, the program to 
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provide English classes for migrants in Puerto Rico evolved rather slowly. In 
November 1950, El Mundo welcomed a program created by the University of 
Puerto Rico with Georgetown University to provide English classes to Puerto 
Rican workers of all kinds, including prospective migrants.22 In January 1951, 
the municipal government of Barceloneta began to provide English classes 
specifically aimed at prospective migrants. This program was created after 
failed attempts to have the Department of Education offer these courses.23 
Later that year, the Department of Labor hired Harry Kessler to train teachers 
in Puerto Rico in the method he had used in the Hudson Guild in New York 
to teach English to Puerto Rican workers in the city.24
In January 1952, the Department of Education announced its program for 
English classes specifically aimed at prospective migrants going to the United 
States. Like in previous programs, the eight-week tuition-free course would 
provide basic conversational English classes to those planning to migrate to 
the United States only. Classes would be at night for persons not currently 
enrolled in schools—that is, it was aimed at adults in the labor force. Classes 
were offered in fourteen of the island’s largest municipalities. When the pro-
gram started in February, there were 1,320 persons enrolled in thirty-four 
groups of forty students each; initially only fourteen groups were anticipated. 
Department officials stated that no more groups were created due to a lack 
of facilities.25 In April the department’s Vocational Training Division and the 
Puerto Rico Employment Service announced a joint program to promote the 
employment of vocational students in Puerto Rico. As part of the agreement, 
vocational students had to register with the Employment Service office and 
vocational schools had to advise students on employment opportunities in 
the United States.26
The role that migration played in the intensification of English teaching in 
Puerto Rico’s public schools became more pronounced and publicly acknowl-
edged in the early part of 1953. In March, the Puerto Rican government spon-
sored the first Migration Conference between functionaries of the New York 
City and Puerto Rican governments. The conference was supposed to show 
the common interests that New York City and Puerto Rican policy makers 
shared regarding island migrants in New York: how to facilitate the incorpo-
ration of island migrants in the United States, for example. Since its creation, 
the NYC Mayor’s Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs in New York (MCPRA) 
had indicated that the lack of English fluency among island migrants was a 
major impediment in the migrants’ incorporation into the labor market and 
the broader community in New York.27 Days before the San Juan conference, 
Mary Finocchiaro, school supervisor in New York City and advisor to the 
Puerto Rican government on education matters, announced that the number 
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of Puerto Rican children in city schools was seventy-two thousand, a much 
higher number than the forty thousand previously announced. Finocchiaro 
agreed with what many others had indicated before, that the major obstacle 
to the educational development of Puerto Rican children going to the city was 
their lack of English knowledge.28 One day before the start of the conference, 
MCPRA made its report on Puerto Ricans in New York City public. Among 
the twelve recommendations presented by the committee on how to improve 
relations between the migrants and the city was the need for them to learn and 
have a basic understanding of English.29 Days after the conference, Superin-
tendent Baldwin—also present in the San Juan conclave—declared that almost 
a fourth of all children in Manhattan public schools were Puerto Ricans.30
On the eve of the first Migration Conference, Muñoz Marín announced 
that his government would intensify the teaching of English in all public 
schools and expand the number of English classes for adults in order to facili-
tate the incorporation of Puerto Rican migrants going to the United States. 
The governor acknowledged that this was an important issue for New York 
City functionaries and a common recommendation of many reports on the 
status of Puerto Ricans in the city. He proposed that the program to teach 
English to prospective migrants be administered by the Departments of Edu-
cation and Labor. A main goal of the new program was to “orient” prospective 
migrants on the “customs and methods of life” they would encounter once 
they moved the United States, and to advise them on other places apart from 
New York City that offered better job opportunities.31 As was to be expected, 
among the recommendations agreed to by participants in the first Migration 
Conference was the need to “orient and advise” prospective migrants on the 
conditions they would encounter in New York City. One widely supported 
recommendation was to encourage Puerto Rican migrants to move to other 
places besides the city. Also urged was the need for island migrants to have a 
basic knowledge of English so they could find jobs more easily and enhance 
their opportunities for a fruitful incorporation into the United States. As 
Muñoz Marín had announced earlier, the Puerto Rican government made a 
commitment to strengthening the teaching of English in public schools.32
The idea behind the intensification in the teaching of English in pub-
lic schools and the offer of English classes to prospective migrants was to 
support both individual migration (people going on their own) and orga-
nized migration (such as through the FPP). Furthermore, and probably more 
important, by intensifying the teaching of English in public schools and pro-
viding orientation and background on migration to mostly poor and rural 
Puerto Rican children in public schools, the Puerto Rican government was 
in fact socializing these children in the experience of migration. Migration 
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would not be seen as a distant experience, perhaps mentioned in the com-
munity or by relatives already in the United States, but as an idea taught in 
schools and promoted by the government that was supposed to represent the 
will of the people.
The obvious contradictions and dilemmas of the English language educa-
tional policy and the political stance of the PPD became a major and conflic-
tive issue for the party, the government, and, particularly, the governor in the 
following decades. A number of PPD ideas became very difficult to incorpo-
rate into a coherent doctrine: How could the PPD reconcile its abandonment 
of independence with its claims to cultural nationalism? How could it rec-
oncile the contradictory notion at the basis of the Commonwealth status—
that Puerto Rico was a nation that gave its consent to a relationship with the 
United States under a so-called pact of free association that in fact reinforced 
colonialism? Most important for the subject of education and migration, how 
could the PPD promote a Puerto Rican national identity while also support-
ing Americanization and migration to the mainland? The new language pol-
icy furthered this contradictory discourse; essentially, migration was in the 
midst of the new cultural debate.
Muñoz Marín tried to reconcile these conflicting principles on the politi-
cal and cultural basis of Commonwealth in his famous “Agapito’s Bar” speech 
in December 1953, when he spoke to the annual assembly of the Teachers 
Association, which had been a strong supporter of both the use of Spanish in 
education and the PPD.33 The governor emphatically called for the preserva-
tion of Spanish as the vernacular language and the axis of identity of Puerto 
Ricans, while at the same time reiterating his government’s policy of accen-
tuating the teaching of English in public schools. For the first time, Muñoz 
Marín declared that it was his government’s goal to make Puerto Ricans bilin-
gual citizens within a generation. He stressed the essential need to maintain 
the cultural and linguistic identity of Puerto Ricans, which constituted their 
essence as a people. But, he argued, Puerto Ricans should not confuse this 
cultural claim with their political reality. Puerto Ricans had agreed to enter 
into a “political association” with the United States in order to achieve a better 
material future and to sustain the ties of common citizenship, but in a context 
that did not require their cultural assimilation. Cultures change through time 
and are not static, Muñoz Marín reasoned, and they should absorb elements 
from other cultures. But he warned against assimilating bad elements from 
American culture, like gross consumerism and the incorrect adoption of Eng-
lish words that diminished the Spanish language. Muñoz Marín questioned 
the indiscriminate use of English names to identify the titles of persons and 
places instead of using the correct words in Spanish, pointing out that English 
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was used as a sign of power and distinction. Why did schoolchildren call their 
teachers “Mister” or “Missis” instead of “maestro” or “maestra,” “señor” or 
“señora,” he asked? The governor wondered why someone in the rural center 
of the island would call his business Agapito’s Bar instead of Bar de Agapito:
Why did you do that, Agapito? If not even once a year you will meet a client 
walking down the street of your little town whose vernacular is English! Is 
it that you feel better saying it in a language that is not yours? And if you 
despise your tongue, are you not somehow despising yourself?
Muñoz Marín warned against making these two great languages of the 
world—Spanish and English—into a “burundangoso y emprobecido papia-
mento” (a messy and impoverished Papiamento). For him, language was a 
reflection of the spirit, so Puerto Ricans should not lose their language in 
order to protect their identity as a people. Learning English would enrich 
the lives of Puerto Ricans, but they should not lose their spirit. He called on 
Puerto Ricans to become bilingual but not “semilingual” in two languages. 
Puerto Ricans could contribute to the Western world, to the Americas in gen-
eral, and to the United States in particular by preserving their Puerto Rican 
national identity and culture.
In his speech, Muñoz Marín made an exception regarding a group of 
Puerto Ricans that did not need to preserve their identity and language—
those migrating to the United States:
Nothing I say here certainly applies to Puerto Ricans migrating and becom-
ing residents anywhere in the United States. From people like this was the 
United States made. People that individually became adapted to the culture 
they found there and contributed to it and enriched it. All Puerto Ricans 
that establish their residence in the United States must adapt to their com-
munity, the same way that the Irish, Poles, Italians and Scandinavians did 
before them. I’m talking about the culture of Puerto Rico in Puerto Rico.
Muñoz Marín made a clear distinction between the preservation of national 
identity and language in Puerto Rico and the prospect of cultural assimila-
tion that awaited migrants going to the United States. Thus, at the same time 
that the Puerto Rican government began to boost the teaching of English in 
public schools in order to facilitate the incorporation of prospective migrants 
in the United States, the governor was also urging Puerto Ricans to preserve 
their language as an essential means of maintaining their national identity 
and culture. At the very moment that the government encouraged migrants 
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to assimilate to American culture and society, the governor warned Puerto 
Ricans against the nefarious consequences of assimilation through the misuse 
of English on the island.34
José Padín, the former commissioner of education, questioned the new 
language policy in public schools. He acknowledged that migration was and 
would continue to be a major element in Puerto Rico’s society and that, as 
citizens, Puerto Ricans had a right to migrate to the United States. In addi-
tion, he applauded the government’s measures to manage migration and to 
aid and advise migrants going to the U.S. mainland. But Padín argued that 
Puerto Rico’s society must not be structured in such a way that it existed only 
to provide cheap labor to the metropolis. Puerto Rico should strive to pro-
vide the best economic, social, and educational development to its members, 
whether they stayed on the island or went elsewhere. Those who migrated 
would be better prepared to find good jobs and standards of living because of 
this educational background. Still, Padín questioned the government’s policy 
that linked the teaching of English to migration; it was not fair, he argued, “to 
revolutionize the school system and attach it to the wave of migration as the 
tail is attached to a kite. It is not fair to sacrifice two and a quarter million 
human beings for the benefit of 60,000 people leaving the island every year.” 
He warned against going back to the old policy of using English in schools as 
a means of Americanization, which he considered a failed and tragic policy. 
According to Padín, “Agapito’s Bar” was but a “collateral effect” of the height-
ened use of English in Puerto Rico.35
EDUCATION FOR MIGRATION
In June 1953, the newly restructured and renamed Department of Pub-
lic Instruction announced its new plan to “alleviate” the situation of those 
migrating to the United States by “intensifying” the teaching of English in 
schools and expanding the program of English education for adults who were 
prospective migrants. The new plan included vocational training for those 
planning to migrate to the United States and the provision of advice to school 
dropouts on job opportunities in the U.S. mainland. Trying to discourage 
migration to New York City, pamphlets and films were to be used to inform 
prospective migrants of the job market throughout the United States. These 
programs were coordinated with the Department of Labor’s BEM. Among 
the proposed goals was to increase the exchange programs between Puerto 
Rico and New York teachers and education functionaries, to expand the pro-
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gram aimed at the orientation of adults, and to provide orientation to migrant 
adults and schoolchildren once they moved to New York City.36
It is evident that by this time, the Department of Education was an integral 
part of the government’s migration program. Migration was seen by govern-
ment officials as a means of improving not only the economic and living stan-
dards of the population in Puerto Rico but its educational system as well, as is 
stated in the 1954–55 annual report of the Department of Labor:
Puerto Rican migration is not only related to living standards in Puerto Rico 
but also to the program of public education. For example: there are 110,000 
Puerto Rican children enrolled at the elementary schools in New York City. 
We cannot oversee the serious problem which Puerto Rico would face if 
besides providing schools for the children actually enrolled it should have to 
provide schools for the 110,000 Puerto Rican children who attend New York 
schools and for the thousands of children who attend other schools in the 
rest of the United States. We could also imagine the impact which migration 
would deal on all aspects of our life if the 650,000 Puerto Ricans living in the 
United States should decide to return to the island.37
As the teaching of English expanded in the island’s public schools, it also 
became more intense when targeted to prospective migrants after the gov-
ernor’s speech. The secretary of education stated that the 1953 fall courses on 
conversational English for adults would be oriented toward those interested in 
migrating to the United States. Villaronga noted that the courses were taught 
in forty-two municipalities, an increase from the previous year, and that the 
teachers for these courses would be selected based on their professional prep-
aration and their spoken English, giving preference to those who mastered 
English as their first language or those whose spoken English approximated 
that of the United States.38 Dr. Pauline Rojas, director of the department’s Eng-
lish program, later pointed out that 2,197 persons took the fall courses orga-
nized in sixty-four groups. She noted that the number of courses in rural areas 
had increased and that the decision of where to hold the courses was made by 
the Department of Labor’s BEM.39
In July 1954, Villaronga announced that the literacy program for adults 
was fused with the program for teaching English to prospective migrants. That 
is, adult education was now integrated with teaching those with plans to move 
to the United States. Villaronga summarized the program’s goal in the depart-
ment’s 1956–57 annual report:
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The Adult English Program is organized for the primary purpose of provid-
ing people who go to work in the United States the opportunity to learn the 
English necessary for their most effective advancement in the Continent. The 
real situations which migrants go through in their journeys, in their work, 
and in their adaptation to new communities is usually taken into account 
in the outlook and content of the courses. The program also tries to edu-
cate migrants about those habits, customs, and traditions of the American 
people that they need to know. .  .  . The majority of migrants will be doing 
agricultural work; therefore, the Program has given priority to those needs.40
The new program was directed by Dr. Ismael Rodríguez Bou, then secretary 
of the Council of Higher Education, the institution in charge of overseeing all 
higher education on the island. The appointment of Rodríguez Bou, a well-
known scholar in the field of education, signaled the importance of this new 
program for the government.41 By the end of that year, 3,122 students were 
enrolled in the program in eighty groups in fifty-one island municipalities, 
almost half of them in rural areas. Villaronga announced that more empha-
sis was being given to expanding the vocabulary taught to reflect the real-life 
situations faced by the migrants in the United States, following the recom-
mendations of the migration functionaries at the Department of Labor. Labor 
Department representatives also gave talks to the students on the job market 
and the ways of living in the United States.42
In December 1954, the Journal of Educational Sociology published a special 
issue on Puerto Rican migration. Prominent among the articles was Villar-
onga’s “Program of Education for Puerto Rican Migrants.” He described the 
goals and the elements of this program as follows:
We are deeply conscious of the importance of an adequate education to 
those who seek their fortune in what to many is a completely strange envi-
ronment. We have, therefore, drawn a definite plan of action with regard to 
the emigration of our countrymen to the continent. Briefly, our program is 
designed (a) to extend educational opportunities to an ever greater propor-
tion of our citizens, (b) to intensify our teaching and to promote the forma-
tion of habits and attitudes that will contribute to an adequate adjustment 
of the individual to the new environment, (c) to familiarize our personnel 
with instructional practices and general environmental factors affecting the 
adjustment of Puerto Rican children in the continental communities, (d) to 
assist school authorities in the State [sic] in understanding our school system 
and the cultural and social background of their new Puerto Rican pupils, 
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and finally (e) to cooperate with other agencies of our Commonwealth in 
orienting adults and children who plan to emigrate.
Villaronga added that in addition to the better preparation and recruitment of 
English teachers, the department had prepared a series of English textbooks 
adapted to children in Puerto Rico, with an emphasis on conversational Eng-
lish. He also mentioned the program of English classes for adults, including 
the transmission of these classes on radio with the lesson published a day ear-
lier in El Imparcial. The social studies program was also designed to provide 
students with “information about living conditions in the continental United 
States.” At the elementary level, particular attention was given to “the study of 
life in the United States as one aspect of education related with situations in 
the daily life of students.” At the secondary level, the topics included
(a) the living conditions of the American people, (b) the migration of Puerto 
Ricans to the continental United States and the problems the migrants must 
face, (c) the agencies responsible for orienting Puerto Rican migrants and 
the work they are doing, (d) employment opportunities in the different parts 
of the United States, and (e) the advantages and disadvantages of migration.
In a word, the social studies program was designed to orient and prepare the 
students in all aspects of migration to the United States. Villaronga also men-
tioned the expansion of the vocational schools program, which although not 
designed specifically to address migration, would “have the effect of bettering 
the employment opportunities of those who choose to migrate to the conti-
nental United States in the future.”
Villaronga declared that the department had developed a “Pupil Transfer 
Card” that included all the information required for Puerto Rican students to 
register in New York City and other U.S. school systems. He also mentioned 
the exchange programs with the New York City school system, which the 
department was extending to other cities and areas of the United States. For 
example, New York City teachers participated in a summer workshop at the 
University of Puerto Rico (UPR) sponsored by the UPR and New York Uni-
versity. In collaboration with the Migration Division, UPR offered a summer 
workshop for New York social workers to get them acquainted with the cul-
ture and problems of island students. Villaronga stressed the role of Assistant 
Secretary Francisco Collazo in maintaining a working relationship between 
the department and the New York Board of Education, particularly in their 
plan to promote the incorporation and better adaptation of Puerto Rican stu-
dents in the city’s school system, including hiring island teachers in New York. 
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Collazo, along with functionaries of the Migration Division, worked closely 
with the Ford Foundation to organize and fund The Puerto Rican Study, an 
extensive research study on the educational status of Puerto Rican children 
in New York. Similar actions were taken in other areas outside of New York, 
particularly in Chicago, where a significant migrant population was already 
established.43
By this time, the Department of Education was playing an active role in 
the implementation of the Puerto Rican government’s migration policy. An 
undated memo for U.S. agencies—one that certainly corresponds to Villar-
onga’s course of action—stated that the department “has assumed the leader-
ship in all educational activities for the benefit of Puerto Rican migrants. The 
Secretary of Education of Puerto Rico has appointed a coordinating commit-
tee composed of central office staff members, with the Assistant Secretary 
of Education as chairman.” The committee was to “coordinate” all activities 
between the Puerto Rican and New York school agencies and would “act as a 
liaison body in coordinating the educational activities of other Puerto Rican 
agencies in behalf of the migrants.” The memo added that special literature 
was available regarding the ways of life, language, customs, and school prac-
tices in New York to be given to “parents, teachers, and prospective migrants.” 
The document also stated: “We are making every effort to locate in advance 
children who are planning to move to New York in order to give them spe-
cial orientation and training in vocational skills and conversational English.”44 
The fine line between providing “orientation” and “advice,” on the one hand, 
and encouraging migration among individuals coming into contact with the 
department’s educational programs, on the other hand, became thinner and 
thinner for the Department of Education, as it did for the Department of 
Labor. Through the public school system, the government was reaching “pro-
spective migrants,” be they adults or children, in a way that the Department of 
Labor could not do. By using the Department of Education, the government 
was able to expand the pool of “prospective migrants” it could reach. By the 
mid-1950s, two agencies of the Puerto Rican government—the Departments 
of Labor and Education—were instrumental in the promotion and organiza-
tion of migration for the colonial state.
In the spring of 1955, Rodríguez Bou announced a shift in the program to 
teach English to prospective migrants: it would now focus more strongly on 
rural areas. This new emphasis coincided perfectly with the Department of 
Labor’s migration policy then. By this time, the department’s Farm Placement 
Program was in full force. The program’s aim was to move the surplus labor 
force from the decaying sugar industry in the rural areas of Puerto Rico to 
the United States. In this case, as on other occasions, the Department of Edu-
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cation supported the Department of Labor’s migration policy. As Rodríguez 
Bou stated while announcing the new shift, “the rural area is the main source 
of Puerto Rican migrants to the North, so the need for instruction is greater 
there.” According to him, while in the previous year only forty-six of the 101 
groups in the program were in the rural areas, that year ninety-six groups 
were in the rural areas, while only forty-six were organized in the urban areas. 
Rodríguez Bou indicated that the dates when the courses were offered coin-
cided with the period of migrants returning home after the harvest season in 
the United States, as reported by the Department of Labor. He also asserted 
that priority would be given to those with immediate plans of migrating to the 
United States. The topics and the vocabulary for these courses were decided 
in collaboration with the Department of Labor’s migration functionaries, who 
also provided the material to be used by teachers in their preparation for the 
courses.45 The following year, Villaronga appointed five hundred teachers for 
these courses and requested that school superintendents promote and support 
the program in their respective districts.46 That is, the teaching of English for 
prospective migrants had to be regarded as a regular program in the depart-
ment’s agenda.
The Department of Education’s regular English program also became more 
intense in rural areas. In her study of the school system under the Common-
wealth, Sylvia Eliza Colón emphasizes how, by 1955, the teaching of English 
dominated the Department of Education’s general curriculum. She points out 
how students at the high school level devoted twice the amount of time to 
English classes compared to any other subject per day or week. This prac-
tice was even more intense in rural areas: ninety minutes of the students’ 
daily schedule was devoted to English, with ninety minutes for agriculture. 
All other subjects received only forty-five minutes each. English classes were 
taught daily, but all other subjects were taught once every other day. Eliza 
Colón questioned this practice:
This expenditure of time, energy, and resources for teaching English to rural 
children is especially striking as it was a language they almost never heard 
or used in their daily life. At the official level, no one raised the question as 
to whether there was a connection between their low performance level in 
the basic skills and the huge amount of time they had to spend in ineffectual 
study of this foreign language.47
This policy did not make any pedagogical sense, but it was not an irrational 
one: it was part of Puerto Rico’s migration policy. By intensifying the instruc-
tion of English in public schools in rural areas, the Department of Education 
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was fulfilling its task of supporting the Department of Labor’s migration pro-
gram, which at the time focused its organized migration plans in the rural 
areas.
In June 1956, through Circular Letter 91, the secretary of education 
announced another major revision to the department’s English program: the 
effort to “departmentalize” the teaching of English from fourth to sixth grades. 
According to this new policy,
the teaching of English is carried out only by the most qualified teachers, 
based on their mastery of the English language, their specialization in the 
subject, their demonstrated proficiency in practice and other factors. This 
change was implemented in conformity with the Department’s goal to inten-
sify and continually improve the teaching of English.48
From then on, the teaching of English in the higher grades of the public 
school system was guided by the department’s central bureaucracy. Further-
more, aware of the failures and shortcomings of previous English programs 
in Puerto Rico, including the use of texts developed for American students, 
the department developed its own texts for island students; this project was 
heralded as “a contribution from Puerto Rico to education in the field of lan-
guage teaching.”49
The secretary’s report for 1957–58 underscored the department’s continued 
efforts to strengthen the English program. English teachers received priority 
in recruitment, training, and compensation. That year, 138 teachers received 
fellowships to study English in U.S. universities, and several program supervi-
sors were sent to receive master’s degrees on the subject. In addition to study-
ing the English language in all its facets, the teachers were also required to 
take courses on U.S. history and culture and to live with American students 
and in close contact with their host communities in order to learn the Ameri-
can way of living.50
Villaronga praised the effectiveness of the program for teaching English 
to prospective migrants in his late 1956 review. A total of 27,520 adults had 
enrolled in the program in the previous three years, with a retention rate of 
80 percent. A total of 772 groups were organized in sixty-six municipalities, 
with 450 groups in rural areas and 272 in urban areas; the initial number of 
147 teachers now surpassed 500. The secretary stated that the program’s tar-
get audience had expanded from just prospective migrants for farm labor to 
include all of those who might think of moving to the United States at some 
point. That year, the department began to present the program’s graduates 
with a certificate in English that they could use when looking for work in the 
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United States.51 Rodríguez Bou reported that by early 1958, forty-four thou-
sand adults had taken the courses since 1954, and that nearly fifteen thou-
sand persons were enrolled in the previous academic year. He announced that 
the Council of Higher Education began publishing the weekly supplement 
Semana (Week) to help students practice at home what they learned in their 
English classes. He also announced that the number of contact hours were 
increased from 72 to 120 to “provide prospective migrants a more solid basis” 
in their command of English.52
The publication and distribution of Semana illustrates the integration of 
the English education for adults program with that of English for prospec-
tive migrants. Semana is an excellent example of the department’s efforts to 
“educate” the masses on the advantages of migration and on how to “adapt” 
to the new and culturally foreign environment in the United States. In 1955, 
the Department of Education took the responsibility of publishing Semana—
the first number came out on September 10—with a circulation of two hun-
dred fifty thousand distributed in public schools. On the recommendation of 
Muñoz Marín and Sierra Berdecía, an additional fifteen thousand copies were 
distributed among Puerto Rican farmworkers in the United States. The weekly 
was designed as a vehicle to provide information to common people on the 
current events in Puerto Rico, the United States, and the rest of the world. 
It was also supposed to enhance the cultural knowledge of the masses, with 
articles and texts by Puerto Rico’s most celebrated authors. The newspaper 
was given to students to take to their homes. Semana was aimed at educating 
not only public school students but their relatives and acquaintances as well. 
From its first edition, Semana also included a supplement on Lecciones de 
Inglés (English lessons).53 Each issue of Semana included a series of vocabulary 
and grammar exercises that could be mailed to the department’s English for 
Adults program for grading. When the public television station WIPR was 
inaugurated in 1958, one of its first regular programs was English courses for 
adults; the registration for these courses and the exercises were published in 
Semana.54 This weekly publication and its English supplement were used as a 
teaching text throughout the department’s regular adult education program.55
A cursory look at Semana’s English lessons shows their emphasis on 
familiarizing the reader with life in the United States: U.S. history, Ameri-
can patriots, the flag and the Pledge of Allegiance, and American culture and 
traditions like Thanksgiving and Christmas. Most of the lessons on grammar 
and vocabulary were based on aspects of day-to-day life in the United States: 
how to order a meal; how to travel by train, bus, or plane; services like mail 
and garbage collection; different ways of life in urban and rural America; dif-
ferences regarding the American way of life on matters related to diet, work, 
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vacationing, travel, education, and family structure; laws of etiquette; seasonal 
changes and its respective clothing (coats in winter are a must); the workings 
of the public school system in the United States; getting professional services 
like doctors and lawyers; laws on taxes and voting; and services available to 
the migrant from the Migration Division or local governments on matters 
regarding health, welfare, and employment, among others. The lessons on the 
American way of life were aimed at sustaining traditional American gender 
and class roles, like the one on “The family”:
The American family is small. The father is the head of the family. He works 
in a factory, an office, a school, a store or some other business place. Some 
men work as policemen, drivers or some other outdoor job. Some work on 
farms. The mother works in the house. She takes care of the children, she 
cooks and irons. She keeps the house clean. Some mothers work out. The 
children help their parents with housework. Each child has certain respon-
sibilities. They learn that everybody must work.56
Other information considered Puerto Rican life in the United States. For 
example, only the cities and states with the largest Puerto Rican population 
were reviewed (New York, Chicago, and New Jersey). After surveying some 
of the states’ main attributes, the lesson on New Jersey, for example, pointed 
out the jobs available and the settlement areas for Puerto Ricans.57 Some of 
the lessons were designed to orient those interested in doing farmwork in the 
United States:
This is José. He lives in Guayama. He goes to the United States every year. He 
is an agricultural worker. He is seeking information for his trip. José wants 
to know what state he can go this year. He went to New Jersey last year. He 
receives orientation from the Department of Labor office. Go under contract 
for work in the States. You and your family will be protected.58
Much of the “regular news” referred to Puerto Ricans moving to the United 
States: one read, for example, “Many Puerto Rican farm workers arrived in the 
United States this month. They are going to work on farms.”59 Other lessons 
emphasized the benefits of learning English in Puerto Rico or in the United 
States: “Ana and Alberto are learning English. They go to night school. They 
work during the day. Knowing more English is good for them. They plan to 
live in the States. If you know English you make more money.”60 In general, 
the lessons underscored the benefits of living in the United States: “Look at 
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Pedro. Look at Ana. Pedro and Ana are from Puerto Rico. They live in Chi-
cago now. They lived in Puerto Rico before. Pedro and Ana are very happy.”61
A brief outline of the Department of Education’s programs to aid migrants 
was presented in the spring 1957 newsletter Educación, in an article titled 
“The Public School Orients Migrants.” The editor of this monthly newslet-
ter, whose goal was to provide “information and orientation to teachers,” was 
Assistant Secretary Collazo, the department’s point man on issues of migra-
tion. The article summarized all the programs provided by the department to 
orient and advise those willing to migrate to the United States and described 
how the overall education of Puerto Rican children better prepared them for 
migrating to the U.S. mainland. Among the programs mentioned was the pro-
duction of teaching materials showing the “practical situations that migrant 
families face” in the United States.62 For example, the department’s English 
program produced the text La familia Vázquez en los Estados Unidos (The 
Vázquez Family in the United States), which included “forty practical lessons 
for persons that think about moving to the United States.” The lessons in the 
book were similar to those presented in Semana but were oriented mostly to 
guiding the migrant family moving to an urban area from the moment they 
boarded the plane in Puerto Rico to the moment they were settled in the 
United States.63
Another text to orient public school children and adults was Emigración 
(Emigration), one of the libros para el pueblo (books for the people) produced 
by the department’s División para la Educación de la Comunidad (Commu-
nity Education Division). The division, created in 1949, aimed at providing 
the poor rural masses with education and the basic tools for developing their 
communities, mostly using artistic means like pamphlets, films, theater, and 
radio programs.64 It recruited some of Puerto Rico’s most renowned artists at 
the time. The migration booklet was written by René Marqués, one of Puerto 
Rico’s best-known writers, and had illustrations by celebrated painters like 
Luis Cajigas and Carlos Raquel Rivera. It answered common questions and 
subjects: “Why do people today emigrate?” “Why is migration so easy for 
Puerto Ricans?” “Do Puerto Ricans know the country they emigrate to?” 
“New York is not the only city.” “Housing in the big U.S. cities.” “Why sick 
workers should not migrate.” “Work in the American farms.” “Do I stay or 
do I go?” It also discussed topics like culture in the United States, the nature 
of prejudice, the differences between Puerto Ricans in Puerto Rico and those 
living in the United States, moving to places other than New York, farm labor, 
and the offices of the Puerto Rican government in New York and Chicago.65 
Emigración was used as a text in the regular adult education program, includ-
ing at the elementary level.66
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In February 1958, Governor Muñoz Marín publicized the steps his govern-
ment was taking to implement the recommendations from the third Migration 
Conference, held in San Juan the previous month. Once again, he promised to 
implement measures to intensify the teaching of English in public schools and 
the English program for prospective migrants. Among the recommendations 
mentioned by the governor to expand and improve the teaching of English 
on the island was to use the new public TV station—WIPR, inaugurated in 
1958—for this purpose. The recommendations included the following:
To explore new techniques for the orientation of a greater number of 
migrants and potential migrants in the United States and Puerto Rico. The 
inauguration of a new educational television channel in Puerto Rico pro-
vides an excellent opportunity to show movies and establish other programs 
to familiarize potential migrants with the conditions in the United States.67
The recently created WIPR became the new mechanism to orient and advise 
prospective migrants. Its English programs were managed by the depart-
ment’s English for Adults program; the exercises were made available through 
Semana and other publications.68 After 1959, English classes were also offered 
by this program through the government’s public radio station.69 In the fis-
cal year 1958–59, the department’s English for Adults program included four 
areas: the regular curriculum in schools, teaching farmworkers in their places 
of work, English courses via public television, and English courses by public 
radio.70
By this time, all the means of socialization available to the government—
public schools, community organization, print, radio, and TV—were employed 
in the organization and promotion of migration to the United States. Every 
Puerto Rican became a “prospective” or “potential” migrant. What may be sig-
nificant is how the numerous texts used throughout the public school curricu-
lum in English classes and the readings and English lessons in publications 
like Semana recall the previous U.S.-implemented policy of Americanization 
of the early decades of the twentieth century, with its texts emphasizing U.S. 
history, American patriots, and the American way of life. However, mastery of 
English and even literacy rates were not what colonial functionaries expected 
given the expenditure on education by the colonial state. There are many rea-
sons why this policy failed. The texts used in schools, imported from the U.S. 
educational system, were foreign to Puerto Rican children: after all, it never 
snows on the island, Puerto Ricans do not sing Christmas carols, and the peo-
ple in those pictures do not resemble them. But in the English programs of the 
1950s, the people in the pictures looked Puerto Rican, and by moving to the 
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United States, Puerto Ricans became part of that country’s history. The Eng-
lish lessons learned then had an impact in the daily life of Puerto Ricans. The 
previous Americanization policy was an effort to Americanize Puerto Ricans 
in Puerto Rico in order to sustain the colonial regime. The PPD’s policy was 
aimed at infusing migrants and prospective migrants with the language and 
way of life in the United States to facilitate their adaptation there; it was now 
aimed at Americanizing those Puerto Ricans going to the United States.
By promoting the intensification and expansion of the teaching of English 
throughout the public school system and by expanding the education pro-
grams—with their heavy content of teaching the American culture and way 
of life—for prospective migrants as a means of easing their incorporation in 
the United States, the colonial government under the PPD was able to do what 
decades of U.S. colonial functionaries were not able to achieve. By treating 
every Puerto Rican as a potential migrant and by trying to prepare them for 
migration accordingly, the PPD government—headed by former independen-
tistas and defenders of Spanish as the vernacular language of the island and 
of a Puerto Rican national identity—implemented policies that furthered the 
influence of English and American ideals and values on the island like never 
before.
ENGLISH AND MIGRANT INCORPORATION IN THE  
UNITED STATES
The issue of English was also prominent in the news reports that came from 
Muñoz Marín’s tour of the United States in commemoration of the tenth 
anniversary of the Migration Division creation in 1958. Muñoz Marín made 
important stops in Chicago and New York, the two cities with the largest 
Puerto Rican communities and the two most important Migration Division 
offices. In Chicago, where issues of poverty and youth gangs in the Puerto 
Rican community were important topics of discussion with government and 
community representatives, the governor reiterated the measures taken by 
his administration to ease the incorporation of migrants into the mainland 
communities, including the intensification of English education on the island. 
While in Chicago, Muñoz Marín asserted that Puerto Rican migration would 
cease by 1975, when Puerto Rico would have achieved the level of economic 
development prevalent in the United States. El Mundo questioned both state-
ments by the governor, declaring that English teachers in Puerto Rico were 
not well prepared or well paid, which explained the continuing problems of 
English education in Puerto Rico. It further argued that Puerto Rico would 
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never achieve the level of economic development of the United States, thus 
making migration a continuing escape valve for the island’s unemployed.71
In New York, Puerto Rican government officials also had to face issues of 
migrant incorporation. San Juan Mayor Felisa Rincón de Gautier complained 
that Puerto Ricans were still regarded as “foreigners” and blamed “those who 
have not cooperated to accelerate our integration” for the migrants’ lack of 
progress. Muñoz Marín touched a more familiar note, stating that ignorance 
of English was “the main problem that delays the integration of Puerto Ricans 
to metropolitan life.”72 The governor mentioned all the measures that his gov-
ernment was taking to ease the incorporation of migrants, particularly the 
intensification in the teaching of English through schools and other institu-
tions, including the new public TV station. He announced the production 
of short films to be shown on WIPR and in cinemas in Puerto Rico and the 
United States to orient and advise migrants moving to the U.S. mainland. 
Muñoz Marín also announced that he had asked island mayors to make a 
census of prospective migrants so the government could be better prepared to 
help them in their journey to the United States, including through the teach-
ing of English.73
By the time that Muñoz Marín toured those cities in the United States with 
the most important Puerto Rican communities (Detroit, Chicago, New York, 
and Lorrain, Ohio) in 1958, the Puerto Rican government was promoting its 
plan to encourage island migrants to integrate into their communities in the 
U.S. mainland. Leading the program was Rincón de Gautier, who made fre-
quent tours to the United States, particularly to New York. According to her, 
Puerto Ricans had to “integrate” to their communities in the United States—
socially, politically, and culturally—in order to become better citizens. They 
could help themselves and Puerto Rico, for example, by engaging in electoral 
politics, a right they could enjoy immediately as U.S. citizens. Integration also 
required assimilation, learning the culture and language of their new society. 
The Puerto Rican government was doing everything possible to achieve these 
goals with programs in Puerto Rico and the United States. Through integra-
tion and assimilation, there would be no more “Puerto Rican problem” in the 
United States, she argued.74 In a previous visit to New York in 1957, Muñoz 
Marín had already declared that with assimilation, “the current problems 
would disappear quickly.” Eliminating the “language barrier” was a step in 
that direction. For the Puerto Rican government and for institutions like El 
Mundo, providing more access to English education in Puerto Rico and the 
United States was an important means of eradicating the language barrier for 
Puerto Rican migrants.75
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At the Migration Division’s tenth anniversary ceremony in New York, 
Muñoz Marín characterized Puerto Rican migration as one more “internal 
migration” in the United States, similar to that of hundreds of thousands of 
U.S. citizens who move from one state to another. He recognized, neverthe-
less, that due to the economic stagnation in the United States, some “return 
migration” had been noticeable in the previous year and argued that this was 
part of the process of migration. The governor acknowledged the “adaptation” 
that Puerto Ricans had experienced in the United States and how this had 
improved their lives there. He praised the role played by the Migration Divi-
sion in the advancement of Puerto Rican incorporation in the United States, 
characterizing the division as “probably unique in the history of the United 
States, as it is the first time that the place of origin of a migrant has established 
offices in the United States for the purpose of helping its people to get adjusted 
to their new home fast and successfully.”76
The inconsistencies of the official discourse on migration by the Puerto 
Rican government were apparent by that time. At the same time that it insisted 
that Puerto Ricans were another “internal migration” group in the United 
States, it had acknowledged the similarities with other immigrant groups that 
had to “adapt” to an “ethnologically different environment” there. While the 
governor emphasized the commonalities that Puerto Ricans shared with other 
U.S. citizens, he praised the work of the Migration Division in advancing the 
adaptation of island migrants to the United States; it was an office that no pre-
vious immigrant group had established before.
During the New York tour, Department of Labor functionaries announced 
a new program to provide English classes to migrants working in farms in the 
United States. The program, with an initial funding of $60,000, would start 
in farms in New York and New Jersey. Classes would be taught early in the 
morning before work or late in the evening after work, with the authorization 
of the employers; the program would be administered by the Departments 
of Education and Labor. The bill was signed into law by Muñoz Marín in 
July 1958.77 The original bill was submitted in May 1958 by the Speaker of the 
House, Ernesto Ramos Antonini. It was based on the conclusions of a report 
by the House Labor Committee on their investigation of working conditions 
faced by Puerto Rican farmworkers in the United States. The report con-
cluded that one major problem faced by farmworkers was their lack of English 
knowledge; this situation created problems not only in terms of labor relations 
but also in terms of their relationship with the local communities in general. 
The bill’s preamble stated that the political, economic, and cultural relations 
with the United States required intensifying the teaching of English in public 
schools. But foremost, the increasing levels of migration to the United States 
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made knowledge of English indispensable. It should be an “imperative” goal of 
the Puerto Rican government to adequately train and prepare Puerto Ricans 
migrating to the United States. To achieve these goals, it was “a primary fac-
tor that they should possess the ability to communicate in English.” The bill 
concluded: “Common citizenship and the increase in mass transportation and 
communication between Puerto Rico and the United States make every Puerto 
Rican a potential migrant.”78
After Congressman Marcantonio was defeated in 1950, the Puerto Rican 
government identified the language barrier as the main issue in the continued 
“Puerto Rican problem” in the United States. By the end of the 1950s, main-
land communities and employers still rejected Puerto Rican migrants; island 
functionaries explained this by the fact that these migrants were still identified 
as foreigners from a strange land and not as U.S. citizens. They argued that 
the main reason for this identification was their cultural difference, mostly in 
terms of language. By eradicating this difference, the government could ease 
the incorporation of these migrants into American society and thus assure the 
continuation of the migration program. By the mid-1950s, the intensification 
in the teaching of English for Puerto Rican children in schools and for pro-
spective migrants became a main goal of the government’s migration policy. 
That this language policy was never truly effective is a reminder of the diffi-
culties of imposing a new language of communication (English) on a society 
that had been using another language (Spanish) as a central part of its identity 
and culture for centuries.79
But perhaps a more important lesson to be learned regarding the rela-
tionship of language and migration may be the fact that the language bar-
rier might have not been the most significant obstacle in the incorporation 
of these island migrants in the United States, as the Puerto Rican govern-
ment and many U.S. public and private officials argued for many decades. The 
U.S. Civil Rights Commission’s 1976 report on the status of Puerto Ricans in 
the United States, entitled “An Uncertain Future,” determined that “mainland 
Puerto Ricans generally continue mired in the poverty facing first generations 
of all immigrant or migrant groups.” Contrary to the expectation that the 
second generation would fare better in social and economic terms, it argued: 
“One generation later, the essential fact of poverty remains little changed. 
Indeed, the economic situation of the mainland Puerto Ricans has worsened 
over the last decade.” The report concluded:
The United States has never before had a large migration of citizens from off-
shore, distinct in culture and language and also facing the problem of color 
prejudice. After 30 years of significant migration, contrary to conventional 
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wisdom that once Puerto Ricans learned the language the second generation 
would move into the mainstream of American society, the future of this dis-
tinct community in the United States is still to be determined.80
As the commission concluded, other factors besides the language bar-
rier are required to explain the difficult incorporation of Puerto Ricans in 
the United States, like racism and prejudice, their exclusion from high-paying 
jobs, their concentration in cheap labor areas like agriculture and the service 
sectors, a lack of educational opportunities, school and residential segregation, 
and concentration in cities and regions that were experiencing deindustrial-
ization. The Puerto Rican government might have achieved some success in 
turning “every Puerto Rican into a potential migrant,” but that in itself did 
not improve the chances of its people achieving a successful incorporation in 
the United States.
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2. Farmworkers in front of BEM office ready to depart, circa 1953. AGPR, Photographic 
Archives, Colección Departamento de Instrucción Pública (Department of Education Collec-
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Education Collection). Photo attributed to Jack Delano.
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5. Aerial view of Isla Grande Airport, March 1948. AGPR, Photographic Archives, Colección 
Departamento de Instrucción Pública (Department of Education Collection). Photo by Charles 
Rotkin.
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7. Pan Am building at Isla Grande Airport in San Juan, August 1946. AGPR, Photographic Archives, Colección 
Departamento de Instrucción Pública (Department of Education Collection). Photo by Charles Rotkin.
8. Main lobby at the International Airport after inauguration. AGPR, Photographic Archives, Puerto Rico 
Industrial Development Company Collection.
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9. Passengers and mother and child boarding unscheduled flight by Waterman Airlines at 
Isla Grande Airport in San Juan, July 1946. AGPR, Photographic Archives, Colección Departa-
mento de Instrucción Pública (Department of Education Collection). Photo by Charles Rotkin.
10. Farmworkers at Isla Grande Airport ready to depart, circa 1953. AGPR, Photographic 
Archives, Colección Departamento de Instrucción Pública (Department of Education Collec-
tion). Photo by Miguel A. Landrón.
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11. Farmworkers on their way to the United States in unscheduled airline, Salinas, Puerto 
Rico, July 1946. AGPR, Photographic Archives, Colección Departamento de Instrucción Pública 
(Department of Education Collection). Photo by Louise Rosskam.
12. Governors Averel Harriman of New York and Luis Muñoz Marín of Puerto Rico at the tenth 
anniversary of the Migration Division in New York City, 1958. Photo from the Migration Divi-
sion Records, Archives of the Puerto Rican Diaspora, Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños, 
Hunter College, CUNY.
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13. Farmworkers arriving at farm housing, circa 1953. AGPR, Photographic Archives, Colección 
Departamento de Instrucción Pública (Department of Education Collection). Photo by Miguel 
A. Landrón.
14. Puerto Rican functionaries visiting farmworkers at camp, no date. Standing from left 
to right, Commissioner of Labor Fernando Sierra Berdecía, Governor Luis Muñoz Marín, 
and Migration Division Director José Moserrat. Photo from the Migration Division Records, 
Archives of the Puerto Rican Diaspora, Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños, Hunter College, 
CUNY.
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15. English lesson from Semana, November 14, 1960.
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16. “Our Holocaust: United States—Puerto Rico, 204 Deaths.” Editorial cartoon by Filardi. El 
Mundo, April 15, 1952.
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C H A P T E R  6
The Beets of Wrath
Migration Policy and Migrant Discontent in  
Michigan, 1950
AS PAR T OF its migration policy, the Puerto Rican government was engaged 
in the authorization of worker recruitment in Puerto Rico. No U.S. employer 
could hire a Puerto Rican worker without a contract approved by the Puerto 
Rican government. Furthermore, by the early 1950s, the Puerto Rican govern-
ment itself organized the movement of labor from Puerto Rico to the United 
States. Thus, many workers saw the government as part of the contract labor 
process when doing farmwork in the United States. As a consequence, on sev-
eral occasions worker discontent emerged in these farm labor expeditions to 
the United States; disappointed with their working and living conditions and 
engaged in labor disputes with farmers, workers directed their dissatisfaction 
against the Puerto Rican government, which usually intervened to mediate 
between the workers and the employers. Concern for the workers’ plight must 
be related to the government’s interest in keeping the migration program run-
ning and preventing major political harm on the island.
In 1950, serious worker dissatisfaction with working and living condi-
tions and a dispute with employers among Puerto Rican farmworkers in the 
sugar beet fields of Michigan forced the government to intervene directly in 
the situation to prevent major damage to the migration program and to the 
government’s image on the island, as well as to promote stability in the labor 
relations between migrant workers and employers. The Michigan incident 
is one of the earliest and most important episodes of Puerto Rican migrant 
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discontent in the United States.1 This experience in Michigan would have a 
lasting impact on Puerto Rico’s migration policy thereafter. The aftermath of 
this experience made clear that Puerto Rican farmworkers under the govern-
ment’s Farm Placement Program (FPP) had become part of that group of 
agricultural laborers in the United States known as migratory labor and that 
the Puerto Rican government had become for all purposes a labor contractor 
to American agricultural interests.
The events in Michigan are of further interest for several additional rea-
sons, all of them related to other aspects of the Puerto Rican migration experi-
ence. The Michigan affair illuminates what can be called the migration politics 
of the time. The workers’ expedition to this sugar beet state once again linked 
migration to the island’s political status debate. This time, it involved the rela-
tionship of Puerto Rico’s government with Fred L. Crawford, representative of 
Michigan’s sugar beet interests and a leading congressman on issues pertain-
ing to Puerto Rico’s political status in Congress at a moment when the Puerto 
Rican government was seeking reforms to the island’s political status.
Furthermore, an examination of the Michigan experience allows this 
book to return to its beginnings—colonialism, citizenship—and, in addition, 
to consider U.S. sugar politics. The same factors that explain the beginnings 
of U.S. rule on the island after 1898 can be seen at work with regard to migra-
tion in the 1950s. The Michigan experience highlights the workings of the 
U.S. sugar industry and its intricate relationship with American colonial ter-
ritories in the twentieth century. When the Bracero Program came under 
heavy attack after World War II, Michigan sugar beet interests tried to replace 
Mexican labor with Puerto Rican farmworkers. The labor surplus created by 
the decline of the sugar industry in Puerto Rico—largely due to restrictions 
supported and promoted in Congress by sugar beet producers—made it pos-
sible that the colonial labor from the “racially inferior” sugar-producing pro-
letariat in Puerto Rico could satisfy the labor needs of the Michigan sugar 
beet producers. Thus, the 1950 Michigan experience is but a reflection of U.S. 
colonial policies echoed in the interests, debates, and conflicts regarding the 
U.S. sugar industry and its ties with colonial populations.
The Michigan experience is also related to the issue of air transportation 
and safety for migrant workers discussed previously in this book. The very 
first flight taking island farmworkers to Michigan crashed en route to the 
United States, one of the worst airplane tragedies involving Puerto Ricans 
up to that moment. More than in previous air disasters, this particular crash 
produced strong public reactions to the government’s farmworkers’ program, 
reactions that directly and seriously questioned its migration policy for the 
first time. The Michigan experience prompted the Puerto Rican government 
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to implement new policies and guidelines for the movement of Puerto Rican 
labor to the United States.
Sending Puerto Rican farm laborers to Michigan in 1950 was important 
for the Puerto Rican government for several reasons. The Michigan contract 
was the second major contract approved by the Department of Labor since 
the approval of the migration law in 1947. According to Commissioner of 
Labor Fernando Sierra Berdecía, the significance of this contract lay in its sta-
tus as “the first contract beyond the Northeast area and it was believed to be 
the opening wedge to the great Middle West for our program of employment 
for the workers of Puerto Rico since it is located in the great industrial area 
around the Great Lakes.”2 There might be an additional reason why the Puerto 
Rican government was interested in sending migrant workers to Michigan in 
an attempt to replace Mexican braceros here: this expedition must be under-
stood as part of that campaign by the Puerto Rican government to promote 
the use of Puerto Rican farmworkers as domestic labor in place of foreign 
workers, the most important source of competition for Puerto Rican labor in 
U.S. agriculture. Negotiations to send Puerto Rican workers to the sugar beet 
fields of Michigan between the government of Puerto Rico and the Michi-
gan Field Corporation (MFC)—the representative of the Michigan sugar beet 
growers—began in March 1950. By May 9, a final agreement was reached on a 
contract to regulate working conditions between workers and employers. Like 
all other government-sponsored contracts, it had to be signed by the workers 
and the employer. The MFC initially placed an order of 1,500 workers with 
the Department of Labor after certification by the U.S. Employment Service 
(USES); it later ordered an additional 5,314 men for the program.3
But before discussing the events in Michigan during the summer of 1950, 
it is necessary to provide a brief background on the many ways that Puerto 
Ricans—particularly those working in the island’s sugar cane fields—were 
linked to the production of beet sugar in Michigan.
SIX DEGREES OF (COLONIAL) SEPARATION: SUGAR BEET 
PRODUCTION IN MICHIGAN AND PUERTO RICAN POLITICS
The paths of Puerto Rican farmworkers and sugar beet growers intertwined 
in a complex way in the fields of Michigan in 1950. It would be the culmina-
tion of decades of U.S. sugar politics and colonial policies. These two had been 
related since the United States began its overseas imperial venture in 1898.4 
U.S. sugar politics, determined by conflicting sugar interests, was at the center 
of the debate regarding the overseas empire in 1898: domestic sugar produc-
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ers—particularly sugar beet producers—were strong supporters of protection-
ism and thus maintained postures in favor of anti-imperialism, while colonial/
foreign sugar producers supported free trade and imperialism. Domestic sugar 
producers were strongly opposed to the “incorporation” of Puerto Rico and 
the Philippines; they were particularly adamant against granting citizenship 
to Puerto Ricans in the 1900 Foraker Act. Similarly, domestic sugar produc-
ers—specifically sugar beet producers—were strongly opposed to the Supreme 
Court declaring Puerto Rico a domestic territory in the early Insular Cases, 
particularly in Downes v. Bidwell.5
Sugar beet farmers and beet sugar producers feared the competition of 
cheaper cane sugar from foreign/colonial markets and the powerful Sugar 
Trust, particularly from Cuba and the Philippines. They not only presented 
their interests behind a veil of protectionism but also used a racist and white 
supremacist discourse so common among anti-imperialists. Protecting the 
production of beet sugar was protecting not only the American farm but also 
American “civilization”: “Would the United States rely on sugar grown on 
large aristocratic plantations by ‘coolie’ labor or would it consume sugar from 
small family farms tended to by white farmers and white workers? Simply put, 
did the United States want ‘barbaric’ or ‘civilized’ sugar?”6 The economic crisis 
at the end of the 1920s pushed the price of sugar to new lows and threatened 
the position of domestic sugar producers in the American market. What came 
as a result of the actions of the U.S. sugar beet lobby was one of their most 
important political victories: they were able to protect the domestic market 
from “colonial” sugar and force the independence of the Philippines. In 1934, 
Congress passed the Jones-Costigan Act, which imposed a quota on the entry 
of sugar from Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico, ending the existing free 
trade with the latter two colonies.7 The political consequences of the Jones-
Costigan Act in Puerto Rico were dramatic.8 The quota on sugar produced 
in Puerto Rico marked the beginning of the sugar industry’s decline on the 
island, and with it, its political power and influence. The quota led to the 
breakdown of the alliance between central owners (led by four U.S. corpora-
tions) and colonos, or independent sugar farmers.9 This event was linked to 
the rise of the reformist PPD and the collapse of the conservative and pro-
statehood Republican forces. The Jones-Costigan Act also affected the Puerto 
Rican labor movement and its political affiliations. It led to the 1934 sugar 
strike—the biggest in Puerto Rico to that point—and altered the political 
spectrum for workers’ politics; many workers abandoned the Socialist Party 
and its related Free Federation of Labor, joining a more radical workers’ orga-
nization and later the PPD.10
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The economic and political weakening of the dominant sugar interests 
on the island, closely related to the economic crisis and the Jones-Costigan 
quota on sugar production, accelerated the push for economic and social 
reform from both local and U.S. government forces. With its “Puerto Rican 
New Deal” sabotaged by the conservative Republican-Socialist Coalition that 
controlled the local government, the Roosevelt administration allied with 
local reformers in the Liberal Party led by Luis Muñoz Marín in present-
ing a program of economic and social reform that dramatically impacted the 
sugar industry.11 The promises of agricultural and land reform made by the 
PPD in 1940 never fully materialized, and by 1947 the PPD-led government 
placed all its bets for modernization on the industrialization of the economy. 
Ironically, many of the sugar workers who became labor surplus after being 
expelled from the sugar industry would be the migrant workers that the PPD 
government’s FPP would send to farms in the United States after 1947.12 Many 
of them would be among the five thousand–plus who went to the sugar beet 
fields in Michigan in 1950.
The other major victory for sugar beet producers was the push for the inde-
pendence of the Philippines. In 1934, Congress passed the Tydings-McDuffie 
Act, allowing for the independence of the Philippines (it also restricted the 
number of Filipinos to be admitted to the United States and created a system 
for the repatriation of Filipinos living then in U.S. territory). Senator Millard 
Tydings, the new chair of the Insular Affairs Committee, was instrumental 
in approving this law.13 In 1936 Tydings submitted—with the support of the 
Roosevelt administration—what would be the first of three bills he authored 
in the next ten years granting Puerto Rico its independence. According to 
Gattel, for Tydings Puerto Rican independence “would be in harmony with 
the United States policy of imperial disengagement and help improve Latin 
American relations.”14 Tydings’s 1936 independence bill was extremely punitive 
for Puerto Ricans, even more restrictive in economic terms than the one he 
proposed for the Philippines.15 This bill exacerbated rifts in the Liberal Party, 
which led to the creation of the PPD in 1938 and later to its victory in the 
1940 elections. Tydings’s two other bills for independence, in 1943 and 1945, 
created rifts within the governing PPD by encouraging its pro-independence 
sectors. In 1946, after Tydings’s third bill, Muñoz Marín was forced to expel 
independentistas from the party. They immediately created the Puerto Rican 
Independence Party (PIP) and became the strongest opposition to the rising 
PPD and its political and economic programs.
Why did Puerto Rican farmworkers go to the sugar beet fields of Michigan 
in 1950? After World War I, when the entry of European labor was drastically 
reduced by the conflict and by restrictionist forces pushing for limited immi-
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gration, sugar beet farmers in Michigan found a new source of labor: Mexican 
migrants. Their dependence on this labor was so pronounced that the sugar 
beet lobby was able to prevent the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act from curtailing 
Mexican labor from entry to the United States. Sugar beet interests were able 
to promote what Mapes calls a “racialized and nationalized” system of labor. 
The federal government would create the structure to provide the sugar beet 
farms with Mexican labor, while at the same time, sugar beet producers would 
satisfy the concerns of restrictionists and nativists by arguing that these labor-
ers were not immigrants but temporary migrant workers. They were to be 
considered laborers, but not future citizens to be assimilated.16
Sugar beet farming, along with cotton farming, was among the areas of 
American agriculture to experience mechanization the latest, and some of 
its production, like early harvesting, required large amounts of manual, or 
“stoop,” labor. This made this industry highly dependent on migratory labor. 
According to the report by the president’s Commission on Migratory Labor, in 
1945 less than 1 percent of the acreage devoted to sugar beet in Michigan was 
mechanized. Although the rate of mechanization increased thereafter, there 
was still a large need for manual labor: by 1950, the industry required fifteen 
thousand seasonal workers for spring work and another five thousand for har-
vesting work.17 Sugar beet interests were supportive of the Bracero Program 
created by the U.S. government during World War II to satisfy U.S. agricul-
tural labor needs. They were also instrumental in the approval of Law 78, 
which reinstated the program in 1951, after a brief interlude when critics were 
able to stop the program. It was precisely during this interval that Puerto 
Ricans would migrate to the sugar beet fields in Michigan as migrant labor.18
The Bracero Program came under attack by nativists and by labor unions 
in the late 1940s and by the Mexican government’s refusal to allow Mexican 
migrant laborers to work in the sugar beet industry due to its brutal working 
conditions. By 1948, the National Farm Labor Union pressured the federal 
government to end the Bracero Program under the assumption that there was 
no shortage of domestic labor to fulfill U.S. agricultural needs.19 The Michigan 
sugar beet interests found an answer to their labor problem by looking again 
south of the border, this time to the Caribbean. As Dennis Valdés argues: 
“The ever resourceful Michigan sugar beet industry turned to Puerto Rico, 
hoping to find workers as poor and easily controlled as the braceros. Because 
they were U.S. citizens, hiring Puerto Ricans would protect the industry from 
criticism for hiring foreign workers.”20 According to an MFC representative, 
they were forced to recruit Puerto Ricans after their “plans in Chicago went 
awry .  .  . when the Immigration Service deported some 1,800 illegal Mexi-
can entries and the balance of the Latin American population remained in 
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the city hoping to obtain the industrial jobs vacated by these illegal aliens.”21 
The Michigan project would not only have made it possible for Puerto Rican 
farmworkers to make an inroad in the Midwest, as Sierra Berdecía stated, but 
it also might have been the ideal opportunity to show agricultural employers 
that they could replace and displace Mexican braceros and undocumented 
workers and thus open a new space for island workers.
Puerto Rican workers and sugar beet producers in Michigan were linked 
in multiple ways by U.S. sugar and colonial politics. But there was another 
link between them that would lead Puerto Rican migrant workers to the sugar 
beet fields of Michigan in 1950. His name was Congressman Fred L. Crawford.
PUERTO RICO’S NEW “BEST FRIEND IN CONGRESS”:  
FRED L. CRAWFORD AND PUERTO RICAN POLITICS
Crawford, elected to Congress as a Republican by Michigan’s 8th District 
in 1934, was secretary of the Michigan Sugar Company in 1925, and by 1932 
he operated several sugar factories in Michigan; he was also director of the 
Michigan National Bank and of the Refiners Transport and Petroleum Corp. 
of Detroit. He belonged to the group of Republicans sent to Congress after 
Franklin Roosevelt’s election in 1932 and led the Republican opposition to 
New Deal policies in agriculture. Crawford was a founding member of the 
Farmers Independence Council, a very conservative organization created to 
oppose New Deal reforms and federal legislation in agriculture.22
As representative of sugar beet interests in Michigan for decades, Craw-
ford had to deal with the issue of the industry’s labor needs. In 1929, Con-
gress held hearings on the tariff to foreign sugar coming to the United States, 
and sugar beet interests were clearly present during these hearings. One of 
the most contentious issues they faced was related to their opposition to the 
entry of foreign sugar produced by nonwhite cheap labor in the colonial/ 
neocolonial territories while, at the same time, they used Mexican labor 
at home. Testifying on behalf of the Michigan Sugar Company, Crawford 
addressed the question of where sugar beet producers would find labor to 
substitute for Mexican workers by arguing, “If we cannot get the Mexican, we 
are going to pull the colored people out of the South and take them out of the 
cotton fields.”23
By the early 1940s, Crawford was already an influential member of the 
House Committee on Insular Affairs, which oversaw the administration of 
U.S. colonial territories. Like many Republicans in Congress, he was extremely 
critical of the reforms that were implemented in Puerto Rico then by Gover-
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nor Tugwell and by the newly elected PPD government. Crawford and the 
other Republicans accused the Puerto Rican government of turning the island 
into a Communist paradise. Crawford’s first inroad into Puerto Rican politics 
was not well received by the PPD/Tugwell government, particularly by PPD 
leader and Senate president Muñoz Marín. In January 1943, Crawford sub-
mitted a resolution in the House that would have allowed Congress to annul 
any law approved by the Puerto Rican government. This act aimed to stop the 
social and economic reforms that were being implemented by the PPD and 
Tugwell, such as the creation of public corporations, land reform, and the 
economic program based on state-owned industries.24 Muñoz Marín reacted 
furiously to this resolution, calling it
the most outrageous assault on democracy attempted in any part of the 
world, whether under democratic or axis domination. . . . If Congress were 
to annul this legislation, the obvious meaning . . . would be that democracy 
can be made a hoax by the highest parliamentary body of democracy.25
The PPD-controlled Puerto Rican legislature condemned Crawford’s resolu-
tion. He replied that his proposed action was allowed by the Puerto Rican 
Organic Acts approved by Congress.26 Although his resolution was not passed 
in the House, it nevertheless played an important role in moving the House 
Committee on Insular Affairs to take a closer look at the political events and 
government reforms in Puerto Rico.27 The House committee’s investigation 
occurred near the same time as a similar one by the Senate’s Committee on 
Territories and Insular Affairs.
Crawford actively participated in the House Committee on Insular Affairs, 
chaired by Representative C. Jasper Bell, which held hearings in Puerto Rico 
in 1943 during its investigation of PPD-Tugwell policies. Its final report, briefly 
mentioned in chapter 1 (one if its main recommendations was the need to 
promote Puerto Rican migration to the United States) was highly critical of 
the Puerto Rican government.28 It is evident throughout the thousand-plus 
pages of the report that Crawford was a leading voice in these hearings. He 
expressed concerns with issues like the government’s land reform; the creation 
of public corporations in communications, the water system, and electricity; 
public planning; the creation of state-owned manufacturing enterprises; the 
influence of independentistas in the Puerto Rican government; and particu-
larly the situation of the Puerto Rican sugar industry. What is most interesting 
is that Crawford’s views in 1943 were no different from those that he would 
hold in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Crawford maintained his economic and 
political ideas regarding Puerto Rico throughout this period, while the PPD 
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government and Muñoz Marín changed theirs. It comes out clearly in his 
statements in 1943 that, for Crawford, Puerto Rico ought to remain under U.S. 
jurisdiction for strategic considerations. By extension, he believed that Puerto 
Ricans needed to be economically self-sustaining, which meant advocating for 
a reduction of federal expenditures on the island.
One of the most discussed issues during the 1943 congressional hearings 
was that of Puerto Rico’s political status. By this time, President Roosevelt 
had requested that Congress reform the Jones Act, including allowing Puerto 
Ricans to elect their own governor.29 Senator Tydings had submitted his sec-
ond bill for Puerto Rico’s independence in reaction to this measure, which 
roused pro-independence supporters who were already a significant voice 
inside the PPD. Muñoz Marín faced particularly pointed questions on the 
status issue during the hearings, which led to heated debates between him and 
members of the committee. In an exchange during the 1943 hearings, Craw-
ford pressed Muñoz Marín on the issue of the elective governor—a reform not 
requested at the time by the PPD—asking if that reform would “take Puerto 
Rico out of the so-called colonial status.” He replied, “Probably it would be to 
a large extent interpreted by many Puerto Ricans as not removing it basically, 
as long as the right to take away that right remains outside the sovereignty of 
Puerto Rico.”30 Although Crawford openly opposed the right of Puerto Ricans 
to elect their own governor in 1943, the 1947 law that allowed Puerto Ricans 
to do this for the first time in their history carried Crawford’s name and was 
hailed by Muñoz Marín as a great step in reforming Puerto Rico’s colonial 
status. Furthermore, Muñoz Marín recognized Crawford’s significant role in 
approving this reform.31
During the 1943 congressional hearings, Crawford made it evident that 
he opposed statehood for fiscal reasons—the “inability” of Puerto Ricans to 
sustain the economic burdens of statehood—and independence for strate-
gic reasons. In 1944, Crawford told El Mundo that there would be no status 
change of any kind—neither statehood nor independence—for Puerto Rico in 
twenty-five years. At that time, he was willing to consider the elective gover-
nor reform but not the right of Puerto Ricans to write their own constitution 
for fear that they could adopt “any kind of constitution that they wished, fas-
cist, communist, or of other nature.”32 Crawford believed that Puerto Ricans 
would be easy prey for international communism.33 Nevertheless, by 1950 
Crawford supported Law 600, allowing Puerto Ricans to write their own con-
stitution, probably because this law clearly limited the type of constitution 
Puerto Ricans could enact: it had to be compatible with and subordinate to 
the U.S. Constitution.
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Another issue on which Crawford presented his opinion during the hear-
ings in 1943—views that he maintained in later years—was Puerto Rican 
migration to the United States. He questioned why foreign workers like Jamai-
cans were given jobs in the sugar beet industry while Puerto Ricans—U.S. 
citizens—remained unemployed.34 For Crawford, the reforms to the status of 
Puerto Rico and the promotion of migration to the United States were related. 
Political and economic stability in Puerto Rico would decrease the need to 
send federal funds to the island, while the United States would maintain a less 
conflictive presence there; at the same time, all the surplus labor in Puerto 
Rico could be employed as cheap labor on the mainland.
During the hearings on Law 600 by the House Interior and Insu-
lar Affairs Committee, Crawford made it perfectly clear that he supported 
Muñoz Marín.35 The conservative Crawford was the perfect answer to those 
in Congress who still harbored concerns about Muñoz Marín and his gov-
ernment’s supposed radicalism. It is important to emphasize the relationship 
that emerged between Crawford and Muñoz Marín in the late 1940s. If at 
the beginning of the decade Muñoz Marín and the PPD relied on Marcanto-
nio—Puerto Rico’s “best friend in Congress” then—to protect and promote 
Puerto Rico’s interests in Washington, by the end of the decade they relied 
on a newfound “best friend” in Washington, Congressman Crawford.36 After 
1945, Muñoz Marín and the PPD began to have conflictive differences with 
Marcantonio with regard to Puerto Rico’s political status, social and economic 
reforms, and migration policy to the United States.37 At the same time that 
they distanced themselves from the radical Marcantonio, Muñoz Marín got 
closer to the conservative Crawford. R. Brian Ferguson noticed the chang-
ing relationship between Crawford and Muñoz Marín and its importance for 
Puerto Rican affairs by the late 1940s. He contends that Muñoz Marín and 
Crawford cut a deal in 1945 where the PPD would let go of its social and 
economic reforms in exchange for Crawford supporting the PPD’s political 
reforms to the island’s status. By 1947, Crawford had become a strong sup-
porter of reforms to the political status of Puerto Rico. Ferguson argues that 
Crawford was crucial for those reforms to become reality: “It was the new-
found support of conservative Republicans that paved the way for the sta-
tus plebiscite and the invited-industrial-development program of Fomento. 
.  .  . After Muñoz Marín and Tugwell, no individual is more important for 
understanding mid-twentieth century colonial policy than the beet man from 
Michigan, Fred Crawford.”38
Muñoz Marín and Crawford maintained their relationship even after 
Crawford left Congress in 1953 following his first electoral defeat since being 
elected to Congress in 1934. Crawford opened a lobbying office offering his 
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services to the governments of the U.S. territories, including Puerto Rico. In 
January 1953, Muñoz Marín appointed Crawford as “Special Assistant to the 
Governor” in charge of studying the possibility of increasing Puerto Rico’s 
trade with its Caribbean neighbors.39 This contract might have been in grati-
tude to Crawford’s defense of the Puerto Rican government’s policies during 
his last years in Congress—particularly in relation to the island’s sugar indus-
try—but also in recognition of his political stance in the 1950 Michigan sugar 
beet strike by Puerto Rican workers. Both issues were considered by many 
in Puerto Rico and Michigan as causes leading to Crawford’s electoral defeat 
in 1952.40 In May 1951, Crawford submitted a report on Operation Bootstrap 
to the House Committee on Insular Affairs, where he praised the PPD’s eco-
nomic reforms and argued that organized migration to different parts of the 
United States would provide the greatest relief to Puerto Rico’s population 
level.41 Crawford’s contract with the government of Puerto Rico was canceled 
by Muñoz Marín in April 1953 in order to avoid—according to the governor—
any “embarrassment, both ways, to the public interest.”42 In 1951, Crawford had 
gained further notoriety in Puerto Rico after it was disclosed, during the trial 
of Nationalist leader Pedro Albizu Campos for his role in the 1950 National-
ist uprising, that Nationalists planned an unsuccessful plot to assassinate the 
congressman during a visit to the island.43
The relationship between Crawford and Muñoz Marín became strained in 
the summer of 1950, when discontented Puerto Rican farm laborers launched 
a strike against the sugar beet farmers in Michigan. Representing the sugar 
beet interests was Crawford, also running a close race for reelection. The 
Puerto Rican government came to represent the Puerto Rican workers by 
default, and it presented a complicated political dilemma for Muñoz Marín’s 
government. On one hand, they could not abandon the workers for fears of 
both political repercussions on the island and the potential consequences to 
the FPP and their migration project. On the other hand, going against the 
interests of farm owners could raise questions about the reliability of Puerto 
Rican workers and the government’s farm labor program in the United States. 
Furthermore, Public Law 600, which allowed Puerto Ricans to write their own 
constitution and thus provided a basis for the PPD’s political power in Puerto 
Rico, was under debate in Washington, and Muñoz Marín had no better friend 
there than Crawford. To complicate things even further for the Puerto Rican 
government, the October 30, 1950, Nationalist uprising in Puerto Rico was 
accompanied by an attempt on President Truman’s life by two Nationalists, an 
event that further clouded the image of Puerto Ricans in the United States and 
the prospects for continued migration there. Once again, status politics and 
migration politics proved to be closely intertwined and difficult to separate.
All Rights Reserved. Copyright © The Ohio State University Press, 2017. Batch 1.
170 •  C H A P T E R 6 
THE “BIGGEST LABOR AIRLIFT IN HISTORY” BEGINS IN 
DISASTER
Sierra Berdecía provided the official account of how the Michigan expedition 
came to be in his 1949–50 annual report to the governor. He stated that in 
August 1949, 181 contract workers in the Northeast were transferred to MFC 
for work in Saginaw, Michigan, with the approval of the department. After 
information given by the workers themselves and from payrolls, the depart-
ment concluded
that the working conditions and earnings in that area were satisfactory. 
When the Michigan Field Corp., Inc., contacted this Department for the 
purpose of negotiating a contract to take a large group of workers to the 
Midwestern area, the Department judging from the results of the first group 
who worked for this company, approved a contract which is admittedly the 
best ever negotiated for best workers in the Mainland.44
There is no mention here of Congressman Crawford’s direct intervention with 
Governor Muñoz Marín on behalf of MFC. In April 1950, MFC placed an 
order of 1,500 workers, followed by an additional order in May that increased 
the number Puerto Rican farmworkers going to Michigan to 5,314.
The Michigan farmworkers’ expedition began in disaster. On June 5, a 
plane owned by Westair Lines—the nonscheduled carrier contracted by MFC 
to transport sixty-one Puerto Rican workers—crashed near the Florida coast; 
twenty-eight workers died in the crash. The C-46 plane left the Isla Grande 
Airport at 6:26 p.m. on its way to Wilmington, North Carolina, and then on 
to Saginaw, Michigan. Another Westair plane, en route to San Juan to pick 
up additional workers, notified the authorities of the disaster. Not all of the 
survivors were able to board the life rafts; some had to spend the night float-
ing with life jackets and were attacked by sharks, to the horror of the others. 
Thirty-seven were rescued by the coast guard—thirty-four workers and three 
crew members, including the pilot—and were later taken to Charleston, North 
Carolina. There, the Westair representative offered the men the choice of a 
flight to San Juan or to Saginaw.45 Muñoz Marín ordered the immediate sus-
pension of all Westair flights carrying workers to the United States and com-
missioned Sierra Berdecía to investigate the situation. BEM’s Pagán de Colón 
announced that the plane had been inspected as required by law and that it 
fulfilled all the requirements of federal and local laws. The Westair crash was 
the fifth air disaster since 1947 and came just one year after the tragic plane 
crash of Punta Salinas that shook public opinion in Puerto Rico.46
All Rights Reserved. Copyright © The Ohio State University Press, 2017. Batch 1.
 M I G R AT I O N P O L I C Y A N D M I G R A N T D I S CO N T E N T I N  M I C H I G A N, 1950 •  171
The Westair crash caught Washington’s attention immediately. Several 
members of Congress, including Marcantonio, called for an immediate inves-
tigation of the accident. Jacob Javits demanded that Puerto Rican migrants 
should be fully protected from any exploitation and that all measures should 
be taken to prevent another horrible accident for the U.S. citizens from Puerto 
Rico. Senator Owen Brewater, pointing out previous air crashes in Puerto 
Rico, stated: “Here we have one more crash carrying Puerto Rican workers 
to their death.”47 More important yet, and with greater repercussions on the 
island, the very same day that the New York Times first covered the crash, it 
also reported that the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) had recom-
mended to the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) in the previous fall that the 
operating certificate to the Aviation Corporation of Seattle, which did busi-
ness as Westair Transport, be suspended. The CAA stated that this company 
was “guilty over a long period of time of careless and reckless operation of 
aircraft.” It charged that Westair’s three planes were operated in such a manner 
“as to endanger the life and property of others.” The CAB charged Westair of 
operating in the Caribbean without the required authorization and violating 
numerous regulations.48
The statement by the CAA fell like a bomb in Puerto Rico. Muñoz Marín 
immediately prohibited Westair from flying farmworkers to Michigan. The 
director of Puerto Rico’s Transportation Administration (TA), which had 
authorized Westair’s flight, denied any knowledge of the CAA accusations. 
Muñoz Marín stated that Westair “should have never been used to transport 
laborers whose contracts are supervised by the insular Government.”49 That 
very same day, El Imparcial published the first of several editorials on the air 
crash. Pointing to the tragic repetition of these airplane accidents, it called for 
a more secure form of transporting farmworkers to the U.S. mainland, be it 
by regularly scheduled airlines or by sea.50
Sources close to the government said that the prohibition on Westair 
flights was “an open disavowal of the Commissioner of Labor.” Some blamed 
him for demanding a lower airfare for the workers from MFC.51 Muñoz Marín 
announced that he would be in charge of the crash investigation and that 
thirty-two of the thirty-five survivors had opted to continue to Michigan. The 
governor also announced that the government was in negotiations with Pan 
Am and Eastern for the air transportation of the remaining workers already 
under contract for the Michigan expedition.52 El Imparcial reported that Sierra 
Berdecía had approved the use of Westair only after the TA had certified 
the use of the airline based on previous reports by the CAA, which had not 
informed the TA about its recommendation to the CAB to decertify Westair. 
A TA functionary acknowledged that the person in charge of inspecting the 
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Westair plane never did so.53 Upon his return to Puerto Rico, Sierra Berdecía 
declared that he would take responsibility for any failure of the Department of 
Labor but claimed that the department was not responsible for the inspection 
and certification of these flights.54
On June 9, El Imparcial published its strongest-worded editorial in many 
years, accusing the PPD government of being “the real masterminds of this 
latest massacre.” After describing the lack of regulations and oversight over 
these flights taking Puerto Rican workers to the United States, the edito-
rial blamed the government and its migration policy for these deaths: “The 
government of Puerto Rico .  .  . which has established, drawn, guided, and 
encouraged this absurd policy of mass migrations—to escape their responsi-
bilities to create sources of welfare and work here—is the real culprit for these 
deaths.”55 El Imparcial’s statement was a direct questioning of the policy itself, 
not of its implementation. Days later, the PPD mayor of a sugar municipal-
ity also questioned the government’s policy of migration, asking why former 
workers in the island’s sugar industry had to emigrate to work in the sugar 
beet fields in the United States.56
After a period of negotiations that included the government of Puerto 
Rico and MFC, the transportation of workers resumed after an agreement was 
reached with Pan American and Eastern Airlines. By June 18, all 5,314 work-
ers were in Michigan.57 The negotiations to achieve this conclusion involved 
Muñoz Marín. On June 10, while Muñoz Marín was in direct negotiations 
with Pam Am and Eastern, Crawford reminded him of the urgency of getting 
Puerto Rican workers to Michigan. Days later, Pan Am agreed to move 3,500 
Puerto Ricans to Michigan in “one of the biggest airlifts in its history.” This 
agreement was reached between Pan Am president Juan T. Trippe and Muñoz 
Marín.58 Sierra Berdecía claimed that “the largest civilian airlift in history . . . 
comparable only to the Berlin airlift . . . was carried on much faster than if the 
original transportation scheduled had been adhered to by Westair.”59 For the 
Puerto Rican government, the “beet airlift” served as evidence that it could 
be counted on by U.S. agricultural employers to deliver massive amounts of 
workers in a short time.
In June 1951, after Lloyds of London finally agreed to pay for the deaths of 
those killed in the Westair air crash in June 1950, there was still no final report 
on the accident by the federal or Puerto Rican government agencies in charge 
of the investigation.60 After it left the Puerto Rican market, Westair continued 
to do business from its Washington State base, expanding its routes to Alaska 
and Hawaii well into the 1960s. After the Charleston tragedy, the CAA had 
requested the CAB to revoke Westair’s certificate of operation, an action that 
was never implemented.61
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The Westair tragedy had important repercussions for Puerto Rico’s migra-
tion policy, specifically on the air transport of farmworkers to the United 
States. According to Pagán de Colón in her review of the FPP, new regula-
tions were implemented by the Department of Labor after the accident. Now 
the employer had to notify the department forty-five days in advance with 
the specific date and airline on which the workers were to be transported. 
Puerto Rico’s TA had to certify that the agreement between the employer and 
the airline satisfied all the security provisions mandated by the Puerto Rican 
government and that the airline fulfilled all federal regulations and certifica-
tions to operate. Nevertheless, the policy established by Muñoz Marín to use 
only scheduled airlines had to be ignored in 1951 when U.S. employers could 
not reach an agreement with Pan Am and Eastern to move the nearly twelve 
thousand workers required for that year’s harvest. The Department of Labor 
instructed the TA to allow the use of nonscheduled chartered airlines that 
were certified by the CAA and the CAB. Furthermore, the selected airline 
had to provide a $10,000 life insurance policy per worker at a fee of $0.50 per 
person. The department assumed responsibility for ensuring that the airlines 
would follow the specific date and time scheduled for the flight as agreed 
with the employers, seeking to make sure that workers would be to their final 
destinations in less than ten hours; it also regulated life insurance companies 
and the life insurance fee paid by the workers.62
The farmworkers’ expedition to Michigan in 1950 began with the tragedy 
of the Westair plane crash on June 5. For those who survived the crash and 
went on to work in the sugar beet fields of Michigan, and for the thousands 
more who joined them later, the tragedy continued with the entire experience. 
Those workers who rose in discontent with the working and living conditions 
they encountered in Michigan, the many who left the sugar beet farms and 
moved elsewhere or went on strike, presented the first real challenge to the 
Puerto Rican government’s migration policy.
MIGRANT DISCONTENT IN MICHIGAN
Ironically, the first news report from farmworkers in Michigan on June 21 
declared that they were satisfied with the working and living conditions they 
encountered there.63 But complaints from other workers in Michigan and their 
families in Puerto Rico began to be heard on the island shortly thereafter. El 
Imparcial began to publish news stories on the workers’ situation in Michigan 
on June 27.64 In letters addressed to Sierra Berdecía, workers told about the 
“horror” stories they were experiencing there, expressing unhappiness about 
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overcrowded living quarters, no beds, no drinking water, inadequate food, 
no pay, and no bathrooms.65 Other workers complained that they “have been 
deceived like children by the American companies in Puerto Rico,” that the $5 
they were paid a week for food was insufficient, and that since they had not 
received any wages, they could “send no money to our children, which means 
they will have to eat wind.” This letter ended: “Tell us, Mr. Sierra, would you 
agree with these conditions if you were working here with us?”66 The situation 
of farmworkers in Michigan was so dire that they requested and received help 
from the American Red Cross.67
On July 9, El Imparcial published a report titled “Horrors Described in 
the Fields of Michigan,” in which farmworkers there depicted their situation 
as “slavery in the twentieth century and under the American flag.” They pro-
tested that under their labor contract—approved by the Puerto Rican govern-
ment—they were supposed to earn $10 per acre, but that after working “from 
six in the morning to six in the afternoon,” they were told that they “had not 
earned enough even to pay for the food.” Workers reported that they were told 
by the employers that, contrary to their contract, they would be paid by piece-
work rates and that “only Americans were paid by the hour.” They added: “We 
were first deceived in our own country and then we are deceived in Michi-
gan.” Deploring that they had received no pay after working for five weeks, 
the workers—alluding to the Puerto Rican government—added, “They offered 
us to end unemployment on the island and what they have done is to let our 
children go hungry and needy.”68 Other workers made similar complaints in 
a letter addressed to the commissioner of labor: “We do not have money to 
send to our families, not even for our own expenses. Do you think, Mr. Sierra, 
that this is just? Would you like to be one of us?”69 Another letter signed by 
dozens of workers claimed that they were protesting directly to Muñoz Marín 
but wanted to have their situation made public so their wives knew the reason 
why they were not sending home any money.70 Other workers from Michigan 
requested Muñoz Marín’s “cooperation for an early solution to our problem,” 
indicating that because they were sending what little money they had earned 
to their families back home, they had been going hungry for days.71
In a letter signed by more than two dozen workers, they lamented that 
after working more than 187 hours in nineteen days, instead of receiving 
$112—based on sixty cents an hour, as stipulated in their contract—they were 
paid only $42: “We get paid at the rate of two dollars a day, with which we 
have to pay the debt of the airfare, pay for our meals and send money to our 
families. It seems that this contract was not made by a worker but by someone 
that wants to live off the workers.”72 Many of the letters by Michigan workers 
published by El Imparcial deplored the lack of supervision of their working 
All Rights Reserved. Copyright © The Ohio State University Press, 2017. Batch 1.
 M I G R AT I O N P O L I C Y A N D M I G R A N T D I S CO N T E N T I N  M I C H I G A N, 1950 •  175
and living conditions and of support by the Department of Labor, many blam-
ing Sierra Berdecía directly: “Mr. Berdecía has not taken care of us after we 
left the airport in Isla Grande. Tell me Mr. Governor, if you were one of us, 
what would you do?”73
Workers held the government responsible for their situation, including 
the governor himself, and asked him to intervene in the situation: “You are 
the one called to solve this critical situation of ours, since we are the ones 
that have taken you to the position in which you are now.”74 Other workers 
lamented that the Puerto Rican government “has left us at the mercy of the 
whims of our employers. . . . Either we get paid or we run away.”75 Address-
ing “the government of Puerto Rico,” workers in Owosso, Michigan, declared 
that “the abuse and exploitation by farmers has been so oppressive that many 
of our comrades have gone on strike.” The workers charged that after hear-
ing their complaints, the representative of the Department of Labor urged 
them to keep working. “Is this what our government representative has to 
say to us?” they asked. “If so, we will have no alternative but to escape or kill 
ourselves.”76
On July 18, El Imparcial requested a government investigation into the sit-
uation of workers in Michigan, stating that the vast number of letters describ-
ing the same situation showed that it was not merely the complaints of a few 
lazy workers or of those feeling nostalgia for their country. The newspaper 
charged that “there is enough proof that there exists a state of oppression 
and exploitation against Puerto Rican workers in Michigan” and urged for a 
government investigation “to see what the true state of affairs is and to pro-
tect Puerto Ricans, if the situation requires it.” The editorial, referring to John 
Steinbeck’s classic novel recounting the hardships experienced by a migrant 
family during the Dust Bowl era, The Grapes of Wrath, argued for “a protective 
hand to be extended to our brothers, so they do not have to pick the ‘grapes 
of wrath.’” The newspaper also requested that the government should have a 
permanent representative in Michigan to deal with the problems facing the 
migrant workers there.77 Earlier, El Imparcial had reported on the contradic-
tion implied by the expedition of Puerto Rican workers to save the sugar beet 
crop in Michigan. Some asserted that the government’s migration policy was 
leaving the island’s agriculture (particularly sugar) without enough of a labor 
force. Others raised the issue that since Congress had reduced Puerto Rico’s 
sugar quota to 86,718 tons while keeping that of domestic sugar beet at 1.8 
million tons, by sending workers to Michigan, the island’s sugar industry was 
hurt: Puerto Rico’s sugar could replace Michigan’s quota if its sugar beet crop 
was lost.78
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Some of the letters regarding the Michigan situation questioned the ratio-
nale for a migration policy. After demanding the “repatriation” of workers 
from Michigan, farmworker Serafín Ramos urged that “this sad affair should 
serve as a warning so that in the future the government does not sponsor 
migrations of this kind, which always end in failure.”79 Pedro Cruz and twelve 
other workers in Michigan decried their terrible working and living condi-
tions, claiming to be without work and pay, suffering physical abuse by their 
employer, and living in conditions “worse than in a jail.” The letter continued, 
“This is the second time I’ve been on these expeditions and I think this is the 
last one for me.”80 Joan Menéndez, from the Michigan fields, also questioned 
the validity of migratory labor: “I’m sure that no Puerto Rican will return 
here to give away his labor to these Yankee millionaires. We will not be fooled 
again.”81
People in Puerto Rico began to share the pains suffered by farmworkers in 
Michigan, blaming the government for their awful situation there:
What is the government of Puerto Rico doing, since it was the insular 
Department of Labor which sponsored emigration of Puerto Rican workers 
to foreign lands? Will it allow our compatriots to be worked like slaves and 
their families perish of hunger? What do Sierra Berdecía and Muñoz Marín 
have to say about this?82
During this period, El Imparcial began to publish letters from people in 
Puerto Rico affected by the situation of farmworkers in Michigan. Angela Var-
gas Pagán showed El Imparcial her husband’s letters from Michigan, which 
described his situation there as a “concentration camp” and “worse than hell.” 
His only remittance was one dollar, given to him by an American woman to 
buy milk; he decided to send the money home to feed his six children.83 The 
newspaper also reported on the situation of Dora Torres de Rivera Oquendo, 
pregnant with two children, who had received no word or money from her 
husband working in Michigan and had been evicted from her public hous-
ing apartment.84 By the end of July, many farmworkers were returning from 
Michigan—with no money, sick, and undernourished—telling their “horror” 
stories regarding their experience in sugar beet fields there.85
Perhaps as disconcerting for Muñoz Marín and the government’s migra-
tion policy makers as the Michigan situation was what it meant for their 
migration policy; the political implications of migrant discontent in Michi-
gan were evident in the workers’ letters. In a letter addressed to Muñoz Marín 
by “Five thousand workers from Alma, Michigan,” titled “We are no longer 
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Populares” (PPD supporters), the workers threatened the governor with politi-
cal reprisals in the next election, stating that
the five thousand workers that are here now are no longer ‘Populares.’ Do 
not count on us for the next elections . . . we will snatch from you the [elec-
toral] victory. With the votes of suffering people you will not be elected again 
since you have to know how we are suffering and you have sent no one.86
Another letter from workers in Michigan, this time addressed to Santiago 
Mari Ramos, president of the Puerto Rican Independence Party chapter in 
Mayagüez, clearly stated, “You can count on our votes, we will make you win 
in ’52, because after what Governor Muñoz Marín has done to us none of the 
5,400 workers who are working here want to have anything to do with him 
ever again.”87 Incidentally, in the 1952 election, the PIP received 19 percent of 
the vote, its highest ever.
The Puerto Rican government had to contend not only with the nega-
tive press coverage that the Michigan experiment was receiving in Puerto 
Rico but also with the attention paid by the Michigan press to the plight of 
Puerto Rican farmworkers in the sugar beet fields there. Reports in the Michi-
gan press described the “deplorable plight” of Puerto Rican workers in the 
sugar beet fields and accused the employers of a “policy of short-sightedness 
combined with a cold, impersonal attitude toward the workers.” It noted that 
island workers vowed not to return to Michigan and that many were already 
leaving.88 Many island workers discontented with their conditions ran away 
from the farms and moved to nearby communities, particularly to Detroit. 
The accusations and complaints raised by the farmworkers in the Puerto Rican 
press were confirmed by the press coverage and several state investigations 
that were carried out in Michigan. Puerto Ricans found in Detroit a comfort-
ing hand in the Mexican neighborhood, particularly in the Catholic parish, 
whose priest was deeply involved in the plight of the previous wave of Mexi-
can migratory workers in the Michigan sugar beet fields. According to him, 
some 10 percent of Puerto Ricans working in the sugar beet fields in 1950 
came to his parish seeking some kind of aid after leaving the farms before the 
end of their contract. He and others helped many Puerto Rican farmworkers 
to find jobs in the area, particularly in steel and auto plants. As Valdés noted, 
“a significant consequence of Operation Farmlift was that it resulted in the 
formation of a permanent Puerto Rican community in Detroit. Almost five 
hundred men who walked out of the beet fields in 1950 ultimately settled in 
the city.”89
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NEGOTIATING DISCONTENT
Many of the complaints expressed by the workers were known to the Puerto 
Rican government from the beginning of the Michigan expedition. From 
May 30 to June 19, two employees of Puerto Rico’s Migration Office in the 
United States, Eulalio Torres and Antonio Vega, went to Michigan to investi-
gate the working conditions faced by Puerto Rican workers in the sugar beet 
fields. Their report voiced many of the complaints expressed by workers in 
the Puerto Rican press. The workers complained that the growers were break-
ing the contract in terms of payment, paying by piecework instead of by the 
hour; that they were given only $5 a week as advance for food, which was not 
enough to cover their expenses; that their living quarters were overcrowded 
and unhealthy, with no running water or electricity; and that after weeks of 
work, they had received no payment at all. The report recommended more 
interpreters to facilitate relations between the workers and the employer and 
more orientation to the workers so they could finish their work contracts.90
After workers’ complaints kept surfacing on the press, Sierra Berdecía sent 
another team to investigate the situation in Michigan. This one was headed 
by Alan Perl, labor adviser to the Puerto Rican government. His July 17 report 
confirmed most of the complaints workers expressed in the press, which were 
also presented in the Torres report. Perl concluded that the biggest source of 
worker dissatisfaction was wage payment since workers had no idea of how 
they were paid or when. He criticized the employers for using different forms 
of payment not stipulated in the contract. But he stated that further discrimi-
nation must be employed in recruitment to avoid those workers not capable of 
doing the field work. Perl also suggested that additional analysis of the situa-
tion was warranted and recommended that the commissioner of labor should 
investigate the situation in person.91
After the recurring allegations of mistreatment and hardships in the local 
press by Puerto Rican workers in Michigan, Sierra Berdecía met with Muñoz 
Marín on July 19 to discuss the situation there. The governor requested the 
commissioner of labor to head a delegation that would investigate the farm-
workers’ program in Michigan. Along with Sierra Berdecía, the delegation 
included Francisco Collazo, of the Bureau of Conciliation and Arbitration; 
Howard Davidson, of the BEM; and Perl, Torres, and Vega. Each would look 
into a different area of Michigan where Puerto Ricans were working.92 El 
Mundo, closer to the government’s position on migration and relatively silent 
on the Michigan situation during this period, welcomed Sierra Berdecía’s 
investigation, stating that he should guarantee that the Michigan project 
would not fail since it would make possible future expeditions to other parts 
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of the United States and assure the continuance of Puerto Rico’s migration 
program.93 El Imparcial, more critical of the PPD government and its migra-
tion policy, added to this assessment of the situation that the success or failure 
of the Michigan expedition would have consequences for the legitimacy of the 
Puerto Rican government.94
Crawford welcomed Sierra Berdecía’s investigation. He had a big stake in 
the Michigan situation since he represented the sugar beet interests in Michi-
gan and as such had lobbied the Puerto Rican government to send workers to 
that area. He was also one of the strongest supporters of granting Puerto Rico 
its own constitution, a bill for which was under discussion precisely at that 
time.95 It was widely acknowledged in Michigan that Puerto Rican workers 
had saved that year’s sugar beet crop. William Dorvillier, an El Mundo cor-
respondent in Washington, stated that “Crawford’s devotion to Puerto Rican 
interests has been paid in a practical way locally in his district.” He added that 
Crawford’s friendship with Muñoz Marín not only saved the sugar beet crop 
but probably also furthered Crawford’s reelection campaign in the coming 
November elections. Dorvillier claimed that Puerto Rican officials were deeply 
concerned that the government’s biggest supporter in Congress might not be 
reelected.96 Meanwhile, discontent among Puerto Rican workers was still run-
ning high. Some complained that they had no knowledge of Sierra Berdecía’s 
investigation, nor had they seen the commissioner visit the Michigan fields. 
Others said they had sent their complaints to Congressman Marcantonio in 
search for remedy to their plight.97
Sierra Berdecía submitted his report to Muñoz Marín on his investigation 
of the situation of workers in Michigan on August 16, 1950. He confirmed the 
seriousness of the situation facing Puerto Rican workers in Michigan, charac-
terized by inadequate housing and food services, as well as breach of contract 
in terms of the amount of wages paid and the method of payment. Michi-
gan growers had repeatedly violated a contract signed with the workers and 
approved by his department. Puerto Rican workers were paid less than half of 
the average wage paid in the beet industry; further, their low earnings were 
not paid every two weeks, as stipulated in the contract. Workers’ complaints 
that they had no money to satisfy their basic needs and to send back home 
to sustain their families were more than justified. In addition, workers had 
been paid by a fixed scale determined by the growers and not by the amount 
specified in the contract.98 El Mundo welcomed the results of Sierra Berdecía’s 
“impartial” investigation, requesting that the government do everything in its 
power to uphold the contract signed by workers and remedy their situation; 
if not, the government should not allow any more workers to go to Michi-
gan.99 El Imparcial also applauded Sierra Berdecía’s report and its conclusions, 
All Rights Reserved. Copyright © The Ohio State University Press, 2017. Batch 1.
180 •  C H A P T E R 6 
acknowledging that the government finally realized “the importance of this 
issue, since it was related to the success or failure of the export of workers on 
a large scale.” After questioning the political motives of the Michigan project 
(to support Crawford), it agreed that future emigration plans could be imple-
mented only if the government assured the workers that the farmers would 
comply with the contracts.100
Prior to the publication of the report, Sierra Berdecía had written to 
MFC’s director, Max Henderson, that he would not support the continuance 
of Puerto Rican workers in Michigan unless growers “completely rectify the 
situation,” including additional payment for work already done and full com-
pliance with all the terms of the contract. Two days after Sierra Berdecía’s 
report, Crawford wrote to Muñoz Marín requesting a rapid solution to the 
situation, “in view of the fact of the unsettled attitude of the Puerto Rican 
workers.”101 Crawford accused Sierra Berdecía of playing politics with his 
report and denied any abuse of Puerto Rican workers in Michigan, adding 
that any complaints about wages and working conditions in the sugar beet 
fields should be sent to the U.S. secretary of agriculture, who was in charge of 
setting the standards in those areas. Henderson also accused Sierra Berdecía 
of playing politics and accused him of being responsible on equal terms for 
the situation of Puerto Rican workers in Michigan.102 In response to Crawford, 
the commissioner of labor defended his report and blamed MFC for the situa-
tion of Puerto Rican workers in Michigan. Furthermore, Sierra Berdecía pub-
licly rebuffed Henderson’s proposal to employ fifteen thousand Puerto Ricans 
in the future, stating that what MFC’s farmers should do is to abide by the 
contract already signed with the workers.103 Even El Imparcial, not given to 
praising Sierra Berdecía, defended him from the accusations raised by Craw-
ford and Henderson and supported the measures approved by the government 
to benefit the workers in Michigan.104
On August 20, the Puerto Rican legislature approved a bill providing 
$117,400 to aid workers in Michigan. The bill, sponsored by Muñoz Marín, 
declared a state of emergency regarding the living conditions faced by Puerto 
Ricans in Michigan. The law was signed by the governor on August 24 and 
allowed the commissioner of labor to provide financial aid to any worker who 
was under contract in Michigan and had started working between May 31 and 
June 18, whether he was still in Michigan or had moved to any other state. 
The worker had to be in economic need and in the process of moving to a job 
in any part of the United States or returning to Puerto Rico.105 The New York 
Times claimed that the appropriations allowed by the bill were not only to 
“meet the workers’ needs but to prevent them from becoming social burdens 
on the community in which they were situated.”106 This was probably one of 
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the major concerns for the Puerto Rican government in the Michigan situa-
tion and in agreement with its migration policy.
On August 25, Governor Muñoz Marín sent a letter to Puerto Rican work-
ers in the sugar beet fields in Michigan. He stated that he had requested the 
Division of Public Welfare to provide financial aid to the neediest of those 
worker’s families that had not received remittances due to the lack of payment 
by employers. The governor also announced new working conditions agreed 
with the MFC, including a salary of not less than sixty-five cents per hour to 
be paid weekly, an effort to improve housing conditions, and additional pay 
of one dollar per acre worked in the sugar beet harvest. He affirmed: “Under 
these conditions and in view of the Company’s agreement with me, my advice 
is that you stay on the job. .  .  . In order to keep a relationship of good faith 
with the people of Michigan .  .  . you should make every effort to finish the 
harvest.” He added that the government was willing to provide aid to those 
interested in finding jobs in other parts of the United States after the harvest 
in Michigan was finished. The governor asked the workers to write to him 
directly if there was a breach of contract so that “it could be resolved with 
the company, which I am sure will be eager to correct any inadvertent breach 
of their commitment to me.”107 On August 21, Muñoz Marín informed both 
Crawford and Henderson that he would ask Puerto Rican workers to remain 
in Michigan and finish the harvest. In this communication, Muñoz Marín 
implied that he was playing a delicate balancing act between the workers and 
the Michigan sugar beet interests. On August 22, Henderson thanked Muñoz 
Marín, since “your timely intervention has saved this program both for pres-
ent and future.”108 Later that year, Crawford won his reelection, news reported 
on El Mundo’s front page, along with the other headline that Senator Tydings 
and Congressman Marcantonio—both “champions of independence”—had 
lost their bids for reelection.109
By the end of August, the situation appeared to have changed little, as 
indicated by two official accounts. In a letter to Muñoz Marín, Luis Rivera 
Santos, administrator of social programs of the International House in Chi-
cago, recounted his recent visit to the Michigan fields to interview Puerto 
Rican workers. He declared that workers were still disappointed that they 
had not been paid for the first half of the harvest and that they could not 
send money back home. He criticized MFC and indicated that many work-
ers had looked for employment in industries near the area.110 A report from 
the Migration Office’s Torres reaffirmed the situation. He indicated that only 
about two thousand workers remained in Michigan, most of them working in 
the pickle fields until the end of the sugar beet harvest began. He stated that 
“the workers have developed an anxiety state of mind to leave the sugar beets 
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territory, that it will take super salesmanship to retain them for the harvesting 
of the sugar beets.” He denounced the MFC for not improving the working 
conditions and not paying workers the hours agreed on in the contract. He 
reaffirmed that many workers were leaving the Michigan fields and getting 
jobs elsewhere, making the coming sugar beet harvest uncertain in terms of 
required manpower.111
A memo from the Migration Division’s director, Manuel Cabranes, to 
Sierra Berdecía dated August 23, 1950, is even more specific on the Michi-
gan situation. Cabranes stated that only $53,925 was used from the amount 
approved by the Puerto Rican government. Of the 5,300 workers in Michi-
gan sugar beet fields at the beginning of the season, only 1,709 received any 
government help; the remaining 3,591 went back to Puerto Rico or moved to 
other parts of the U.S. mainland. Cabranes claimed that the discontent that 
Sierra Berdecía witnessed during his July visit to the camps was “complicated 
with the confusion created in workers’ minds with the approval of the law.” To 
this he added: “This confusion was encouraged and exploited in New York by 
followers of former congressman Marcantonio and other elements disaffected 
with the Puerto Rican government.”112
Problems with the application of the law appeared immediately. Work-
ers who had been employed in Michigan but were working in other places 
appeared in New York’s Migration Office demanding funds to return to Puerto 
Rico. Sierra Berdecía argued that those holding jobs could not benefit from 
the law and that doing so could set a bad precedent, since many workers in 
the East Coast would make the same demand. He asserted that the money 
approved by the law could provide for transportation to only 1,565 workers.113 
Puerto Rican workers picketed the Migration Office, demanding to be flown 
back to the island. Cabranes declared that only the sick or incapacitated could 
be repatriated to Puerto Rico; otherwise, money would be given only to those 
seeking new jobs on the mainland.114
The New York Times reported that of the 5,500 Puerto Rican farmworkers 
in Michigan, only 900 were flown back to the island; around 3,000 stayed in 
the United States, with nearly 1,300 moving to farms in New Jersey and others 
staying in Detroit or going to New York.115 El Imparcial reported that Torres 
and two other migration functionaries remained in Michigan to ensure that 
the beet farmers abided by the labor contract. It also noted that of the 5,500 
initial workers in Michigan, only 916 renewed their contracts with MFC.116 
According to Sierra Berdecía, of the 5,514 workers in Michigan that summer, 
1,721 received a total of $80,961.48 in compensation. He also declared that as 
of June 1951, the Migration Division had collected $87,661.62 from MFC on 
behalf of workers due to claims of unpaid labor.117 In December 1950, Cabranes 
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informed BEM director Pagán de Colón that Torres had returned to the New 
York office since the sugar beet season had ended, and any worker remaining 
in Michigan would be on his own.118 The 1950 Michigan expedition for Puerto 
Rican farmworkers had officially ended.
But the 1950 fiasco experienced by Puerto Rican migrant workers in Mich-
igan did not end the relationship of island laborers with that state’s sugar beet 
industry. In mid-March 1952, Crawford sent a letter to Muñoz Marín request-
ing another expedition of Puerto Rican migrant workers to the sugar beet 
fields of Michigan. The plea included a new contract by MFC that guaranteed 
a specific number of working hours to laborers and a set wage standard. They 
requested a thousand workers from Puerto Rico. Crawford asked the governor 
for a prompt consideration of the proposal, since the sugar beet crop was to 
begin soon.119 It seems to be no coincidence that Crawford’s new petition hap-
pened to arrive during the congressional debate for the approval of the Com-
monwealth constitution in 1952—much like his first petition to Muñoz Marín 
for workers in 1950 was delivered in the midst of the debate in Congress for 
the approval of Public Law 600, allowing Puerto Ricans to write their own 
constitution.
An ad hoc committee was created to discuss Crawford and MFC’s pro-
posal. It was chaired by the University of Puerto Rico’s chancellor, Jaime 
Benítez, and included Sierra Berdecía, BEM’s Pagan de Colón, Pedro Muñoz 
Amato from the Planning Board, and economic adviser Millard Hansen. 
Sierra Berdecía elaborated on the 1950 experience of Puerto Rican workers in 
Michigan and “expressed his interest in trying to help Mr. Crawford in a way 
that could be satisfactory to the workers.” Although there was some question-
ing about sending workers to Michigan again, the committee concluded:
However, in view of the necessity that the Michigan Field Corps has for 
Puerto Rican workers to take in the crop, and in view of the friendship which 
Congressman Crawford has shown for the Island it was thought that every 
effort should be made to arrange for workers to go to Michigan.
The committee then agreed that workers should not be sent unless sufficient 
working hours were guaranteed, standards of employment were satisfied, and 
the Department of Labor was assured that the contract terms were going to 
be complied with. Muñoz Marín later informed Crawford of the committee’s 
discussion, stating that some workers could be sent to Michigan.120 Eventu-
ally some 190 workers were sent there to work on the 1952 harvest. Still, some 
government officials expressed doubts about allowing Puerto Ricans to return 
to Michigan and questioned the working arrangements.121 El Diario de Nueva 
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York, the most important Hispanic daily in the city, criticized the Puerto Rican 
government for allowing Puerto Rican farmworkers to return to Michigan, 
arguing that this action was a measure to placate Crawford in a period when 
the Puerto Rican constitution was under debate in Congress.122 Even after the 
1950 fiasco, employers in Michigan showed their interest in recruiting Puerto 
Rican workers, without any success.123 The Puerto Rican government never 
again organized another farmworkers’ expedition to the state.
IN THE AFTERMATH OF MICHIGAN
The incidents related to the Michigan expedition in 1950 had important con-
sequences for Puerto Rico’s migration policy. The Michigan incident makes 
visible the active role played by Muñoz Marín not only in the formulation 
but also in the implementation of Puerto Rican migration policy and illus-
trates the importance of migration for the governor and the PPD government. 
Migration policy was not an afterthought for Muñoz Marín and other top 
government policy makers, a policy to be formulated and implemented by 
second-level functionaries. Michigan demonstrates how Muñoz Marín was 
directly involved in approving farmworkers’ expeditions to the North and in 
the approval of labor contracts. When discontent emerged in Michigan, the 
governor intervened directly to mediate between workers and employers. Fur-
thermore, when workers’ discontent threatened to wreck the Michigan expe-
dition and thus endanger future migration expeditions to the United States, 
Muñoz Marín used his legitimacy to keep workers in Michigan, appealing to 
them directly as the charismatic leader of the island. Muñoz Marín and Sierra 
Berdecía intervened personally to make sure labor contracts were complied 
with by employers, that air transportation was safe and reliable, and that labor 
discontent in U.S. farms was minimal and taken care of by government offi-
cials. Finally, the Michigan incident shows the workings of the Puerto Rican 
government as a labor contractor, a subject I will examine more carefully in 
the next chapter.
Valdés points out another lesson of the Michigan expedition for the Puerto 
Rican government and U.S. employers: not to underestimate the unwilling-
ness of Puerto Rican farmworkers to accept abuses by the government or 
employers:
Industry calculations erred first by underestimating the Puerto Rican work-
ers, who had many years of experience in agriculture on the island, were 
much more aggressive in defending their rights than were Mexican Ameri-
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cans, and who expected employers to abide by contract terms. They pre-
ferred not to work rather than endure abuses.124
Indeed, Puerto Rican farmworkers going to the United States came mostly 
from the sugar industry and were highly radicalized, politicized, and well 
organized in Puerto Rico. They were very supportive first of the Federación 
Libre de Trabajadores (FLT) and then of the Socialist Party, the main working 
class organization and political party, respectively, of Puerto Rican workers 
in the first three decades of the twentieth century. After the 1934 strike, sugar 
workers abandoned both the FLT and the Socialist Party and supported the 
radical General Confederation of Workers and the PPD.125 After Michigan, 
the Puerto Rican government would be more conscious of screening workers 
going to do farmwork in the U.S. mainland, but it also became more attentive 
to workers’ demands and complaints in the United States.
The Michigan incident brings to mind the 1947 “Puerto Rican problem” in 
New York City, and in a sense, they might be comparable. In both cases there 
was a sustained public debate in the press and calls for the Puerto Rican gov-
ernment to assume a more active role in the situation. But there are important 
differences to keep in mind. The “Puerto Rican problem” in New York was 
caused by individual, or “spontaneous,” migration to that city; it was a reaction 
by the host society to the entry of these migrants. This incident is significant 
in Puerto Rican migration history because it was a central factor in the for-
mulation of the government’s migration policy. The incidents in Michigan, in 
contrast, reflected the travails and dilemmas of organized migration under the 
Puerto Rican government’s Farm Placement Program. Migrant discontent in 
Michigan called into question the government’s organized migration program 
for the first time.
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Puerto Ricans as Migratory Labor,  
the State as a Labor Contractor
U.S.  COLONIALISM in Puerto Rico created an economic space in the terri-
tory that allowed U.S. corporations to exploit Puerto Ricans as cheap labor 
beginning in 1898. The economic, social, and political changes that emerged 
after the 1940s did not change this situation. Under Operation Bootstrap, the 
Puerto Rican government gave subsidies to U.S. corporations that included 
local tax exemption and a vast source of cheap labor that was not fully pro-
tected by U.S. labor laws. One of the areas of autonomy of the reconstituted 
colonial state under the Commonwealth status was its continued exclusion 
from specific federal laws approved by Congress, like minimum wage and 
environmental protection.
Puerto Ricans also became a significant source of cheap labor in the 
United States after 1945. They were regarded as such from the time they began 
to move to the United States. What was qualitatively and quantitatively new 
was the massive number of Puerto Ricans leaving the island after World War 
II. For over a decade, tens of thousands of Puerto Ricans moved to the United 
States, most of them on their own, to areas of the American Northeast. They 
worked mostly in low-paying jobs in labor-intensive manufacturing indus-
tries, in the service industry, and in agriculture. Thousands more left the 
island every year as farmworkers under contract, in expeditions organized 
and managed by the Puerto Rican government. They were considered migrant 
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workers, as part of that army of exploited farmworkers moving from one place 
to another in search of agricultural work in the U.S. mainland.
One consequence of the Michigan expedition was the insertion of Puerto 
Rican farmworkers into the debate regarding the status of migratory labor 
in the United States at the end of the 1940s. As migratory labor, they joined 
large numbers of domestic workers, largely African Americans and Chicanos, 
and of alien laborers who worked in U.S. agriculture, mostly Mexicans—both 
legal braceros and undocumented immigrants—and West Indians. Reflecting 
the status of their homeland, Puerto Rican farmworkers occupied a liminal 
position within the structure of U.S. migratory labor: they were not deemed 
domestic labor by the U.S. government and employers but neither were they 
completely alien, given their citizenship. They enjoyed the protection of a 
government-sponsored contract, like Mexican and West Indian alien labor, 
but they could not be deported, like domestic labor.
In the first section of this final chapter, I use the report by President Tru-
man’s Commission on Migratory Labor to examine the status of Puerto Rican 
farmworkers as migrant labor in the United States and the working of the 
Puerto Rican government as a labor contractor: an intermediary between 
Puerto Rican farmworkers and U.S. agricultural interests. The Puerto Rican 
government became a provider of reliable cheap labor to American agricul-
tural employers. This is an important reason why Puerto Rican farmworkers 
were hired in American agriculture for decades.
The last two sections discuss the specific workings of the Farm Place-
ment Program (FPP) and the Migration Division in the United States. The 
FPP is the clearest example of an organized migration program by the Puerto 
Rican government and reflects its role as a labor provider to American agri-
cultural interests. Once Puerto Rican migrants moved to the United States, 
the Migration Division would provide information on jobs and social services 
to facilitate their incorporation in American society. Furthermore, through 
its employment program, the Migration Division also functioned as a labor 
provider of unskilled labor to low-paying manufacturing industries in the 
United States.
THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON MIGRANT LABOR: 
PUERTO RICANS AS MIGRATORY WORKERS
The director of the Bureau of Employment and Migration (BEM), Petroamé-
rica Pagán de Colón, stated in a report to Governor Muñoz Marín in Decem-
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ber 1949, “Our workers have joined the group of migratory workers in the 
United States and they move from region to region where there are job oppor-
tunities.”1 By 1950, particularly after the incidents in the sugar beet fields of 
Michigan, Puerto Rican farmworkers became part of the United States’ debate 
on migrant labor. In June 1950, President Truman appointed a presidential 
commission to study the situation of migratory workers in the United States. 
The plight of Puerto Rican migrant workers figured prominently in the hear-
ings held by the presidential commission.
According to Kirsten, the commission “represented a noble but futile 
effort on the part of the Truman administration to bridge the difference 
between organized labor and agribusiness over immigration policy and to 
rationalize the use of alien labor.”2 A major concern that led to the creation 
of this commission was the issue of Mexican labor, both legal braceros and 
undocumented immigrants. Representatives of labor argued that Mexican 
workers, both bracero and undocumented, were displacing American work-
ers; they stressed that agricultural interests preferred undocumented workers, 
who were more easily exploited and subject to deportation after their work 
contract ended. Agricultural interests contended that the continued need for 
alien labor resulted from a lack of interest by American workers in performing 
agricultural work. Representatives of American labor reasoned that domestic 
labor would carry out farmwork if wages and working conditions improved. 
After the NAACP and other African American and Hispanic organizations 
complained that the conditions of domestic labor were not included in the 
commission’s proposed agenda, Truman ordered the commission to study the 
labor conditions of this group as well. Nevertheless, Truman did not appoint 
any African American or Hispanic representatives to the commission.3
Hearings by the president’s Commission on Migratory Labor were held in 
Trenton, New Jersey, and the situation of Puerto Rican migrants workers there 
figured prominently in those proceedings. Asked if all Puerto Ricans went 
back to the island after finishing their contract, John G. Sholl, from the New 
Jersey migrant labor bureau, answered that some went to New York in the 
first year, and added: “New Jersey has not had a single case of relief for Puerto 
Ricans, however. Most of them go back to their home island with a good roll 
of bills in their pockets.” He stated that farmers were satisfied with their work. 
New Jersey’s secretary of agriculture also praised Puerto Rican workers, saying 
that farmers generally preferred them because they were “good workers, came 
from rural areas, were well behaved and single.”4
The last round of hearings by the commission was held in Saginaw, Michi-
gan, in the heart of Congressman Crawford’s district. There, too, the plight 
of Puerto Rican workers in that state would play an important part in the 
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hearings. Crawford argued that the hearings, scheduled to start a day before 
primary elections, were aimed at hurting him politically—that unions trying 
to organize agricultural workers were behind the commission’s hearings in 
an attempt to harm agricultural interests and him in particular. He criticized 
Sierra Berdecía for playing into the hands of union interests by criticizing 
sugar beet farmers in his report on Puerto Rican workers in Michigan. Craw-
ford maintained that even if it hurt him politically in Michigan, he would 
still defend the right of Puerto Ricans to work in the Michigan fields. Muñoz 
Marín had to intervene to indicate that the Puerto Rican government still 
considered Crawford a friend of the island and had no political agenda against 
the Michigan congressman.5 The Puerto Rican government was trying hard 
to maintain Crawford’s crucial support for its agenda of political reforms in 
Congress. Crawford won the primary and the right to represent his Michigan 
district once again.6
The first person to testify in the Saginaw hearings was precisely Craw-
ford. He stated that Puerto Rico’s “fantastic overpopulation” required an 
extensive plan of migration of at least twenty-five thousand per year. Accord-
ing to Crawford, the American government had two options: “Either we let 
them work or we send them financial aid. If we cannot provide them with 
opportunities for work they will disintegrate at the expense of the American 
taxpayer.”7 Also testifying that day was MFC’s Henderson, who declared that 
enforcing federal regulations would have ruinous consequences on Michigan’s 
sugar beet industry. In his statement, Henderson elaborated on the disastrous 
situation experienced by Michigan sugar beet farmers with Puerto Rican 
farmworkers in the 1950 season, claiming that difficulties with these workers 
arose from several misunderstandings regarding working conditions and pay. 
He basically blamed the Puerto Rican government, arguing that “a very poor 
job of briefing the men in Puerto Rico was done with the result that the men 
did not understand the terms and conditions of work properly and many of 
them came under the impression they were working on an hour basis” instead 
of being paid by piecework. He found fault with their living conditions in the 
fact the “these men being without the women” were not able to do their cook-
ing and cleaning and “soon found themselves living in filth.” Henderson stated 
that MFC would still hire a small number of Puerto Ricans in the future, but 
under a “special system of supervision, housing, feeding, and payment.” The 
MFC representative argued that until sugar beet production was fully mecha-
nized, a foreign labor program would still be required in the industry.8
The panorama presented by several Puerto Ricans who had worked in the 
Michigan sugar beet farms in the 1950 season was vastly different from that 
portrayed by Crawford and Henderson. Santos Cintrón, who left a wife and 
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seven children in Puerto Rico to go to work there in June, testified that after 
eight weeks of work, the Michigan Sugar Company contended that he owed 
them $9.69 for deductions of food, housing, and transportation. Cintrón left 
the Michigan farms and moved to Detroit, where he made $75 a week working 
in a steel plant and was able to send $45 a week to his family back home. A 
similar story was told by Martín González, who had survived the June Westair 
crash and, like Cintrón, had abandoned the sugar beet field for a steel plant 
in Detroit. Father Clement Kern, of the Holy Trinity Church in Detroit, gave 
testimony of similar stories from the more than one hundred Puerto Ricans 
who had gone to this parish seeking aid and shelter. He testified about pay 
statements of $10, $13, and $16 for a period of four weeks’ work. A spokesman 
for the Michigan sugar beet industry told the commission that the workers’ 
working and living conditions could not be improved “until we prove that 
the sugar beet industry is profitable.” The deputy commissioner of Michigan’s 
Department of Labor testified that the farmers had the resources to pay the 
workers fair salaries and provide them with decent living conditions.9
After several days of hearings before the presidential commission, it was 
evident that Puerto Rican workers in Michigan were mistreated and deceived. 
Representatives of social service agencies in Saginaw explained how the work-
ers were misled and not properly advised in terms of the working and liv-
ing conditions and wages to be expected in Michigan. A representative of 
Michigan’s Labor Department argued for stricter federal regulations on migra-
tory farm labor, particularly on the sugar beet industry. There were no com-
plaints against Puerto Rican workers from the community or agricultural 
representatives.10
The commission’s report to the president was made public on April 7, 1951. 
It presented a strong condemnation of the appalling working and living condi-
tions of migratory workers in the United States.11 The report remains the best 
document on the working and living conditions of this group of workers in 
American agriculture at this time of history. Nevertheless, none of the main 
recommendations presented by the commission—like giving domestic labor 
priority over foreign labor in agricultural jobs—were implemented. In fact, 
a year after the report was made public, Congress approved Public Law 78, 
extending the Bracero Program, in blatant contradiction to a major recom-
mendation by the commission.
The report established that what made a person a migratory worker was 
not the kind of work he did but “whether he maintains a stable home the year 
round.” Other areas of the economy depended on seasonal work, but “it is 
only in agriculture that migratory labor has become a problem of such pro-
portions and complexity” as to require government intervention and study. 
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The single most important reason for workers to become migrant laborers “is 
that many people find it impossible to make a living in a single location and 
hence have had to become migratory” (5).12 By 1950, migratory labor repre-
sented almost one-fourth of the agricultural labor in the United States. Of the 
close to one million migratory workers, half were domestic workers and the 
other half were foreign workers, most of them Mexicans, with a smaller num-
ber of West Indians and Puerto Ricans (3, 6).13
The report characterized migrant workers as “children of misfortune,” be 
it in the United States or in foreign lands: “They are the rejects of those sec-
tors of agriculture and of other industries undergoing change.” Domestic and 
foreign migratory workers shared many experiences of work and exploita-
tion; they moved through the nation in search of work, “but they neither 
belong to the land nor does the land belong to them.” Both were marginal 
and excluded in the nation and in the communities they worked for. The 
differences between domestic and foreign migratory workers in the terms 
of economic and social status and job security were none: “Under the law, 
the domestic migrants are citizens of the United States but they are scarcely 
more a part of the land of their birth than the alien migrants working beside 
them.” They worked everywhere but belonged nowhere. Communities wanted 
their labor, yet declined “to accept them as full members of the community.” 
Although migratory workers worked in the same places, doing similar jobs, 
they did not join forces in defending their common interests (3). Not only 
citizenship status divided them, but race and ethnicity, too.
One characteristic element faced by all migratory workers was that their 
work was seasonal, and they worked for specific periods of time, sometimes 
very short, at the whims of the employers. Farm employers 
want a labor supply .  .  . ready and willing to meet the short-term work 
requirements and which, on the other hand, will not impose social and eco-
nomic problems on them or on their communities when the work is fin-
ished. . . . The demand for migratory workers is thus essentially twofold: To 
be ready to go to work when needed; to be gone when not needed.
To avoid the problems related to family migrants, “many farm employers pre-
fer alien labor” (16). Wages for migratory workers were very low, particularly 
compared to manufacturing jobs; in 1949 the average earning for farmwork 
was $5 per day, with a yearly income of $514. Migratory workers worked an 
average of 101 days per year (70 days of farmwork and 31 days of nonfarm-
work) (125, 128). Harsh treatment, low wages, and no job security explained 
why very few farmworkers returned the next year to their previous employer. 
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Migratory workers enjoyed almost none of the social protections extended 
to industrial workers, like unemployment benefits, social security, disability 
insurance, sickness pay, or minimum wage protection (17–19).
Migratory laborers worked mostly in cotton, fruits, vegetables, and sugar 
beets. Although they provided only 3 to 4 percent of the American agricultural 
output, their labor was significant at the critical periods of crop production. 
Migratory farmworkers were employed in a small number of large and highly 
specialized farms that employed a great quantity of labor. The approximately 
125,000 such farms represented 2 percent of all American farms, and their 
crop production constituted 7 percent of all farm products. These laborers 
proliferated in those crops less amenable to mechanization. After the end of 
the war, increased agricultural production did not imply more jobs, as mecha-
nization extended throughout. By 1949, only 40 percent of all farmworkers 
could get eight or more months of work per year (7–10). The commission’s 
report questioned the contradictory nature of U.S. policy on alien labor. Most 
alien labor was used in large-scale farms that represented only 2 percent of all 
of the nation’s farm units. The use of cheap alien labor gave these large farms, 
owned by big agricultural companies or corporations, a competitive advantage 
over smaller, family-owned farms (22).
Although North American migratory workers and alien labor in agri-
culture faced similar working and living conditions, they experienced differ-
ent situations that were defined by their citizenship status. Ironically, alien 
labor enjoyed more government-provided protections than did American 
farmworkers:
Domestic migratory farm workers not only have no protection through col-
lective bargaining but employers as a rule refuse to give them the guaran-
tees they extend to alien contract workers whom they import. These include 
guarantees of employment, workmen’s compensation, medical care, stan-
dards of sanitation, and payment of the cost of transportation.
Like the Mexican bracero and the West Indian laborer, the Puerto Rican farm-
worker enjoyed a contract and the protection and representation of his gov-
ernment. Domestic farmworkers, nevertheless, “have one security which alien 
contract labor does not have: Whether they quit or are discharged, they can-
not be deported” (5). Although considered in most ways as alien labor, Puerto 
Ricans enjoyed one right in common with other domestic workers: as U.S. cit-
izens, they could not be deported. Puerto Rican farmworkers were, in a sense, 
in a more advantageous position than alien and domestic migratory workers.
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THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON MIGRANT LABOR:  
THE PUERTO RICAN GOVERNMENT AS A LABOR 
CONTRACTOR
Puerto Ricans occupied a peculiar position within the structure of the U.S. 
migratory labor system: like the status of their island or their citizenship, they 
moved within the borders of the domestic and the foreign in the American 
polity. Even though they were U.S. citizens, their status had many similari-
ties with that of foreign labor; however, even though they were considered 
by many as alien labor, they enjoyed rights of citizenship. Unlike the domes-
tic migrant labor force, Puerto Ricans were protected by their government, 
like Mexicans and West Indians—that is, like foreign labor. But like domestic 
workers, they could move within the borders of the nation without fear of 
deportation. Although they were not usually considered part of the domes-
tic supply of labor, they were not seen as alien labor, either. When the presi-
dent’s Commission on Migratory Labor reported in its main conclusion that 
the United States should decrease its dependence on alien labor for agriculture 
and create more jobs opportunities for its workers, it also recommended: “To 
meet any supplemental needs for agricultural labor that may develop, prefer-
ence [should] be given to citizens of the offshore possessions of the United 
States, such as Hawaii and Puerto Rico” (36). That is, when the need arises, 
these particular U.S. citizens should receive preference over alien workers.
One important conclusion that comes from reading the report by the pres-
ident’s Commission on Migratory Labor is the extensive and significant role 
that governments played in providing alien labor to American agriculture. As 
the report concluded, during and after World War II, “government was the 
labor contractor.” The report is referring here to the U.S. government, but the 
same could have been said of the foreign governments that were supplying 
labor to American agriculture, like Mexico, the Bahamas, and Jamaica. The 
same can also have been said of Puerto Rico, which, although technically not 
a foreign government, is treated as such throughout the report. In all of these 
cases, these governments were functioning as a labor contractor, that is, as 
intermediary agents regulating and organizing the movement of labor from 
their territories to the United States in order to provide labor to agricultural 
employers. There is a difference, though, in the procedure to implement this 
movement of labor between the Mexican experience and the West Indian 
and Puerto Rican ones. In the case of the Bracero Program, the governments 
of Mexico and the United States entered into an agreement that was later 
accepted by the workers and the employer. In this agreement, employers paid 
transportation costs, and there was no penalty for the workers if they aban-
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doned work. In the West Indian and Puerto Rican cases, agricultural employ-
ers came to an agreement directly with these governments, which provided a 
contract stipulating the working conditions and responsibilities for both the 
employers and employees. Recruitment was mostly carried out by the govern-
ment, and transportation was organized by the employer but paid for by the 
worker. The agreement allowed the employer to make deductions from the 
worker’s pay to cover transportation costs, meals, and housing, as well as any 
other expenses included in the agreement. There was no mechanism estab-
lished to settle disputes related to working and living conditions, as existed in 
the Mexican agreement. Work desertion in the West Indian case—as it would 
be in the Puerto Rican experience—was lesser than in the Mexican program 
due to the “vulnerability of the British West Indian workers to financial disci-
pline, as provided in their agreements” (48). The report made clear the differ-
ence between the Mexican agreement and the West Indian and Puerto Rican 
ones:
Mexico is the only country which requires an intergovernmental agreement; 
by coincidence, Mexico is the country which is ostensibly least interested in 
having its nationals do farm work in the United States. The greater concern 
of the British West Indies and of Puerto Rico to allow their people to enter 
into farm employment is reflected in the terms of their agreements, all of 
which are somewhat less costly to employers in one respect or another than 
is the Mexican agreement. (51)
Puerto Rican policy makers—from Muñoz Marín down—asserted throughout 
many decades that it was the government-approved contract and thus their 
government’s protection that differentiated island farmworkers from other 
domestic workers in the United States. They claimed that the Puerto Rican 
government had to fight farm employers to get them to accept the contract 
and thus provide some basic protections and benefits for island migrant work-
ers. But contrary to what these government functionaries argued, it was pre-
cisely because these workers had a contract that they were employed in the 
United States.
This discussion leads us to important questions: Why were Puerto Ricans 
hired to do farmwork in the United States? What was their comparative advan-
tage over other alien workers or other domestic workers? The contract might 
be a reason: although it offered some important protections for Puerto Rican 
workers that other domestic workers did not enjoy, it also provided certain 
benefits to employers that made these workers attractive for hiring. To agri-
cultural employers, dealing directly with the Puerto Rican government as a 
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provider of labor guaranteed a reliable and safe source of labor when needed. 
And unlike agreements with contract alien labor, dealing with the Puerto 
Rican government, an authority from a U.S. territory, avoided all the bureau-
cratic entanglements of diplomatic understandings with foreign nations like 
Mexico, the Bahamas, or Jamaica. The Puerto Rican government provided a 
reliable labor force since it did all the screening and selection before signing 
the workers into a contract and did its best to ensure that the workers would 
return to the island. Through its migration agencies in Puerto Rico and the 
United States, the Puerto Rican government encouraged its workers to comply 
with their contract and return home and never to disturb the communities 
where they worked. Even when these workers did not return home, which was 
often, they would move to cities far away from the communities where they 
had been working, and once they were there, the Puerto Rican government 
would do its best through its Migration Division offices to find them work and 
help in their incorporation into American society. One stipulation that ben-
efitted employers in the labor contract provided by the Puerto Rican govern-
ment was the so-called prevailing wage agreement. Puerto Rican functionaries 
boasted that their contract guaranteed Puerto Rican workers the same wages 
earned by other domestic workers and that island labor did not lower wages 
in the areas where they worked. Nonetheless, the prevailing wage was not set 
by the federal government nor by collective negotiations, but by the farmers 
themselves before the beginning of each season. The presidential commis-
sion’s report characterized the prevailing wage as “worse than meaningless.” It 
argued that a wage that was set by the employer with “no regard to whether it 
is a sufficient wage to attract workers” has no value in determining the price 
of labor in this area. It continued: “This is especially true when contract for-
eign workers are brought in at the arbitrary wage rate which then inevitably 
tends to set the pattern of wages in the locality.” That is, the prevailing wage 
was used by employers to keep wages below their true value in the labor mar-
ket. As a consequence, the prevailing wage standard set in the contracts with 
foreign labor, including Puerto Rico, was used to depress wages for domestic 
farmworkers. Contrary to the prevailing wage standard in industrial employ-
ment, there was no collective bargaining in agriculture setting the price of 
labor. As a consequence of this mechanism, domestic labor was not attracted 
to agricultural work, and thus an artificial scarcity of labor would require the 
importation of foreign labor (59–61).
The hiring of Puerto Rican workers was possible only after USES had 
established a shortage of domestic workers for the industry and allowed the 
importation of foreign workers to satisfy that demand. But the presumed labor 
shortage existed because the prevailing wage rate was insufficient to attract 
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domestic workers. Domestic workers also faced another disadvantage with 
regard to alien and Puerto Rican workers since they had no contract that 
provided certain benefits and protections. Thus, the Puerto Rican govern-
ment reproduced and benefitted from a system that kept wages depressed for 
domestic workers and allowed the employment of Puerto Rican farmworkers 
in the United States for wages that were lower that what the market would 
establish. That is, Puerto Ricans were employed in agriculture because their 
labor was cheaper than the available domestic labor supply.
But would not the other workers’ benefits of the Puerto Rican labor 
contract increase the price of their labor with respect to domestic workers? 
Indeed, but the contract also offered another element that was beneficial to 
employers: the Puerto Rican government as a labor contractor. By accepting 
the contract, the Puerto Rican government guaranteed employers an orga-
nized and reliable source of labor, something that domestic migratory labor 
could not offer. Although USES determined labor shortages and the areas in 
need of labor, it did not organize the movement of labor from one region to 
the other; in fact, the commission’s report was highly critical of the agency in 
this regard.14 Migrant workers had to move on their own, often with families, 
or get work through the use of private labor contractors. The latter served as 
intermediaries between the workers and the employers. As the report stated: 
“The labor contractor system is essentially a means by which the employer of 
migratory farm workers avoids the responsibilities of obtaining and managing 
his labor” (91). But the use of private labor contractors was often problematic 
for employers. Although employers would have little contact with the work-
ers, the workers would often have conflicting relationships with contractors. 
Many contractors would steal from the workers’ pay, charge exorbitant fees 
for finding employment, and mislead them regarding their working and liv-
ing conditions; more often than not, they would leave the farm after delivering 
the workers. The first expeditions of Puerto Rican farmworkers after the end 
of the war were organized by private contractors; the host of problems these 
created for workers and local communities was one of the given reasons for 
the government’s intervention in the migration of farmworkers.
According to the commission’s report, worker desertion in farms using 
labor contractors was high, and workers would not return the next year to 
work in the same place, forcing employers to devote time and resources every 
year to the process of contracting of workers. The use of labor contractors 
was not the most efficient means of getting labor. On the other hand, “when 
the employment occurs under the contractual relationship which legal aliens 
and Puerto Ricans have, there is no occasion for the labor contractor or the 
crew leader to introduce himself as an employment intermediary.” Although 
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“foreign and Puerto Rican work contracts” provided workers with guaran-
teed wages and terms of employment that could increase labor costs for the 
employer, they also provided “stability in the employer-employee relationship” 
(105). The contract and the intervention of governments provided alien and 
Puerto Rican contract labor with a means to deal with grievances, contrary 
to what “the typical domestic migrant has, which is to move on to something 
else, if he feels he has been treated unjustly” (106).
Another major advantage of alien and Puerto Rican contract labor was 
that their governments could guarantee large numbers of workers to associa-
tions of agricultural employers, something that individual migrant workers 
or even private labor contractors could not do. By the early 1950s, the Puerto 
Rican government was dealing almost exclusively with farmers’ associations 
like the Michigan Fields Corp., the Garden State Service Cooperative Asso-
ciation, the Glassboro Service Association in New Jersey, and the Minnesota 
Canners Association. These were four of the best examples of agricultural 
associations mentioned in the commission’s report, and all four hired labor 
from Puerto Rico. Encouraged by the U.S. government, these associations 
proliferated during World War II as a mechanism to provide labor to Ameri-
can agriculture. They allowed farmers and companies to pool their resources 
to hire large numbers of workers and guaranteed that they could fulfill the 
requirements of the labor contracts.15 The Puerto Rican government would 
provide many workers, but only to these associations. These associations 
allowed individual farmers to have access to a secure source of Puerto Rican 
workers through the pooling of labor, that is, sharing workers throughout a 
season in order to guarantee the minimum number of working hours required 
by the Puerto Rican contract (160 hours for a four-week period). Organiz-
ing the pooling of labor on such a scale with domestic migrant workers was 
much more time-consuming and costly for farm employers. Furthermore, the 
Puerto Rican government implemented a very exhaustive process of screen-
ing and selecting workers in Puerto Rico in order to provide U.S. agricultural 
employers with a reliable labor force for the duration of the contract.
As the report by the Presidential Commission on Migratory Labor con-
cluded, the labor contract given to alien labor, the relationship with for-
eign governments, and the creation and expansion of farmers’ associations 
provided American agriculture with some “orderly” relations. In fact, the 
commission concluded that it was having an impact in improving working 
conditions for domestic migrant labor (174). By the early 1950s, Puerto Rican 
farmworkers, through the government’s FPP, had become part of American 
agriculture’s migratory labor system. The Puerto Rican government played a 
fundamental role in this process.
All Rights Reserved. Copyright © The Ohio State University Press, 2017. Batch 1.
198 •  C H A P T E R 7 
ORGANIZING PUERTO RICAN LABOR FOR U.S. 
AGRICULTURE
After the United States took over the island in 1898, Puerto Rico became a 
source of cheap labor for U.S. corporations largely based on certain constitu-
tional and legal exclusions from the American polity sustained by the notion 
of the unincorporated territory justified by the Supreme Court in 1901. But 
these exclusions remained even after Puerto Ricans became U.S. citizens 
under the Jones Act of 1917. For example, Puerto Ricans were excluded for 
decades from the federal minimum wage approved by Congress under the 
New Deal, something that Congress could do under the legal and constitu-
tional exceptions approved by the Supreme Court for the territory. And even 
though the PPD had emerged in 1938 as a party of reform and of “social jus-
tice” for workers and peasants, by 1947 its Operation Bootstrap model for eco-
nomic development was designed to market Puerto Ricans as cheap labor to 
U.S. corporations as one major incentive for these to settle on the island. The 
Commonwealth status approved in 1952 allowed Puerto Rico to enjoy fiscal 
autonomy over local matters so that the island government could keep offer-
ing local tax exemptions and cheap labor to U.S. corporations going to Puerto 
Rico. And although the Commonwealth status was supposed to represent a 
new era in U.S.–Puerto Rico relations, the island remained an unincorpo-
rated territory of the United States. Thus, the island’s marginal standing in 
the American polity allowed Puerto Rico’s government to use the territory’s 
exclusion from certain federal laws—like minimum wage and environmental 
protection—as incentives to attract American capital to the island.
Months after the government approved the Industrial Incentives Act in 
1947 that launched Operation Bootstrap, another act with far-reaching con-
sequences for the island was approved: the Migration Law. Although less 
remembered than its economic counterpart, this law is of equal significance 
for the island’s postwar social and economic development. It acknowledged 
that the organization and encouragement of migration would be government 
policy from then on. Migration functionaries liked to say that the govern-
ment’s migration policy was the other face of Operation Bootstrap. And, 
indeed, it was. While Operation Bootstrap sought to provide cheap labor to 
U.S. corporations going to Puerto Rico, its migration policy allowed Puerto 
Ricans to work in U.S. agriculture and other areas of the American economy 
as cheap labor as well.
The Puerto Rican government became a labor contractor that, by moving 
farm labor from Puerto Rico to the U.S. mainland, provided a source of cheap 
labor to U.S. agriculture. According to Sierra Berdecía, the BEM, “facing the 
All Rights Reserved. Copyright © The Ohio State University Press, 2017. Batch 1.
 P U E R TO R I C A N S A S M I G R ATO RY L A B O R •  199
surplus of unemployed workers in agriculture during the dead season .  .  . 
has acted as an intermediary between workers and mainland employers who 
need workers precisely during the same season.”16 The BEM became part of 
USES after the approval of the Wagner-Peyser act of 1950. Under this system, 
U.S. agricultural employers justified their demand for labor and requested 
Puerto Rican workers to satisfy these needs. Through its employment offices 
in Puerto Rico, the BEM evaluated and selected the workers able to go to the 
United States. These workers would go there with a contact approved by the 
Puerto Rican government. Once in the United States, these contract workers 
were serviced by the Migration Division. It made sure that employers abided 
by the contract and provided services for the “integration and adaptation” of 
the workers to their new environment. BEM opened regional offices in Puerto 
Rico’s major municipalities: San Juan, Ponce, Mayagüez, Arecibo, Aguadilla, 
Caguas, Humacao, and Guayama. Another branch office was opened in 1950 
at the airport.17
The BEM’s Farm Placement Program was designed to move the surplus 
labor from the decaying sugar industry to U.S. farms. Unlike other sugar-
producing areas, the sugar industry in Puerto Rico did not experience mech-
anization because of the excess supply of cheap labor on the island; “as a 
consequence, the agricultural phase of the sugar industry in Puerto Rico finds 
itself in a primitive state of technological development which hinders it from 
paying wages adequate to the living necessities of our workers.”18 Total employ-
ment in agriculture decreased from 203,000 workers in 1950–51 to 164,000 in 
1954–55, and the total number of unemployed workers in agriculture increased 
from 21,000 in 1946–47 to 37,000 in 1950–51. The overwhelming majority of 
the unemployed in agriculture came from the sugar industry: from 15,000 in 
1946–47 to 27,000 in 1950–51.19 The number of unemployment benefit claims 
in the sugar industry increased from 98,628 in 1949–50 to 125,099 in 1952–53, 
with almost all claims coming from workers in the agricultural field. Never-
theless, the number of unemployment claims in the sugar industry decreased 
to 85,690 in 1956–57, in large measure as a consequence of migration and the 
government’s FPP.
Even with the impact of migration in providing employment for the work-
ers in the sugar industry, the unemployment rate in agriculture increased from 
14.9 percent in 1953–53 to 17.8 percent in 1954–55. By 1960, agricultural work-
ers represented only 24 percent of the island’s labor force, and sugar workers 
represented only 36 percent of all those working in agriculture.20 Not only 
was agriculture decaying in Puerto Rico, particularly the sugar industry, but 
the wages on the island were far lower than those in American agriculture. 
In 1959–60, for example, the prevailing wage set by the Puerto Rican govern-
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ment’s contract for farmworkers going to the U.S. mainland was 80 cents per 
hour, with higher rates in tobacco harvesting, at 95 cents per hour, and $1 per 
hour in flower farms and greenhouses. In Puerto Rico that same year, the 
highest hourly wage in agriculture was paid in the industrial phase of sugar 
manufacturing, at 68 cents, while working in the cane fields paid 44 cents. 
Hourly wages in other agricultural areas were even lower: 45 cents at poul-
try farms, 43 cents in pineapple farms, 40 cents processing tobacco leaves, 37 
cents at flower farms, and 28 cents at minor crop farms.21
One of the consequences of the Michigan experience in 1950 was that 
the Puerto Rican government placed more attention on the screening and 
selection process of farmworkers going to the United States under the FPP. In 
order to avert the extensive discontent among farmworkers due to the living 
and working conditions in farm camps and to reduce the number of workers 
abandoning work before the end of their contract, labor functionaries made 
clear to prospective migrants the duties and conditions they would face on the 
U.S. mainland. The Department of Labor described the orientation process by 
1952 as follows:
Local offices receive copies of the clearance orders from the central office 
and the quota of workers allocated to each of them. The local farm labor 
representative makes a preliminary selection of the best qualified workers to 
fill the order and called-in them. Complete orientation is given to the work-
ers before selection by the employer or his representative as to the following 
points: 1) place of employment 2) name of employer 3) transportation to the 
mainland 4) wages 5) duration of the work agreement 6) kind of work to 
be performed 7) working conditions in labor camp 8) insurance policies 9) 
duties and rights of workers 10) compliance with the contract 11) importance 
of identification cards 12) any other matter of interest to the workers.22
By this time, the local offices of the Farm Placement Program had to provide 
the BEM with a register of not only those interested in migration but those 
ready to move at little notice.23
By 1952 the Department of Labor had intensified the screening and selec-
tion process for prospective farmworkers going to U.S. farms. For example, it 
required a set of documents necessary for the worker to apply to go to U.S. 
farms under the government’s contract, including a birth certificate, a health 
certificate from a government health clinic (no more than six months old), a 
police certificate of good behavior to attest that the applicant had no criminal 
record (not older than six months), a reference letter from a farmer confirm-
ing that the applicant was a “bona-fide” farmworker, $30 for air transporta-
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tion, and an identification photo. The signed reference letter from the farmer 
had to include information regarding the applicant’s agricultural jobs and 
whether the worker was “efficient and responsible in carrying out agricultural 
tasks.” The purpose of this requirement was to exclude all those unable to do 
the arduous and demanding farmwork in the United States and thus prevent 
worker desertion. The application form for the FPP also required that workers 
detail their working experience and the specific agricultural tasks performed. 
The police certificate would exclude not only those with a criminal record 
but also those linked to political or labor union activism. After workers were 
selected, labor officials provided them with a photo ID to be presented at the 
time of departure in Puerto Rico and arrival at a United States airport and 
at the farm contracted for work. The ID was used for identification purposes 
for the placement program, as proof of citizenship in the U.S. mainland, and 
to prevent unauthorized persons from going to the United States under the 
placement program. Recruitment was held at the local offices of the Depart-
ment of Labor or at specific town halls throughout the island.24
A flyer for the BEM’s Farm Placement Program is quite indicative of the 
department’s marketing toward prospective migrants. It featured a big drawing 
of a jíbaro con pava (the traditional peasant with a straw hat—also the sym-
bol of the PPD) with the words “TRABAJADOR AGRICOLA” (farmworker). 
“If you are planning to work in the United States” described the advantages 
of going to do farmwork with a government contract, which guaranteed a 
$10,000 air flight insurance paid by the employer; an employer’s bond to pro-
vide payment, health insurance, compensation insurance for work-related 
accidents, wages and work for 160 hours per four weeks, and adequate hous-
ing; and no labor contractor fee.25
As shown in table 6, the number of Puerto Ricans leaving the island to 
settle in the United States increased dramatically after 1947–48, according to 
Department of Labor statistics. Net migration (departures minus arrivals) in 
the 1950s reached a peak of close to 75,000 in 1952–53 and a low of nearly 
14,000 in 1960–61. Total migration from 1947–48 to 1960–61 was 558,388, for 
an average of nearly 40,000 migrants per year during this period. The Depart-
ment of Labor argued that the ebb and flow in the number of people leaving 
the island was due to pull factors (job availability) in the United States. During 
this period, the department characterized these migration statistics as “indi-
vidual migrants” leaving the island on their own; this conclusion was based 
on the idea that workers going to the U.S. mainland under the FPP returned 
to the island after ending their work contract.26 On the other hand, as shown 
in table 7, the flow of agricultural workers going to the United States under 
the FPP kept a steady pace throughout the decade. From 1951–52 to 1960–61, 
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some 129,372 farmworkers were placed in U.S. farms (a total of 152,253 since 
1947–48) for an average of close to 13,000 per year; this movement of work-
ers reached its peak during this decade in 1956–57, with nearly 16,000 place-
ments. The number of farm placements by the government program stayed 
the same throughout the decade, while the number of migrants going on their 
own varied from year to year, influenced by the vagaries of the labor market 
forces. In fact, while net migration decreased during the 1960s, in part due to 
better economic conditions on the island, the number of workers placed in the 
United States by the FPP increased steadily during this period. That is, while 
individual migration fluctuated and even decreased in the 1960s, the migra-
tion flow organized by the government kept a steady pace and even increased 
in this period. In addition, the Department of Labor estimated that between 
10,000 and 15,000 farmworkers went on their own to the United States every 
year to work in agriculture.27
The first group of Puerto Rican farmworkers going to the United States 
under the government’s placement program went to New Jersey; later, other 
farm employers began to hire Puerto Ricans in Pennsylvania, Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, Indiana, New York, Minnesota, Washington, Delaware, Michi-
gan, and Wisconsin.28 As shown in table 8, by the mid-1950s the overwhelm-
ing majority of Puerto Rican workers in the FPP went to four states: New 
TABLE 6















Sources: GPR, Comm. Labor: Eighteenth Annual Report 1948–49, table 5; Nineteenth Annual Report 1949–50, 
63; Twenty-Seventh Annual Report 1960–61, 60.
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Jersey, Pennsylvania, New York, and Connecticut, with the largest contingent 
by far going to New Jersey. During this decade, New Jersey agricultural inter-
ests hired around half of all Puerto Rican contract laborers.
The number of agricultural cooperatives and individual employers hir-
ing Puerto Ricans under contract increased after the creation of the FPP in 
Puerto Rico. In 1948, four employers hired island farmworkers, eight did so 
in 1949, fourteen in 1950, and thirty-six in 1951. But by the end of the decade, 
the vast majority of farm placements by the Puerto Rican government were 
concentrated in just a few agricultural associations. In 1957–58, for example, 
9,948 of the 12,180 farm placements were hired by the Garden State Service 
Association, a mega-union of agricultural cooperatives and associations in 
the Northeast, mostly in New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Connecti-
cut. But even here, the distribution was highly skewed: the Glassboro Service 
Association from New Jersey alone hired 5,772 Puerto Ricans, close to half of 
all placements that year.29 By the end of the 1950s, the Puerto Rican govern-
TABLE 7






1947–48 2,533  — 2,533
1948–49 5,796  — 5,796
1949–50 8,846 3,966 12,812
1950–51 5,706  —  —
1951–52 12,491 8,108 20,599
1952–53 14,417 13,167 27,584
1953–54 14,088 10,751 24,839
1954–55 11,628 10,683 22,311
1955–56 11,750 13,885 25,635
1956–57 15,776 11,720 27,496
1957–58 12,180 11,147 23,327
1958–59 11,728 10,482 22,210
1959–60 11,733 12,767 24,500
1960–61 13,581 10,954 24,535
*Placements of farmworkers by the Bureau of Employment and Migration in Puerto Rico.
Sources: GPR, Comm. Labor: Nineteenth Annual Report 1949–50, 60; Twenty-First Annual Report 1951–52, 39; 
Twenty-Third Annual Report 1953–54, 47–48; Twenty-Fourth Annual Report 1954–55, 55; Twenty-Third Annual 
Report 1956–57, 51; Vigésimo Cuarto Informe Anual 1957–58, 66–67; Twenty-Fifth Annual Report 1958–59, 42, 
57; and Twenty-Seventh Annual Report 1960–61, 53, 61.
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ment was indeed a labor contractor for American agriculture, but just for a 
few major farm conglomerates.
The Puerto Rican government functioned not only as a provider of farm 
labor from Puerto Rico to U.S. agricultural interests but also as an intermedi-
ary between Puerto Rican labor and other employers in the U.S. mainland. 
The Migration Division was created to facilitate the integration and adapta-
tion of Puerto Ricans in the United States. Among its many functions was to 
find employment for Puerto Ricans already settled in the U.S. mainland. From 
1951–51 to 1960–61, the division’s employment program placed 113,664 persons 
in the United States (see table 7). Like the FPP in Puerto Rico, the division’s 
job placement program kept a constant pace throughout the decade of close 
to 12,000 placements per year. The majority of job placements by the Migra-
tion Division in the United States were in low-paying manufacturing jobs. The 
total number of job placements in the United States by the Puerto Rican gov-
ernment during this period—be it through the Farm Placement Program in 
Puerto Rico or the Migration Division in the United States—reached 243,036.
TABLE 8
PUERTO RICO FARM PLACEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES, BY STATE AND SELECTED 
FISCAL YEARS
1955–56 1957–58 1958–59 1959–60 1960–61
Connecticut 1,200 829 1,992 1,477 2,070
Delaware 210 591 863 1,127 1,284
Illinois — — — — 20
Indiana — — 62 95 25
Maine 9 33 30 28 41
Maryland 106 161 175 164 252
Massachusetts 875 512 457 453 563
Michigan — 56 23 22 —
New Hampshire 46 101 84 78 100
New Jersey 6,704 6,503 6,619 6,476 6,882
New York 2,536 1,788 1,108 962 1,446
Ohio — — 4 7 6
Pennsylvania 1,903 1,600 1,443 818 875
Rhode Island 21 6 25 — 5
Wisconsin — — 6 26 12
Total 12,180 13,610 11,728 11,733 13,581
Sources: GPR, Comm. Labor: Twenty-Fifth Annual Report 1955–56, 47; Vigésimo Cuarto Informe Anual, 1957–
58, 79; Twenty-Fifth Annual Report 1958–59, 42; Twenty-Seventh Annual Report 1960–61, 69.
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THE MIGRATION DIVISION:  
GUIDING THE INCORPORATION OF INDIVIDUAL MIGRATION
While the FPP provided farm labor to U.S. agricultural interests, the Migra-
tion Division’s functions were more complicated. It also functioned as an 
intermediary between Puerto Rican labor and U.S. employers, and in addi-
tion it had to fulfill the task of promoting the incorporation of Puerto Ricans 
in the United States. While the government in Puerto Rico could mobilize 
the administrative structures of the colonial state to organize and encourage 
migration, the workings of the Migration Division in the United States were 
somewhat more complex and delicate. This extension of the Puerto Rican gov-
ernment in the United States functioned as a labor provider to U.S. employers, 
but it had additional functions as an intermediary between Puerto Ricans and 
the American polity: between Puerto Ricans and the different state structures 
in the United States (federal, state, local) and between islanders and the Amer-
ican community in general. For several decades, the Puerto Rican government 
through the Migration Division became the “representative” of Puerto Ricans 
in the United States for employers and government institutions at multiple 
levels.30
The primary function of the Migration Division was to “orient and advise” 
those Puerto Ricans living in the United States in their “adaptation” and incor-
poration to American society. For the most part, the division focused on those 
going to the U.S. mainland on their own; that is, it was created to oversee the 
flow of individual migration settling in the United States. Since the formula-
tion of its migration policy, the Department of Labor tried to influence the 
movement of those who migrated to the United States on their own, always a 
greater number than those going to work on government contract. As stated 
in the department’s 1948–49 annual report:
The Bureau tries to reach these people through the radio with talks on cli-
mate, food, living and working conditions and information on requirements 
for entrance into the public schools. They are constantly warned of the dan-
ger of unscrupulous persons who might attempt to swindle them out of their 
money in their ticket fares, in cost of transportation upon arrival from the 
airport to their residence. They are advised as to the duties and responsi-
bilities of citizenship and information required by individual cases is gladly 
furnished. Conferences before groups are given in addition to printed and 
mimeographed material and personal interviews. The material is distributed 
through mayors, public welfare offices, vocational schools and other agencies 
of the Government.31
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In 1956, the department opened its Traveler Orientation Section, with offices 
throughout the island; its main function was to “orient and inform” prospec-
tive migrants regarding job and housing opportunities in the United States 
outside of New York City.
This program underlined for those planning to migrate the need to know 
English, to have a job or skill, to be in good health, and to be prepared to 
adapt to the culture and customs of the new country. That year, orientation 
committees for the island’s mayors were organized in a majority of munici-
palities, using these government structures to orient prospective migrants. 
Initially, the orientation program focused on agricultural workers going under 
contract to the United States, but after 1951 a greater emphasis was placed 
on those going on their own, which represented the bulk of Puerto Rican 
migration. In 1959–60, for example, migration functionaries made visits to 123 
towns and 70 rural districts to provide orientation to prospective migrants, 
using both films and printed material. The department estimated that 170,000 
persons were oriented though this program that year.32 The department’s ori-
entation office at the San Juan International Airport provided information 
and advice to those going on their own to the United States on issues regard-
ing jobs, education, and housing; it also offered counseling on other areas of 
settlement outside of New York City and tried to discourage those interested 
in moving to Florida and other Southern states.33
The Migration Division was in charge of providing orientation and ser-
vices to Puerto Ricans once they moved to the U.S. mainland, including those 
who came under the FPP. By 1956, the Migration Division had twelve offices in 
the United States, mostly in the Northeast, where Puerto Ricans were working 
or settling by then. In addition to the central office in New York and the two 
main offices in New York and Chicago, there were local offices in Hartford, 
Connecticut; Boston; Keyport and Camden in New Jersey; Rochester, Middle-
town, and Riverhead in New York, and Hamburg, Pennsylvania.34 La oficina 
de Puerto Rico (or the Commonwealth office) became a kind of consular office 
for many Puerto Ricans in the United States. Even in New York City, the oldest 
U.S. community, the division replaced Congressman Marcantonio as a pro-
vider of services and protection for the tens of thousands of newcomers from 
the island. As table 9 shows, as the Puerto Rican community increased in size 
during the 1950s, so did the number of visitors to division offices throughout 
the United States. Even though the operations of the Chicago office increased 
during this decade—reflecting the growing community there—the New York 
office remained the biggest in terms of functionaries and services provided, a 
reflection of the status of the city as the major Puerto Rican settlement in the 
United States.
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TABLE 9










1948–49 19,320 19,320 — 10,815*
1949–50 18,450 18,450 7,451 14,361**
1950–51 16,332 16,332 — 9,874**
1951–52 26,833 26,833 — 20,022**
1952–53 45,321 33,783 11,538 23,141**
1953–54 54,835 37,348 17,487 27,578**
1954–55 57,673 41,118 16,555 30,112**
1955–56 61,973 41,961 20,012 32,462**
1956–57 70,027 45,374 24,553 54,980***
1957–58 84,671 53,792 19,533 53,996***
1958–59 82,487 54,128 17,977 59,202****
1959–60 80,884 52,672 21,378 66,326****
1960–61 77,523 52,987 19,815 67,483****
*Total number of persons seeking services in all of the U.S. offices of the Migration Division.
**New York Office only.
***New York and Chicago offices only.
****All Migration Division offices.
Sources: Data from GPR, Comm. Labor: Nineteenth Annual Report 1949–1950, 62; Twenty-Fifth Annual Report 
1955–56, 53, 63; Twenty-Third Annual Report 1956–57, 56, 58; Vigésimo Cuarto Informe Anual 1957–1958; 
Twenty-Fifth Annual Report 1958–59, 57; Twenty-Sixth Annual Report 1959–60, 56–57; Twenty-Seventh Annual 
Report 1960–61, 53, 61.
As indicated by table 9, the most numerous of the services provided by 
the Migration Division was giving employment information to migrants; the 
majority of visits to its offices were people in search of jobs. When the Depart-
ment of Labor began to produce data in 1956–57 on the movement of people 
to and from the island, 33.8 percent of those who departed by air that year 
went to the United States in search of jobs; 70 percent were between the work-
ing ages of fifteen and forty-four years old.35
In 1955–56, the Employment Section of the New York office of the Migra-
tion Division referred a total of 11,835 persons for employment, out of which 
6,999 were hired. The overwhelming majority (74 percent) of old and new 
applicants that year were unskilled, and another 11 percent were semiskilled; 
the majority was male. Most of these placements (66 percent) were in manu-
facturing, followed by agriculture (15 percent), service (13 percent), and office 
and professional (6 percent). According to the Department of Labor, the 
major reason for these people not finding jobs was their lack of skills and 
English fluency. In that same year, the Chicago office referred 8,710 persons 
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for employment, out of which 7,009 were hired, mostly in manufacturing, fol-
lowed by services and lastly in agriculture.36 While a majority of placements 
by the BEM in Puerto Rico itself were in manufacturing, supplying labor to 
Fomento-subsidized plants, most of their placements in the United States were 
in agriculture, under the FPP. On the other hand, the majority of placements 
by the Migration Division were in nonagricultural jobs. For example, in 1954–
55, 5,768 of the 6,999 placements by the New York office and 2,480 of the 3,684 
placements by the Chicago office were in nonagricultural work.37 As with its 
counterpart in Puerto Rico, the BEM, the Migration Division placed Puerto 
Ricans in the United States in low-paying jobs in labor-intensive manufactur-
ing industries.
Besides its employment placement program, the Migration Division was 
structured to provide information and services to Puerto Ricans in other areas 
of their incorporation to American society. The Service Section was in charge 
of providing aid and support to Puerto Rican farm and manufacturing work-
ers in the United States placed by the government’s placement programs on 
the island and the U.S. mainland. The services provided included direct nego-
tiation for employment, inspection of agricultural camps and living quarters, 
visits to camps and factories to investigate working and living conditions and 
accidents in and outside the job, and intervention in wage claims and medical 
assistance. The section serviced 16,834 migrant workers in the United States 
in 1951–52, up to 22,088 in 1953–54, and 24,127 in 1954–55. In 1960–61, there 
were 20,145 island farmworkers spread over eleven states in the Northeast 
and Midwest. That year, division field workers made 1,113 visits to camps and 
farms where the Puerto Ricans worked: 516 visits were related to complaints 
filed by workers and employers, and 597 visits were to instruct both work-
ers and employers about the labor contract and its related rights, duties, and 
responsibilities. Some 5,948 workers were contacted personally that year.38
The major purpose of the division’s Identification Section was to give proof 
of citizenship to Puerto Ricans for employment, education, health, and wel-
fare services. The section also worked with state and city agencies regarding 
the correct verification and interpretation of documents from Puerto Rico. 
In addition, along with federal and state agencies, it implemented a cam-
paign against the fraudulent use of Puerto Rican birth certificates by undocu-
mented immigrants. In 1957–58, some 7,325 persons requested services from 
this section.39
The aim of the division’s Social Service Section was to aid Puerto Rican 
families in confronting the major issues of adaptation to U.S. society, like 
insufficient economic resources, domestic relations, health and welfare, juve-
nile delinquency, and other matters in the field of social work. The majority 
of problems presented by clients were related to economic matters, followed 
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by housing concerns and complaints and compensations. In 1957–58, a year 
characterized by an economic downturn, the New York and Chicago offices 
received 7,346 visits to the Social Service Section, mostly related to unemploy-
ment, housing, and welfare issues.40 In 1957–58, some 9,679 Puerto Ricans 
received assistance by the Travel Aid Society at the Idlewild International Air-
port; two Puerto Rican social workers employed by the Migration Division 
worked in this office to take care of island migrants.41
The Education Section functioned mostly to provide access to English 
learning materials and classes for Puerto Rican adults and children living in 
the United States. Its “Learn English” campaign distributed fifty thousand 
copies of the pamphlet “La llave del exito” (“The Key to Success”) in 1953–
54; it distributed two hundred and forty thousand pamphlets in 1957–58. In 
that year, the English campaign extended to twenty additional cities in the 
United States, and the New York City public school system expanded its Eng-
lish classes for Puerto Rican children and adults throughout the city.42 The 
Department of Labor claimed that ten thousand Puerto Ricans were enrolled 
in English classes for adults in the autumn of 1954 as a result of the Migration 
Division campaigns. This section also coordinated a teacher exchange pro-
gram between Puerto Rico and schools in the United States.43
Throughout the 1950s, the division’s Education Section and Community 
Organization Section organized the “Inscríbase y vote” (“Register and vote”) 
campaign, distributing tens of thousands of “Use su derecho a votar” (“Exercise 
Your Right to Vote”) pamphlets. In its 1960–61 annual report, the Department 
of Labor claimed that one of the “outstanding achievements” of the division’s 
work that year was “the tangible demonstration of the awakening interest in 
politics” by U.S. Puerto Ricans as a consequence of “the registering and voting 
campaign during the elections” in the United States that year.44 From 1957 to 
1959, the Information and Public Relations Section produced 1,422,200 prints 
of the division’s many publications. These included ones aimed at the Puerto 
Rican public, providing information on English programs, electoral registra-
tion, housing, employment, health services, and welfare services. There were 
also publications directed at the American public in general: these provided 
information on Puerto Ricans as American citizens, their culture, and their 
contributions to the local community.45
PUERTO RICO’S GOVERNMENT AND PUERTO RICANS’ 
UNCERTAIN FUTURE IN THE UNITED STATES
In the most extensive study of the Migration Division so far, Lapp argues that 
this institution failed to become an “ethnic representative” of the Puerto Rican 
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community in the United States. He called it “an ethnic bureaucracy manque,” 
an extension of the Puerto Rican government in the United States that had no 
constituency of its own and responded to the goals of the PPD government 
on the island.46 In the 1960s, the U.S. Puerto Rican communities developed 
their own leadership and agendas, pushing the division to the margins and 
developing their own representation in the American polity. The election of a 
pro-statehood government under the New Progressive Party in 1968 further 
delegitimized the division’s goals and internal functioning. Although the FPP 
lasted well into the 1970s, a lawsuit by apple growers questioning the need to 
hire Puerto Ricans under a labor contract finally put an end to the program.47
The limited success of the Puerto Rican government’s placement programs 
in Puerto Rico and the United States in finding not only good jobs, but jobs 
in general in the U.S. mainland, shows the limits of the colonial state as a 
labor contractor. Be it in agriculture, through the FPP, or in manufacturing, 
mostly through the Migration Division’s employment program, the Puerto 
Rican government for the most part channeled migrants to low-paying jobs 
with no long-term employment security and benefits. And although the gov-
ernment’s labor contract offered protections and benefits to island farmwork-
ers that domestic farmworkers largely did not enjoy, the actions of the Puerto 
Rican government in protecting these workers were not always the best. In 
general terms, the FPP benefitted U.S. agricultural interests. The fact that it 
sustained and reproduced the prevailing wage reflects how the labor contract 
was beneficial to American farm interests, in addition to providing them with 
a reliable and continued source of cheap labor.
Furthermore, the literature on Puerto Rican migration and the govern-
ment’s own records attest to the extensive and continued instances where 
farm employers broke the labor contracts with no major penalties and con-
sequences. Hundreds of boxes in Puerto Rico’s national archives belonging to 
the Department of Labor’s FPP are filled with farmworkers’ claims of contract 
violations.48 Furthermore, the fact that more Puerto Ricans decided to work 
in U.S. agriculture on their own with no government contract, as the depart-
ment continuously complained, reflects on how little farmworkers thought of 
the celebrated contract or the government’s protection. In general, the Puerto 
Rican government failed to confront farm interests with contract violations, 
be it in terms of contract duration, wages, or working and living conditions. 
The government’s own track record in enforcing the contract and its ideology 
of cooperation with farming companies undermined the validity of the labor 
contract itself.49 At the end, the Puerto Rican government’s FPP maintained 
and sustained the migratory labor system that benefitted U.S. agricultural 
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interests in the postwar period at the expense of the laborers it was suppos-
edly designed to protect.50
Despite the programs and services provided to Puerto Rican migrants in 
the United States by Puerto Rico’s government through the Migration Divi-
sion, significant sectors of the mainland community faced persistent rates of 
poverty and economic and social marginalization for decades. Although many 
Puerto Ricans experienced economic, social, and educational improvements 
after the 1950s, particularly second-generation cohorts, the economic and 
social indicators of the Puerto Rican community by the 1970s were rather dis-
mal, according to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights: in 1974, 32.6 percent 
of Puerto Rican families living in the United States remained in poverty, and 
85 percent of New York City’s one million Puerto Ricans lived in low-income 
neighborhoods. Puerto Rican family earnings were only 59 percent of the 
national average, 24.5 percent of Puerto Rican families received income from 
public welfare, and in 1972, 8.8 percent of Puerto Rican men and 17.6 percent 
of women were unemployed—rates higher than the national average. In addi-
tion, 60 percent of all Puerto Rican families living in poverty were headed by 
a female single parent.51 Not only were Puerto Ricans employed in low-paying 
jobs in agriculture, manufacturing, and services, but they settled primarily in 
areas of the Northeast facing deindustrialization in the postwar period—New 
York City is the best example—factors that were not conducive to their eco-
nomic and social mobility. Characterized by lower job skills, limited English 
fluency, and less education, large sectors of the immigrant generation continu-
ously faced lower indicators of economic and social achievements than the 
second generation.52 In addition to these factors, the commission stated that 
“the evidence is compelling that racial, ethnic, and sex discrimination are bar-
riers to job opportunities for Puerto Ricans.”53
While the Puerto Rican government cannot be blamed for the poverty that 
existed in Puerto Rico by 1945, its postwar economic model largely benefit-
ted U.S. capital and sustained an economic and colonial order that marketed 
Puerto Ricans as a source of cheap labor. Similarly, while the Puerto Rican 
government was not the cause of postwar migration, its postwar migration 
policies encouraged, promoted, and even organized the mass movement of 
people from Puerto Rico that forever transformed the lives of Puerto Ricans 
in the years to come. As Acosta-Belén and Santiago indicate, while tradi-
tional human capital models of migration argue that it is the highly skilled 
in the homeland society that are most likely to move, in the case of Puerto 
Rico, it was those considered surplus labor that the government encouraged 
to migrate to the United States in the postwar period.54 Despite its efforts to 
facilitate their incorporation into and adaptation to the metropolitan society, 
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the Puerto Rican government’s policies could not overcome the economic and 
social obstacles these migrants faced in the U.S. mainland. In concluding his 
widely influential study of the Migration Division, Lapp contends that the 
Puerto Rican government became an “apologist for an economic order that 
marginalized Puerto Ricans.”55
The Puerto Rican government’s Operation Bootstrap and migration pro-
grams were designed to provide economic, social, and political stability to 
Puerto Rico in the postwar period. While Operation Bootstrap presented an 
economic development plan to provide economic growth and industrializa-
tion as a means of turning the island into a modern and politically stable 
society, migration was supposed to ease the pressures created by the island’s 
overpopulation and allow the realization of the PPD’s economic and political 
goals. In the minds of Puerto Rican and American policy makers, the 1950s 
became the golden era of economic and political development in Puerto Rico. 
During the Cold War period, in an attempt to win the “hearts and minds” of 
peoples in the so-called Third World, the U.S. government presented Puerto 
Rico as a showcase of capitalist development and political democracy imbued 
with American ideals and institutions.56 Nowhere in the local, national, and 
global campaigns showcasing Puerto Rico was the mass migration of Puerto 
Ricans to the metropolitan territory mentioned as one major reason for the 
apparent economic success of this era.
The limits of Operation Bootstrap in providing continued economic 
growth became obvious by the late 1960s, as the labor-intensive, low-paying 
manufacturing enterprises that the program attracted to the island began to 
leave for other areas of the global economy with lower wages and restrictions. 
The situation became so critical that by the early 1970s, the federal govern-
ment had to intervene to prevent a furthering of the economic crisis and a 
possible social and political crisis as well. The increase in federal transfers to 
Puerto Rico sustained a weakened economy and a growing poor and marginal 
sector, as well as the colonial government. In addition, the metropolitan state 
once again used the island’s marginal position within the American polity as 
an unincorporated territory to create a special and protected space for U.S. 
capital with the Internal Revenue Service’s Section 936, which allowed Ameri-
can transnational corporations to produce huge amounts of profits on the 
island as the new bootstrap for economic growth and development. Although 
this metropolitan strategy benefitted American corporations, it created few 
jobs since mostly capital-intensive manufacturing plants came under this cor-
porate welfare scheme. The end of Section 936, along with massive corruption 
and incompetence by successive PPD and Partido Nuevo Progresista (PNP 
[New Progressive Party]) administrations, plunged the island in a spiral of 
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economic and social disarray that has persisted into the twenty-first century. 
The result has been a massive flow of people from the island, comparable 
to the great migration of the 1950s. By 2005, more Puerto Ricans lived in 
the U.S. mainland than in Puerto Rico. The 2010 census, for the first time in 
Puerto Rico’s history, marked an absolute decrease in population from the 
previous census. For many Puerto Ricans today, migration is seen as their 
best exit strategy in a crumbling economic, social, and political system. If in 
1947 Operation Bootstrap and migration were seen as two sides of the same 
strategy, by the beginning of the new century, when Operation Bootstrap is 
no more than a evanescent memory of a seemingly golden past, migration 
remains for hundreds of thousands of Puerto Ricans the only plausible alter-
native facing a collapsing colonial order that was created more than a century 
earlier. The postwar migration history of past generations of Puerto Ricans 
should not be lost to those following their paths today.
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